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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 “[…] in a political democracy it is nearly impossible to implement any 
theory of justice without sufficient support from the general public. 
This support will depend on the citizens' own values and preferences. 
Empirical research on the acceptance of notions of justice by different 
social groups is therefore essential to understand the social 
environment in which policy decisions are taken.”  
Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012, p.8) 
 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
The distribution of benefits and burdens among its members is one of society’s most 
important issues. Inequality is a major concern of economic scholars1, policy makers2, and 
international organizations 3 , often portrayed by the increased divergence of pre-tax 
income or wealth owned by those at the top and the bottom of the income/wealth 
distribution. The topic is also at the heart of public discourse with newspapers discussing 
problems of rising inequality prominently.4 The recently published first “World Inequality 
Report” introduces changes in inequality levels as an issue that “challenge(s) our most 
basic and cherished notions of justice and fairness” (Alvaredo et al., 2017b, p.22). Norton 
and Ariely (2011) further document that people prefer a distribution of wealth that is more 
equal than the actual one. 
                                            
1  See, for example, the World Inequality Database collecting and providing data on income and 
wealth inequality on a global level (https://wid.world/) coordinated by economists Facundo 
Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, as well as 
numerous papers on topics of inequality published by the latter (see, e.g., Piketty and Saez, 
2003; Saez and Zucman, 2016; Alvaredo et al., 2017a) and Thomas Piketty’s bestseller “Capital 
in the twenty first century” (2014). 
2  In 2013, ex-president of the United States of America Barack Obama described growing 
inequality as dangerous (The Washington Post, 2013). In 2017, the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (SPD) lead its electoral campaign with the slogan “Time for more justice” (English 
translation from the German original “Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit”), one proposal being higher 
taxes on top incomes (Böcking, 2018). 
3  The OECD, for example, has published a series of major reports on the issue of inequality in 
the last decade (see “Growing unequal” (OECD, 2008), “Divided we stand: Why inequalities 
keep rising” (OECD, 2011), and “In it together: Why less inequality benefits all” (OECD, 2015). 
4  See, for example, Stellinga and de Koning (2017), Hagelücken (2017), Marinić (2018), Eidelson 
(2018). These inequalities are viewed as unfair. The German national television has aired a 
three-part documentation discussing the injustice of rising inequality in Germany at prime 
time. “Ungleichland” was aired on the public television channel WDR in 2018 and has received 
a lot of public attention (see, for example, Frank, 2018; Gertz, 2018; Küppers, 2018). 
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In this thesis, I investigate individual motives for (re-)distribution. To alter the 
distribution of market incomes and wealth, governmental redistribution from richer to 
poorer members of the society is an important means to establish a more desirable 
distribution (Durante et al., 2014). Redistribution is achieved by tax and transfer systems, 
as well as by the provision of public goods such as education (Guillaud et al., 2017; 
Felbermayr et al., 2016; Dur and Teulings, 2003; Alvaredo et al., 2017a). The Gini index 
of incomes in the EU is reduced on average from almost 0.5 for market incomes to slightly 
below 0.3 after redistribution in 2017 (Niehues, 2018).5 In the US, in 2016, the Gini index 
after governmental redistribution was reduced by 23 percent as compared to the Gini 
index of market incomes (OECD, 2018a). Government spending on redistributive purposes 
comprises a huge share of total public expenditures. In the EU, in 2016, 41.2 percent of 
total government expenditure was spent on social protection alone (Eurostat, 2018). If 
expenditures on health and education with a large redistributional potential are included, 
this percentage rises to 66.7. 
Not least due to this significant degree of governmental redistribution, redistribution 
policy that is just in the eye of society is indispensable for social cohesion (Alvaredo et al., 
2017b). Whether such policies are perceived as just depends on people’s fairness 
considerations. Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) assert that “in a political democracy it is 
nearly impossible to implement any theory of justice without sufficient support from the 
general public. This support will depend on the citizens' own values and preferences” (p.8). 
Saez and Stantcheva (2016) emphasize the crucial role of society’s distributional fairness 
concerns for the design and evaluation of optimal taxation. Frohlich and Oppenheimer 
(1992) note that fairness judgments can influence, for example, the perceived fairness of 
tax systems as mechanisms for implementing redistributive policies. This, in turn, can 
have severe impacts on the acceptance of these systems and, thereby, ultimately of the 
political regime. Empirically, people’s distributional fairness concerns have been shown to 
be related to, among others, the probability of engaging in tax evasion (Barth et al., 2013), 
their political decisions (Fisman et al., 2017) and political orientations (Almås et al., 
2017). 6  It is therefore important to understand people’s motives for redistribution 
(Gaertner and Schokkaert, 2012).  
 
                                            
5  Data for EU SILC countries for which reliable data was available. The Gini index after 
redistribution is the Gini index of net incomes, i.e., market incomes minus taxes and social 
security contributions plus transfer payments (Niehues, 2018). 
6  Barth et al. (2013) show that the fairness ideal to consider income based on work effort as fair 
and income based on other factors as unfair can explain the probability of justifying and 
actually engaging in tax evasion. Results of Fisman et al. (2017) reveal that subjects who are 
more inclined towards equality as opposed to efficiency are more likely to have given their vote 
to Barack Obama in the 2012 elections, and also to be a member of the Democratic Party. 
Almås et al. (2017) show that preferences to reward luck and effort are related to political 
orientation. 
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1.2 OUTLINE 
This thesis is comprised of two parts. In the first part (Chapter II–IV), I focus on the role 
of concerns for the fulfillment of basic human needs as a behavioral motive for (re-) 
distribution. Securing basic human needs is at the heart of social policies, e.g., social 
security systems and social law (see for example, SGB XII, AsylbLG (Germany), and 
Algemene Bijstandswet (Netherlands)) in which a minimum for subsistence and social 
participation is secured. I argue that people’s support for these policies is likely to crucially 
depend on their willingness to secure the fulfillment of these needs on a societal level. Yet, 
the economics literature has paid little attention to basic needs fulfillment as an individual 
behavioral motive and focused instead on motives such as inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, 2005; Blanco et al., 2011), and the 
maximin principle (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; 
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, 2005). These motives also entail a concern for less well-off 
people in the society, but have different implications for redistribution policy. In this 
thesis, I formulate and extensively investigate concerns for basic needs satisfaction as a 
distributional motive, while disentangling it from other distributional concerns, such as 
inequity aversion, maximin, efficiency, and selfishness.  
In Chapter II, I investigate whether basic needs satisfaction is a distributional 
principle in economic decisions, by analyzing incentivized choices between alternative 
payoff distributions in a laboratory experiment. At the same time, I also disentangle 
concerns for basic needs satisfaction from other distributional motives (maximin, 
efficiency, generosity, envy, and selfishness). Subjects make a series of choices in five-
person dictator games. I find that basic needs satisfaction is a prevalent and important 
distributional concern. In line with other studies, I also find a high prevalence of choices 
in line with maximin concerns and selfishness. I show that these results are also robust 
to running the experiment with different incentive schemes (in a purely hypothetical 
setting and with increased stakes). My results further suggest that in situations in which 
both maximin and basic needs satisfaction make similar predictions – especially when it 
is a decision to fulfill all basic needs – the motive of basic needs satisfaction is likely to 
play an important role next to maximin.  
Chapter III explores whether the motive of basic needs satisfaction is a behavioral 
driving force in decisions with (1) a real-world context (i.e., subjects are confronted with 
exactly the income amounts in the experiment in their everyday lives), (2) high stakes, 
and, most importantly, (3) the fulfillment of basic needs being at stake. For this purpose, 
I run an experiment based on the one in Chapter II in which subjects of a sample from the 
general population in Tbilisi (Georgia) decide about the distribution of actual monthly 
incomes between themselves and four other subjects from the same sample. I find that 
concerns for the satisfaction of basic needs play an important role in the motivation of 
subjects in this setting. The majority of subjects choose at least once in line with the motive 
in choices in which they have to forego utility in terms of other distributional motives, 
such as maximin, efficiency, generosity, envy, and selfishness. Furthermore, I show that 
people do not only care for the number of persons lifted above the threshold, but also for 
the overall amount of unfulfilled needs. Moreover, concerns for basic needs satisfaction 
4 
 
elicited in this setting are predictive of helping people in need in a different choice context 
at the expense of subjects’ own payoff. My findings also suggest that women have stronger 
concerns for the fulfillment of basic needs than men, but that the prevalence of the motive 
is independent of subjects’ age and income. 
In Chapter IV, I implement a variant of the dictator game – the need game – in which 
receivers are at risk of being eliminated from subsequent rounds of the experiment if their 
final payoffs fall short of a certain threshold. If less than two receivers remain in the game, 
it is stopped. By this, I introduce a strategic motive to satisfy the need of the receiver to 
reach the threshold. I find that the prevalence of behavior in line with concerns for basic 
needs satisfaction increases substantially. Even subjects displaying a considerable 
amount of self-interest in the choice experiment of Chapter II, choose to satisfy the 
receiver’s need, even though this entails giving up half of the amount that they can 
distribute. I show that these results are unlikely to be explained by risk aversion or beliefs 
about other dictators’ giving behavior. I conclude that the salience of the importance of the 
threshold amount for the receiver’s – and ultimately also the group’s – survival might have 
triggered dictators’ desire to fulfill receivers’ needs. Finally, I propose a modified version 
of the need game that can serve as a workhorse experiment in order to explore the motive 
of basic needs satisfaction further. 
In the second part of this thesis (Chapter V), I investigate redistributional attitudes, 
preferences, and beliefs of millionaires and people from the general population. As noted 
by Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012), it is important to elicit “[…] the acceptance of notions 
of justice by different social groups […] to understand the social environment in which 
policy decisions are taken.” (p.8, emphasis added). Fisman et al. (2015) emphasize the 
importance of the differences in distributional preferences between those with political 
power and the general population in explaining the relation between preferences of the 
general population measured by researchers and actual policies. In this thesis, I assess 
attitudes towards redistribution in the field of a sample of Dutch millionaires and compare 
them to a sample from the general population in the Netherlands. In line with the 
literature, I find that the wealthy have a substantially less favorable attitude towards 
redistribution than people from the general population as measured by their political 
orientation, their general attitude towards income inequality, and their attitudes towards 
raising taxes on income or wealth. My results suggest that these differences are not due 
to differences in preferences to level income differences that stem from luck, or individual 
effort. I assess these preferences in an experiment in which subjects make a choice that 
has real monetary consequences for two workers who completed the same work 
assignment, but does not affect their own payoff. Instead, my findings indicate that these 
differences are driven by disparities in beliefs in the importance of hard work for success 
in life. Beliefs about the role of hard work might thus determine how similar preferences 
for redistribution translate into different redistributional decisions or attitudes. Moreover, 
assessing the relation between a millionaire’s source of wealth and her beliefs suggests 
that differences between millionaires and subjects from the general population in these 
beliefs stem from differences in actual experienced social mobility.
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CHAPTER II 
Satisfaction of basic needs as a 
fundamental distributional motive7 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Public expenditures, such as transfer payments, are often justified by the moral obligation 
to satisfy basic needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter.8  The International Labour 
Organization (ILO) recommends basic social security that guarantees that “all in need 
have access to [...] basic income security which [...] secure[s] effective access to goods and 
services defined as necessary at the national level” (ILO, 2012, p.3), and asserts that “basic 
income security should allow life in dignity” (ILO, 2012, p.4). Clearly, other motives that 
drive fairness norms also give rise to redistribution policy, but might have different 
implications for what policy is considered just. Since fairness judgments have a bearing 
on the acceptability and viability of social policy, and ultimately on social cohesion, the 
political debate of what is socially just should be based on an understanding of the 
prevalence of different motives for redistribution. This is not least because transfer 
payments are large – in 2016 countries in the European Union spent on average 19.1 
percent of their GDP on social protection (Eurostat, 2018). 9  Despite its importance, 
knowledge about the prevalence and relative importance of motives that give rise to 
redistribution is limited. In particular, little is known about the prevalence of the motive 
for basic needs satisfaction. 
The economics literature has mainly focused on motives, such as inequity aversion, 
                                            
7  This chapter is based on joint work Thomas Dohmen and Gari Walkowitz. The authors would 
like to thank participants of the 2013 Symposium on Economic Experiments in Developing 
Countries, the 2014 ESA International Meeting, the 4th ACCER Workshop on Cross-Cultural 
Experimental Economics Research, the Bay Area Experimental Economics Workshop 2015, 
the DUHR seminar at Maastricht University, the PhD seminar at the University of Cologne, 
the internal seminar at the Rady School of Management, the seminar of Economics and 
Management at Paderborn University, and in particular Martin Strobel, Alexander Cappelen, 
and Bertil Tungodden for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to Kevin Breuer, 
Jonas Radbruch, Patrizia Stumper, and Katharina Peeters for excellent research assistance. 
8  In the Netherlands, for example, social assistance has the purpose to cover the “necessary costs 
of living” (in Dutch: “noodzakelijke kosten van het bestaan” (see § 1, 6(a). ABW (Algemene 
Bijstandswet)). The German social security code specifies that social benefits have the purpose 
to guarantee the basic necessities for subsistence to everybody who cannot afford these 
necessities on her own in order to enable recipients to lead a decent human life (see §§ 1, 27(1), 
27a(l) SGB (Sozialgesetzbuch) XII). 
9  Taking into account expenditures on health, this percentage rises to 26.2. 
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which comprises generosity and envy (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Engelmann and 
Strobel, 2004, 2005; Blanco et al., 2011), the maximin principle (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 
2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, 2005), and efficiency (e.g., 
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, 
2005; Fisman et al., 2015). 
In this paper, we assess the prevalence of concerns for basic needs satisfaction in a 
framework that allows us to disentangle them from the above mentioned motives. While 
a small set of studies considers the role of basic needs fulfillment as drivers of behavior in 
dictator games (Brañas-Garza, 2006; Aguiar et al., 2008; Konow, 2010; Cappelen et al., 
2013b) and in vignette studies (Konow, 2001; Gaertner et al., 2001; Faravelli, 2007; Weiss 
et al., 2017), it is not clear whether results in these studies are driven by a concern to 
fulfill basic needs or by other distributional motives, such as maximin or generosity.10 We 
believe that it is crucial to disentangle these motives because they have very different 
implications for public policy. If maximin is taken seriously, it would call for income 
transfers until income equality is achieved. 11  In contrast, a concern for basic needs 
fulfillment implies redistribution until all basic needs are met. If the motive of basic needs 
satisfaction is the driving factor, policy discussions should revolve around questions about 
the threshold amount at which basic needs can be fulfilled, rather than about whether 
redistribution should take place at all. 
This chapter constitutes, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to provide 
clean evidence on the existence of concerns for basic needs satisfaction, by disentangling 
the motive from other important distributional concerns, such as maximin, efficiency, 
selfishness, generosity, and envy in an incentive compatible way. We employed five-person 
dictator games in a series of laboratory experiments (Engelmann and Strobel 2004, 2005). 
Subjects chose between three different allocations of payoffs among themselves and four 
other persons. The allocations were constructed such that a dictator’s choice of a particular 
alternative implies that she attaches a positive weight to a particular motive. In a first set 
of five choices, we systematically disentangled concerns for basic needs satisfaction from 
each of the other five motives. We then exposed subjects to additional choices in which we 
altered the trade-off between concerns for basic needs satisfaction and the other motives. 
By this, we reveal subjects’ distributional concerns, and shed light on the relative 
importance of the different motives. 
In order to introduce basic needs in the experimental framework, we provided context 
                                            
10  This is because the transfer of money to a relatively poorer person as, for example, in Cappelen 
et al. (2013b) reduces inequality between the giver and the receiver and, at the same time, it 
increases the income of the least wealthy person in the reference group within the experiment. 
Further, comparing giving to a person who has her basic needs satisfied versus to a person 
who lacks some of her basic needs are as well not suited to elicit whether basic needs fulfillment 
matters in an unconfounded way (see also Chapter IV). If a person, for example, takes into 
account the disutility a poor person derives from the lack of basic needs, she could decide to 
give to the person with higher unfulfilled needs because of maximin considerations rather than 
because she wants to fulfill this person’s needs. 
11  Note that Rawls (1971), where the principle originates from, viewed those inequalities as 
acceptable that are in the best interest of the poorest in a society. 
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by informing subjects in an introductory text about the amount of money needed to satisfy 
basic needs. In this text, we also alluded to the other above mentioned motives for 
distributing income, and provided relevant income figures. Hence, we exogenously set a 
threshold for basic needs satisfaction, while at the same time mentioning other 
distributional motives. 
In line with previous literature, we find that selfishness and the maximin principle 
are prevalent motives, whereas only a small fraction of our subjects seems to be motivated 
by efficiency, generosity, or envy. Our core finding is, however, that a substantial fraction 
of individuals is motivated by basic needs satisfaction. 34 percent of subjects choose in line 
with basic needs satisfaction in at least one out of the five main choices, and 9 percent of 
them always choose an allocation that implies that they attach a positive weight to basic 
needs satisfaction. Subjects’ decisions in additional choices indicate the importance of 
concerns for basic needs satisfaction in situations in which it makes similar predictions as 
maximin. Our analysis of a complementing set of choices shows that the motive for basic 
needs satisfaction is relatively insensitive to variation in relative prices in terms of the 
different motives. When subjects, for example, have to forgo a higher payoff for themselves 
in order to guarantee basic needs satisfaction of others, many still do so. 
Conditional logit and mixed logit estimates reassert our conclusion that concerns for 
basic needs satisfaction, maximin, and selfishness are important drivers of subjects’ 
choices in our experiment. The mixed logit model further confirms that there is substantial 
heterogeneity in the extent to which subjects’ care about the motives. Finally, we show 
that our main results are robust across different incentive schemes. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the 
conceptual framework of concerns for basic needs satisfaction. Section 2.3 outlines the 
design, our identification strategy, and the experimental procedures. Section 2.4 presents 
the results. Section 2.5 presents additional evidence drawn from qualitative data. Section 
2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
BACKGROUND 
The principle of basic needs satisfaction plays a prominent role in normative philosophical 
theories of distributive justice. In order to judge a distribution on the grounds of this 
principle, two ingredients are needed: (i) the definition of what constitutes a need on which 
a moral claim can be based and (ii) the rules according to which the adequacy of 
distributions on the grounds of this principle can be evaluated (Miller, 1999). With respect 
to (i), Shue (1996) advocates that the guarantee of subsistence is a basic (moral) right. He 
defines subsistence as a minimum of economic security, which consists of having “available 
for consumption what is needed for a decent chance at a reasonably healthy and active 
life” (Shue, 1996, p.23) like water, air, food, clothing, shelter, and health. Besides these 
biological necessities, a basic needs claim can also be based upon social factors (Miller, 
1999). An example is a specific type of clothes enabling a person to enter the public sphere 
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without shame (A. Smith, 1976, as cited in Miller, 1999).12 The sum of all claims that 
qualify as basic human needs constitute the threshold of basic needs satisfaction. Which 
social and biological factors constitute a basic need and thereby determine the level of the 
threshold is defined within the society in which those claims are put forward.13 
Regarding (ii), the principle of basic needs satisfaction provides a rule for judging the 
fairness of a distribution relative to the threshold defined by the society (Miller, 1999). 
This paper is concerned with examining whether people apply this rule in distributional 
decisions. In the following, we provide a formal definition of this principle that we call 
concerns for basic needs satisfaction. 
We define the threshold of basic needs satisfaction 𝑡 as the monetary amount that is 
necessary to fulfill a person’s basic needs. We model concerns for basic needs satisfaction 
as the disutility an individual 𝑖 derives from unmet needs by a term in an individual’s 
utility function. We assume that a person’s distributional preferences are affected by 
various motives, where concerns for basic needs satisfaction is one of them (see, for 
example, Konow, 2001). For simplicity, let us first consider the two-person case. The utility 
of an individual who is concerned with her own payoff and with basic needs satisfaction is 
modeled as follows: 
 𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 𝛼1𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑖[−𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑥𝑗, 0)] , (1) 
where 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 is individual 𝑖’s own income, 𝑥𝑗 is the income of person 𝑗, and 𝛼1𝑖 and 𝛼2𝑖  are 
the weights she attaches to her own payoff and to satisfying the needs of person 𝑗 , 
respectively. We assume that individual 𝑖’s utility is linear and monotonically increasing 
in 𝑥𝑖 and in 𝑥𝑗 for 𝑥𝑗 < 𝑡. The functional form implies that people who are concerned with 
basic needs satisfaction derive disutility if not all needs of person 𝑗 are satisfied.  
Figure 1 depicts the utility of individual i as a function of person 𝑗’s income for a given 
𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 relative to the threshold of basic needs satisfaction for 𝑛 = 2 and 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 . If the other 
person has an income lower than the threshold (i.e., 𝑥𝑗 < 𝑡 ), individual 𝑖 ’s utility 
diminishes proportional to the difference between 𝑡 and 𝑥𝑗. Thereby, the more weight she 
puts on the motive of basic needs satisfaction relative to the amount of her own income, 
the larger is the reduction in utility per unit of unfulfilled basic needs of person 𝑗. If person 
𝑗’s income is higher than the threshold, individual 𝑖 can reap the full benefits of her own 
income without experiencing any disutility. 
                                            
12  These social needs are determined by a social norm of what comprises a decent human life in 
order to avoid social harm. 
13  In the experiment, however, we implement an exogenous threshold to avoid endogeneity 
problems in the analysis of our choice data. Thus, we assume throughout this paper that 
individuals have no influence on the level of the threshold. 
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In the case in which the reference group of an individual is comprised of multiple 
persons, we assume that utility is given by: 
 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 𝛼1𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑖 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑥𝑗 , 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] , (2) 
where 𝑥𝑗  is the income of person 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}. A person concerned with basic needs sa-
tisfaction derives disutility if not all needs of all n members of a society are satisfied. If one 
or more persons have an income lower than the threshold, individual 𝑖's utility diminishes 
proportional to the sum of the positive differences between 𝑥𝑗 and t. If, for example, two 
persons with the respective incomes 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are in need, her utility is diminished by 
𝛼2𝑖[(𝑡 − 𝑥1) + (𝑡 − 𝑥2)].14 Thus, in a situation in which there are enough resources to satisfy 
                                            
14  Note that this formulation implies that as the number of needy persons in an individual’s 
reference group approaches infinity, her disutility approaches negative infinity. A single 
person’s income is unlikely sufficiently high to fulfill the needs of all persons and her utility 
would approach minus infinity. It is, however, reasonable to assume that a person’s reference 
group is not infinitely large. Even if the amount of unfulfilled basic needs of people in a person’s 
reference group is sufficiently large in order to cause her utility to become negative, it is likely 
that the number of people willing to satisfy basic needs increases as well. This would again 
decrease the amount of unfulfilled basic needs in a person’s reference group. In our experiment, 
we limit the group of people to five persons, which prevents the above mentioned limitations. 
Figure 1: Concerns for basic needs satisfaction 
(two-person case) 
 
Notes: Utility of individual 𝑖 as a function of person 𝑗’s income (𝑥𝑗)  
for a given income of individual 𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑡, where 𝑡 is the threshold 
of basic needs satisfaction) relative to 𝑡 in the two-person case. 
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basic needs of every member, an income distribution in which there are no unfulfilled basic 
needs would result in the lowest disutility. If, however, resources are not sufficient to grant 
every person a sufficiently high income, then minimizing the sum of the differences 
between the income of each member and the threshold (i.e., ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑥𝑗 , 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1 ) yields the 
lowest disutility. In this paper, we primarily investigate situations in which it is not 
possible to fulfill all basic needs in order to disentangle concerns for basic needs 
satisfaction from maximin. Note that the fact that the motive is modeled as a disutility in 
case of unfulfilled needs is in line with the notion of minimizing the injustice in cases of 
resource scarcity, as perfect justice cannot be achieved in these cases (Miller, 1999). 
The moral reasoning behind the principle of basic needs satisfaction as defined above 
is that the higher the overall unfulfilled basic needs in a society, the less preferable the 
distribution of the resources among its members is considered. This means that the 
fairness judgment based on this principle is independent of the distribution of the 
unfulfilled basic needs. In terms of the utility function specified above, this means that 
the disutility individual 𝑖 derives from the deprivation of basic needs only depends on the 
sum of positive differences between the threshold and people’s endowments. It is, for 
example, equally bad if a single person lacks 100 Euros to fulfill her basic needs as if ten 
persons each lack 10 Euros – ceteris paribus. This first property of the principle reflects 
the moral claim that everybody has an equal right to fulfill her basic human needs (Shue, 
1996). Thus, there exists no criterion based on which basic needs of one person have 
priority over those of another person. In other words, the principle of basic needs 
satisfaction does not prescribe that people with distinct amounts of needs should be 
treated differently. This would be the case if we added, for example, the criterion that we 
should first fulfill basic needs of the least well-off person. Hence, our definition 
distinguishes the motive of basic needs satisfaction conceptually from other fairness 
principles that are concerned with people at the lower end of the income distribution, for 
instance, with the least well-off in a society (maximin) or those who are worse off than 
oneself (generosity). A second important property of the principle is that once all basic 
needs of all members of a society are satisfied, the motive does not make any further claim 
on how additional resources should be distributed. This is because the principle is defined 
relative to a threshold value. Both of these properties are crucial for identifying basic 
needs satisfaction as a distinct distributional motive. 
Besides basic needs and selfishness, we also consider four other distributional fairness 
motives: maximin (the desire to maximize the minimum income) (Charness and Rabin, 
2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002), efficiency (the desire to maximize total incomes) 
(Charness and Rabin, 2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002), generosity (aversion to 
advantageous inequality), and envy (aversion to disadvantageous inequality) (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999).15 We assume that a person can be motivated by these six motives: 
                                            
15  Note that we consider the different components of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) separately. Results from Dannenberg et al. (2007) indicate that subjects’ envy and guilt 
parameters are unrelated. This implies that they should be treated as two distinct 
distributional motives. 
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𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 𝛼1𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑖 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑥𝑗 , 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] + 𝛼3𝑖 min
𝑗∈{1,…,𝑛}
(𝑥𝑗) + 𝛼4𝑖 ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
+𝛼5𝑖 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗 , 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] + 𝛼6𝑖 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖 , 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] 
(3) 
 
= 
𝛼1𝑖𝑆𝐿𝐹 + 𝛼2𝑖𝐵𝑁𝑆 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛼4𝑖𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝛼5𝑖𝐺𝐸𝑁 + 𝛼6𝑖𝐸𝑁𝑉, (4) 
The weight individual 𝑖 attaches to the different motives are 𝛼1𝑖 for selfishness (SLF), 𝛼2𝑖 
for basic needs satisfaction (BNS), 𝛼3𝑖 for maximin (MXM), 𝛼4𝑖 for efficiency (EFF), 𝛼5𝑖 for 
generosity (GEN), and 𝛼6𝑖 for envy (ENV). If a person, for example, deems her own income 
more important than the total income of the reference group, then 𝛼1 > 𝛼4. In this paper, 
we abstract from the scaling parameter (
1
1−𝑛
) for generosity and envy, since we only 
consider one specific group size.16 
We are aware that the above formulation is one of many possibilities to formalize the 
notion of concerns for basic needs satisfaction. We chose this formulation because it is 
simple and it clearly disentangles basic needs fulfillment from other distributional 
concerns.17 The goal of this paper is to provide evidence of the existence of the motive, i.e., 
to show that people care for the fulfillment of basic needs. Note that choices in line with 
basic needs satisfaction in the experiment can also be explained by alternative 
formulations of the motive; for example, by a desire to minimize the number of persons 
below the threshold (see also Section 2.5). In Chapter III, we further explore these two 
peculiarities of the motive.  
 
2.3 EXPERIMENT 
2.3.1 Design of the experiment 
We employed five-player dictator games in each of which the dictator had to choose 
between three different payoff distributions among herself and four other subjects (for an 
example, see Table 1).18 The design builds on Engelmann and Strobel (2004, 2005), who 
                                            
16  The term has the purpose to make "the relative impact of inequality aversion on player i’s total 
payoff [...] independent of the number of players" (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, p.824). Since we 
only consider groups of five persons in our experiment and we also don’t implement a scaling 
term for the other motives under consideration, e.g., basic needs satisfaction and efficiency, we 
disregard the term for the purpose of this paper. 
17  A concave function, for instance, could imply the prioritization of persons with greater needs 
and thus could be confounded with maximin concerns. A convex function, in contrast, could 
lead to triage (Miller, 1999). 
18  The dictator game is especially suited to elicit distributional concerns. Since it does not contain 
any dynamic elements, possible strategic considerations of dictators such as reciprocity or 
reputation are eliminated (Ruffle, 1998). 
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use multiple-person dictator games to elicit subjects’ distributional motives. The main idea 
of the experiment is to identify motives from observed dictator choices. In order to 
disentangle concerns for MXM, GEN, and BNS, we need at least three persons with a 
payoff lower than the dictator’s payoff. In order to disentangle MXM from BNS, the income 
of the worst-off person (Person 5) was always less than the basic needs threshold. We 
modified the income of the second worst-off person (Person 4) in order to vary the amount 
of basic needs fulfillment across options independent from the minimum payoff. We varied 
the income of the third worst-off person (Person 3) in a way that allows us to distinguish 
concerns for GEN from MXM and/or BNS. 
In our experiment, we exogenously set a threshold for basic needs satisfaction. Imme-
diately before making their choices in the experiment, subjects received a flyer with 
written text (see Appendix C). The experimenters made sure that all subjects read the 
text, which remained on subjects’ desk during the entire experiment. The text informed 
that the monthly necessary amount to fulfill a person’s basic needs is 630 Euros in 
Germany. We chose this amount based on the poverty threshold at the time of the 
experiment. It is defined as 40 percent of the monthly median net equivalent income. This 
poverty line is a generally accepted threshold for basic needs satisfaction in Germany 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012a, b).19 To avoid a bias towards salience of basic needs 
fulfillment, we further informed participants about other motives related to income 
distribution in a society that we consider in our study, i.e., MXM, EFF, GEN, and ENV. 
In order to not make the amount of 630 Euros salient in the text, we also mentioned other 
numbers, such as the median income, which was 1570 Euros at the time of the experiment. 
The amounts displayed to subjects in the choices were in the same order of magnitude as 
the amounts in the information text. In this way, we put the choice scenarios in a context 
in which subjects can judge the income distributions with respect to the above mentioned 
distributional motives. 
Table 1 shows the five main choices in our experiment in which we systematically 
disentangle concerns for BNS from each of the other five motives. Rows three to seven 
depict the payoffs of Person 1–5 for each option and choice. For instance, if a dictator in 
choice 1 chooses Option C, Person 1 gets 2910 Monetary Units (MU), the dictator (Person 
2) gets 1620 MU, Person 3 gets 1040 MU, Person 4 gets 730 MU, and Person 5 gets 180 
MU. Person 1–5 each had a fixed income position in all choices, where persons were 
ordered with respect to their income with Person 1 being the richest and Person 5 the 
poorest. The dictator as Person 2 was the second richest with an income amount close to 
the median income in Germany. 
Next, subjects were exposed to five additional choices and subsequently to up to ten 
                                            
19  It might be argued that our subjects perceived the threshold of 630 Euros as too high. Since 
they were mainly students, they themselves might have less than this amount at their disposal 
per month. This is, however, not true. A German student has on average a disposable monthly 
income of 864 Euros (Greiner, 2013). Moreover, in the case of Cologne, which has one of the 
highest rental costs in Germany, students need on average 893 Euros per month (Zeit Online, 
2015). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that subjects in our study viewed the threshold as 
sufficiently low as to only cover basic human needs. 
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trade-off choices, which we will elaborate on in Section 2.3.2 (for an overview see Figure 7 
in Appendix A). Each subject made all choices in the role of the dictator (Person 2). The 
order in which subjects were exposed to the choices as well as the order in which the three 
allocation options were displayed to subjects within each choice was completely 
randomized both within the five main choices as well as within the five additional 
choices.20  For payment, subjects were randomly assigned into groups of five persons. 
Subjects were further randomly assigned the role of Person 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in their 
respective group. For each group, one choice was randomly chosen and paid out. The 
decision of each group’s dictator in this choice then determined the payoffs of all five group 
members.21 The payment (in Euro) a subject received was the respective amount in the 
respective choice divided by 150. 
Our design allows us to disentangle the different distributional motives in a context 
in which fairness principles and selfishness concerns conflict with each other. This is a 
crucial ingredient to the external validity of our results and to the ability to capture 
behavior outside the experiment. In naturally occurring decision environments, selfish 
incentives are typically present and conflict with people’s desire to achieve or maintain a 
fair distribution of benefits and burdens. The fact that dictators’ decisions have 
consequences for the payoff of themselves and other subjects provides an incentive to 
evaluate the choices carefully and truthfully (V. L. Smith, 1976). 
                                            
20  The randomization was carried out by the computer for each subject. In this way, we control 
for possible order effects and confounding effects that may occur when subjects systematically 
prefer an alternative due to its position, e.g., the left option. 
21 A subject’s payoff hence depended on her randomly determined group, her role, and on the 
decision of the subject that had been assigned the role of Person 2 (which could be herself or 
another subject) in her group. The fact that subjects faced role uncertainty at the moment of 
their decision could have potentially biased them towards making less selfish and more 
prosocial and efficiency enhancing decisions (Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011). Assigning subjects 
to the different roles upfront would have meant that we needed to pay five subjects (one 
dictator and four receivers) in order to collect one observation. Since this would have been too 
expensive, we chose the outlined design. Furthermore, note that a subject’s choice only affected 
her own payoff in the role of Person 2 and only if she was assigned this role. This precludes 
the possibility that subjects’ risk preferences could influence her choices (Schildberg-Hörisch, 
2010). 
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2.3.2 Motives and identification strategy 
We assume that people can be motivated by various distributional principles that they 
trade off against each other (see, for example, Konow, 2001). We consider six different 
motives that people can take into account when comparing the different allocations in our 
choices. Let 𝑥𝑗 be the payoff of person 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 5} in an allocation, and assume utility is 
linear in 𝑥. Then, given the basic needs threshold of 630 MU as defined in Section 2.3.1, 
given that Person 1–5 have a fixed position in the income distribution in all choices with 
Person 2 as the dictator, and given that Person 1 and 2 never have an income lower than 
the threshold amount, the utility function in equation (3) for a dictator simplifies to: 
 
𝑈2(𝑥) = 𝛼1𝑥2 + 𝛼2 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑥𝑗 , 0)
5
𝑗=3
] + 𝛼3𝑥5 +  𝛼4 ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
+𝛼5 [− ∑(𝑥2 − 𝑥𝑗)
5
𝑗=3
] + 𝛼6[−(𝑥1 − 𝑥2)] . 
(5) 
On the basis of this utility function, we can calculate the utility in terms of the different 
motives for each allocation.22 We say that a motive predicts an option if the utility in terms 
of this motive is higher than in the remaining options. The last four rows of Table 1 
indicate which option is predicted by which motive. If an option is predicted by only one 
motive, then choosing this option is only compatible with attaching a positive weight to the 
motive which alone predicts this option, since this option is worse in terms of the utility of 
all other motives. From here onwards we say that a motive alone predicts an option if no 
other motive predicts this option. This is the core of our identification strategy. 
In choice 1, for example, BNS predicts Option C, since the sum of the positive 
differences between the threshold (𝑡 = 630) and each person’s income is smaller in Option 
C than in A or B. In other words, the sum of unfulfilled basic needs is smallest in C, where 
Person 5 lacks 450 MU to have an amount that would allow her to fulfill her basic needs 
(i.e., to have an amount at least as big as the threshold). All the other persons have an 
amount above 630 MU. By contrast, in Option B, Person 4 lacks 200 MU and Person 5 
lacks 350 MU. Thus, the overall unfulfilled basic needs amount to 550 MU. Similarly, the 
sum of unfulfilled basic needs is also 550 MU in Option A. Since BNS is the only motive 
predicting Option C (i.e., BNS alone predicts Option C), a dictator choosing this allocation 
must care to some extent for the fulfillment of basic needs, i.e., she has a positive 𝛼2. 
Likewise, in choice 2, for example, SLF predicts Option A, since the dictator’s payoff is 
higher than in Option B or C. If a dictator chooses Option A in choice 2, we can deduce 
that she cares to some extent for her own payoff, i.e., she has a positive 𝛼1. 
In our five main choices, we systematically vary the utilities in terms of the different 
motives in the three different allocations such that it allows us to assess to which motive(s) 
                                            
22  For a complete overview of the utilities in terms of the different motives per option, see Table 
4 in Appendix D. 
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the dictator attaches a positive weight, where the focus of this paper is on concerns for 
BNS. In particular, in all choices, BNS alone predicts Option C. Hence, in all choices, a 
dictator choosing Option C must attach a positive weight to BNS. Furthermore, in each 
choice, one of the other five motives is the only motive predicting Option A. The remaining 
four motives predict Option B. In this way, these five choices allow us to assess whether 
BNS plays a role in dictators’ choices and is thus a distinct distributional motive. Note, 
however, that if a dictator chooses an allocation that is not predicted by BNS, it does not 
imply that she deems this motive completely unimportant. Our assessment of the 
prevalence of concerns for BNS is thus a lower bound estimate. Moreover, the five main 
choices reveal which other motives play a role in subjects’ decisions if they choose the 
option not predicted by BNS. Our within subject design further allows us to elicit 
individual decision patterns (e.g., how often subjects choose in line with a specific motive). 
In addition to the main choices, we employed five additional choices (see Table 5 in 
Appendix E). In two of these choices, both BNS and MXM predict the same option (choice 
6 and 7). We shed light on the role the different motives play in situations in which they 
make similar predictions by comparing decision patterns in the five main choices with 
decisions in these two additional choices. Finally, we exposed subjects to up to ten 
additional trade-offs, depending on their decisions in the main choices. In these choices, 
we vary the relative prices of the motives in order to shed light on the relative importance 
of different motives. 
All choices have features that preclude possible confounding effects. Firstly, we avoid 
income amounts that might make an option salient for reasons unrelated to the motives. 
For example, we make sure that the income for any given person remains within an 
interval with the same first digit of a four-digit number. In other words, the payoff of one 
person, for instance, does not jump from 2900 to 3100 MU from one allocation to the other. 
This difference might be more salient than the difference between, for example, 2700 and 
2900 MU and thereby introduce confounding effects. Second, the amounts are not exactly 
the same as those stated in the information text to avoid that these are especially salient 
to subjects. Third, we limit the complexity of the scenarios by ordering the persons from 
highest to lowest income, as well as by using numbers rounded to multiples of 10 MU and 
by changing incomes of a person by multiples of 100 MU when possible.23 
 
2.3.3 Procedures 
The experiment took place at the University of Cologne in the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research (CLER). The experiment involved a total of 90 subjects who were 
recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was programmed in ztree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). It was common knowledge that subjects remain anonymous towards 
other participants and the experimenter throughout the whole experiment. 24  The 
                                            
23  By ordering the persons from highest to lowest income, we keep the relative position of the 
persons with respect to their income constant. Using round numbers makes calculations with 
and comparisons of the amounts simple. In this way, we restrain the cognitive load during the 
choices, which facilitates the comparison of the allocations. 
24  Anonymity of subjects makes potential social image concerns less likely, since they do not have 
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experiment consisted of three parts and a questionnaire (see Figure 6 in Appendix A). 
Sessions lasted about 1.5 hours and subjects earned on average 9 Euros in addition to a 
fixed show-up fee of 2.50 Euros and a compensation of 2 Euros for filling in a questionnaire 
at the end of the experiment. In this paper, we focus on the first part of the experiment, 
in which subjects made decisions in up to 20 dictator choices (see Figure 7 in Appendix A). 
Subjects made on average 13 choices. 
 
2.4 RESULTS 
2.4.1 Main results 
We start by providing descriptive evidence, before we estimate conditional logit and mixed 
logit models in order to evaluate the impact of motives on the probability that an option is 
chosen. 
 
Main choices 
The dark grey bars in Figure 2 represent the fraction of subjects choosing in line with BNS 
(Option C) in each of the main dictator choices displayed in Table 1. We find that in every 
choice, BNS is a prevalent motive with 11 to 21 percent of subjects choosing in line with 
the motive. As mentioned above, these are lower bound estimates of the prevalence of 
concerns for BNS, since the choice of a different allocation does not necessarily imply that 
subjects attach no weight to the motive. Figure 2 further reveals that SLF and MXM are 
important for subjects’ choices with 37 percent of dictators choosing in line with each of 
these motives (light grey bar in choice 1 and 2, respectively). 
  
                                            
to worry about what other people might think of their decisions (Hoffman et al., 1996). 
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Figure 2: Choice fractions main choices 
 
Notes: Fraction of subjects choosing Option C and thus attaching a positive weight to BNS 
(dark grey bars) and fraction of subjects choosing Option A and thus attaching a positive 
weight to the respective motive predicting this option (light grey bars) in the main choices 
(choice 1–5). The remaining subjects choose Option B (the option predicted by the four 
remaining motives), which is not depicted here. 
We now look at individual choice patterns and turn to the question of how many 
subjects are concerned with BNS. Figure 3 depicts the reverse cumulative distribution of 
the number of times a subject chooses in line with a motive conditional on choosing in line 
with this motive when it alone predicts an allocation. 25  The reverse cumulative 
distribution indicates the fraction of subjects choosing more than 𝑥 times in line with a 
motive. 34 percent of subjects choose at least once in line with BNS. For these subjects, 
we can conclude that they attach a positive weight to concerns for BNS, i.e., the motives 
enters positively into their utility function. We can further observe that about 37 percent 
choose in line with MXM and SLF at least once. 
  
                                            
25  If a subject chooses in line with a motive when it alone predicts an option, this indicates that 
this motive is at least somewhat important to her. It is therefore a more reliable indicator of 
her preference than when she chooses an option that is predicted by multiple motives. For all 
motives except BNS, a person who chooses 𝑥 times in line with a certain motive chooses by 
construction of the main choices also (𝑥 − 1) times in line with all other motives except BNS. 
Hence, in order to look at individual choice frequencies of these motives in a meaningful way, 
we condition them on choosing in line with the motive when it alone predicts an option. 
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Figure 3: Reverse cumulative distribution 
 
Notes: The reverse cumulative distribution indicates the fraction of subjects choosing 
more than x times in line with a motive, conditional on choosing in line with this motive 
when it alone predicts an allocation. This means that for MXM, SLF, EFF, GEN, and ENV 
the motive has to be chosen when the respective motive alone predicts an option (in case 
of MXM this is, for example, Option A in choice 1) in order to qualify as choosing 𝑥 times 
in line with this motive. 
Observing subjects choosing repeatedly in line with a motive raises confidence that 
this motive is indeed important to them. In particular, Figure 3 reveals that 10 percent of 
subjects choose in line with BNS at least four out of five times, while a third of these 
subjects always choose in line with the motive. These observed choice frequencies cannot 
be explained by random choice behavior. Given that subjects choose among three possible 
alternatives in five choices, there are exactly 243 different possible choice patterns 
(permutations of chosen alternatives). Under the assumption of purely random choice 
behavior, each option is equally likely chosen in a particular choice. There is exactly one 
choice pattern that implies being in line with a given motive five times. In case of BNS, 
this choice pattern is always choosing Option C. Thus, the resulting probability to choose 
five times in line with a given motive under random choice is 
1
243
. Further, there are exactly 
10 choice patterns that imply being in line with BNS exactly four times. The expected 
probability that subjects choose at least four times in line with BNS under random choice 
is therefore 
10
243
+
1
243
=
11
243
. Two-sided binomial probability tests reject the null hypothesis 
that the share of dictators choosing five (at least four) times in line with BNS is equal to 
the share that we would expect if subjects were choosing completely at random 
(𝑝 = .0119 (𝑝 = .0063)). 
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Further, 32 (31) percent of subjects choose at least four times in line with MXM (SLF), 
while 16 (26) percent of these subjects always choose in line with the motive. Again, two-
sided binomial probability tests reject the null hypothesis that the share of dictators 
choosing five (at least four) times in line with MXM (SLF) is equal to the share that we 
would expect if subjects were choosing completely at random (𝑝 < .0001 for all four tests).26 
Overall, these results indicate that BNS, alongside MXM considerations and SLF, is 
an important separate distributional concern. Moreover, the fact that a large majority of 
our subjects chooses repeatedly in line with one of the motives under consideration lends 
support to the internal validity of our experiment.27 Furthermore, the individual choice 
data uncovers that there seems to be substantial heterogeneity in the importance subjects 
attach to each motive. We will elaborate further on this later in this section. 
 
Implications for the prevalence of concerns for BNS 
When interpreting differences in the fractions of subjects who repeatedly choose in line 
with BNS and another motive, two things should be kept in mind. First, each choice in 
line with BNS requires that an allocation is chosen that is not predicted by any of the 
other motives, i.e., that is worse in terms of the five other motives. Hence, a dictator 
choosing, for instance, four times in line with BNS automatically chooses four times an 
allocation that is neither optimal in terms of her own payoff, nor in terms of MXM, EFF, 
GEN, or ENV. By contrast, all the other motives, including SLF and MXM, are the single 
motive predicting an allocation only once out of the five main dictator choices. In the four 
respective other choices, these motives predict an option that is also predicted by three 
other motives. For example, a dictator who chooses five times in line with MXM has to 
choose only one allocation that is only predicted by MXM (in choice 1 when the motive 
predicts Option A). The remaining times MXM predicts Option B, which is also predicted 
                                            
26  For MXM and SLF there is also exactly one choice pattern that implies being in line with a 
given motive five times resulting in a probability of  
1
243
 to choose five times in line with a given 
motive under random choice. In case of MXM, for example, this choice pattern is choosing 
Option A in choice 1 and Option B in the remaining choices. Furthermore, the expected 
probability that a subject chooses at least four times in line with either MXM or SLF 
(conditional on choosing in line with this motive when it alone predicts an allocation) under 
random choice behavior is 
5
243
. 
27  Almost half of our sample always chooses in line with a single motive in the five main dictator 
choices. This percentage rises up to 72 percent if we also take into account those subjects who 
choose four times in line with one motive. Hence, a large amount of our subjects puts a strong 
weight on one of the motives under consideration. Of these subjects, those choosing repeatedly 
in line with a non-selfish motive are the majority. This suggests that our design indeed 
captures motivations that are important to our subjects in the presented distributional choices. 
It is important to keep in mind that those who do not choose repeatedly in line with a single 
motive might still be motivated by a mix of the motives under consideration (as elaborated in 
Section 2.3.2). In other words, we do not label subjects who do not choose in line with one 
motive in most of the choices as inconsistent or irrational. 
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by three of the other motives (in choice 2–5). The same holds for the other motives.28,29 
Hence, we can say that it is more restrictive to repeatedly choose in line with BNS than 
with any of the other four motives under consideration. 
Second, it is more difficult to compare the allocations based on BNS than based on 
MXM or SLF. The former involves assessing the differences between the incomes and the 
threshold and comparing the overall differences. On the contrary, choosing the highest 
possible outcome for themselves (SLF) or for the least well-off person (MXM) is relatively 
straightforward. Subjects simply have to compare three income amounts (of Person 2 for 
SLF and Person 5 for MXM). Hence, applying BNS is potentially more susceptible to 
mistakes. To evaluate whether this is indeed the case, we compare response times of 
subjects who choose five (at least four) times in line with MXM, SLF, or BNS in the five 
main dictator choices. We find that SLF types are on average faster than BNS types 
(𝑡(24) = −2.6238, 𝑝 = .0149) for those subjects choosing five times in line with one of the 
motives. We find similar differences in response times for individuals who choose one of 
the motives at least four times (𝑡(30) = −4.6609, 𝑝 = .0001).30 On the contrary, we don’t 
find a significant difference in decision times between MXM and BNS types for those who 
choose five times (𝑡(15) = −.6709, 𝑝 = .5125) or at least four times (𝑡(36) = −.8466, 𝑝 =
.4028) in line with a motive.31 This lends support to the conjecture that applying the 
principle of BNS as a basis for decisions in the scenarios is more demanding (and thus 
more susceptible to mistakes) than applying SLF, while this is not the case when 
comparing BNS to MXM.32 
Additionally, any assessment of the relative prevalence of the different motives under 
consideration depends on the specified utility function (see equation (5)), as well as scaling 
differences between the motives. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, the fraction of 
subjects attaching a positive weight to concerns for BNS in each choice is a rather 
conservative assessment, since choosing a different allocation does not imply that subjects 
do not care for the motive at all.33 Overall, we can conclude that the prevalence of concerns 
                                            
28  This means that for dictators who are motivated by more than one motive and whose most 
important motive is either MXM, SLF, EFF, GEN, or ENV, Option B is very likely to be more 
attractive as soon as it is predicted by her most preferred motive and other motives to which 
she attaches importance. Hence, these dictators are likely to choose Option B and thereby 
consistently with their most preferred motive. 
29   In fact, even with this restriction, it is possible for subjects to classify as choosing in line four 
times with two of the motives (excluding BNS). This is the case if they choose two times Option 
A and three times Option B. In our sample, five subjects classify as choosing four times in line 
with MXM, as well as with SLF. These subjects choose Option A in both choice 1 and 2, and 
Option B in choice 3–5. 
30  Subjects choosing in line with SLF five (at least four) times take on average 54 (61) seconds, 
while BNS types take 90 (104) seconds. 
31  Subjects choosing in line with MXM five (at least four) times take on average 79 (91) seconds. 
32  One explanation for this is that (some) subjects choosing in line with BNS do not compare the 
sum of unfulfilled basic needs. Instead they compare the number of persons below the 
threshold, which is likely to take less time. In Section 2.5, we explore this further by means of 
questionnaire data, while in Chapter III, we assess this via additional allocation choices. 
33  This also holds for the other motives under consideration. 
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for BNS, MXM, and SLF should be, if anything, compared only with care and while 
keeping in mind the above mentioned design features. Most importantly, the results 
presented in this paper are not meant to provide an exact estimate of the prevalence of 
concerns for basic needs satisfaction. It should rather be understood as evidence for the 
existence of the motive as an important distinct distributional concern. 
 
Additional choices 
In a lot of settings, predictions of concerns for MXM and BNS go in a similar direction. 
Concerns for BNS might, for example, also play a role in studies that have elicited MXM 
concerns. A reason for why we find a lower prevalence of MXM concerns than Engelmann 
and Strobel (2004, 2005), for instance, could be that in their setting a part of the subjects 
who choose in line with MXM concerns actually did so because this option has the highest 
prospect of fulfilling basic needs.34 To shed more light on the role the different motives 
play in situations in which they make similar predictions we now look at two additional 
choices.35 Choice 6 is similar to choice 1 with the difference that in choice 6, BNS predicts 
the same option as MXM. In this option predicted by BNS and MXM, Persons 4 and 5 also 
get an income above the threshold, so that there are no unfulfilled basic needs in this 
option. The remaining four motives predict a different option. Likewise, in choice 7, which 
is similar to choice 2, MXM and BNS predict the same option together with all other 
motives but SLF. Again, in this option, all persons have an income of at least the threshold, 
while the option predicted by SLF leaves three persons with an income below the 
threshold.  
We find that in choice 6, 41 percent of subjects choose Option A that is predicted by 
MXM and at the same time by BNS. In choice 7, the option predicted by MXM and BNS 
becomes even more appealing to our subjects. We find that 62 percent opted for this option. 
Of those subjects, the fraction who displayed a strong preference for MXM in the main 
choices (i.e., who chose at least four times in line with a motive) is 27 percent in choice 6 
and 23 percent in choice 7. For BNS, these fractions are 24 percent in choice 6 and 14 
                                            
34  Engelmann and Strobel (2004, 2005) elicit subjects’ distributional motives in three and five 
person dictator games similar to our choice design. One possible explanation is that without 
information on a threshold for basic needs fulfillment, the absolute smallest monetary amount 
has the highest chance of being below any threshold. They find that on average 48 to 73 percent 
of subjects choose in line with MXM when it alone predicts an allocation. A reason for why this 
share is much higher than in our experiment could thus be that decisions in their setting were 
partly driven by concerns for BNS. In our setting subjects do have the information they need 
in order to judge the allocations based on basic needs fulfillment. Hence, subjects to whom 
BNS is sufficiently important will choose the option predicted by BNS. The combined share of 
subjects choosing either in line with BNS or MXM when both motives predict a different 
allocation in choice 1 is 48 percent in our study. This matches the shares found in Engelmann 
and Strobel (2004, 2005) more closely than the 37 percent who choose in line only with MXM 
in choice 1. This could indicate that concerns for BNS play a role in settings that have so far 
been interpreted as being purely driven by MXM concerns. 
35  Table 5 in Appendix E shows the incomes allocated to Person 1–5 in, the motive predicting, 
and the fraction of subjects choosing the respective allocation. 
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percent in choice 7. This suggests that both MXM and BNS are important in explaining 
why subjects choose the option in which there are no unfulfilled basic needs in choice 6 
and 7. Even though we find a lower share of strong BNS than MXM types (i.e., subjects 
choosing at least four times in line with a given motive) in the main choices, these types 
make up a comparable share of the subjects choosing the option predicted by the two 
motives in choice 6. This is because all strong BNS types choose this option, while only a 
bit more than half of the strong MXM types do so. Choice 7 presents a similar, although 
less pronounced picture. 72 of strong MXM types choose the option predicted by the two 
motives, while this share amounts to 83 percent for strong BNS types. Thus, having a 
strong preference for BNS seems to be more predictive for choosing the option predicted 
by the two motives in both choices than putting a lot of weight on MXM. This gives an 
indication that in situations in which both motives make predictions in a similar direction 
– especially when it is a decision to fulfill all basic needs – the motive of BNS is likely to 
play an important role next to MXM. This suggests that if basic needs satisfaction is 
ignored as a motive, we would ascribe behavior driven by this motive to maximin. Hence, 
in these situations, the prevalence of maximin would be overestimated if basic needs 
satisfaction is ignored as a behavioral motive. Thus, given that the motive has received 
less attention in the economic literature, it should be taken more seriously in future 
empirical and theoretical considerations. 
 
Trade-offs 
In the main choices, we observed the share of subjects who attach a positive weight to the 
different motives given specific relative prices in terms of each motive. In these choices, a 
subject has to give up 100 MU in terms of a motive that alone predicts an option in order 
to gain 100 MU in terms of another motive that alone predicts a different option when 
choosing in line with the latter. For example, in each of the five main choices, the option 
that is predicted by BNS is 100 MU better in terms of BNS and at the same time also 100 
MU worse in terms of MXM. We saw that MXM, BNS, and SLF are important for subjects 
in these choices. Due to the fact that only some subjects choose in line with EFF, GEN, or 
ENV in choices 3, 4, and 5, we only look at the trade-off choices MXM vs. BNS and SLF 
vs. BNS here. To get a glance at the relative importance of these motives, we exposed 
subjects to up to 10 additional choices in which we systematically varied the relative prices 
of BNS in terms of the MXM and SLF, respectively. Specifically, we test if subjects are 
willing to give up 150, 200, and 250 MU depending on previous choices. Figure 8 and 9 in 
Appendix E shows the logic with which subjects were exposed to the different choices. For 
instance, subjects who choose MXM in choice 1 were first exposed to choice 1HH. Of those 
subjects who choose MXM (BNS) in choice 1HH were then exposed to choice 1HHH (1H). 
In this way, we narrow down the minimum amount of MU in terms of one motive a subject 
is willing to sacrifice in order to gain 100 MU in terms of the motive she had chosen in the 
respective main choice. Subjects who chose Option B in a respective choice were not 
exposed to further trade-off choices belonging to this choice. 
It is reasonable to assume that the higher the amount of MU in terms of one motive a 
subject is willing to forego in order to gain 100 MU in terms of another motive, the more 
weight she attaches to the latter relative to the former. In choice -H (-HH, -HHH), subjects 
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have to sacrifice 150 (200, 250) MU in terms of BNS when choosing Option A in order to 
gain 100 MU in terms of the motive predicting Option A. Similarly, in choice -L (-LL, -
LLL), subjects have to sacrifice 150 (200, 250) MU in terms of the motive predicting Option 
A when choosing in line with BNS in order to gain 100 MU in terms of BNS. For example, 
in choice 1HH, subjects have to accept unfulfilled basic needs of 200 MU if they choose 
Option A. Hence, a subject who chooses this option is likely to put a relatively high weight 
on MXM as compared to BNS. 
We find that of those subjects who choose MXM in choice 1, 39 percent stick to MXM 
in choice 1HH, while 15 percent switch to BNS.36 Again, of those who stuck to MXM in 
choice 1HH, 62 percent also choose in line with MXM if this entails 250 MU more 
unfulfilled basic needs compared to the option predicted by BNS (choice 1HHH). This 
means that for 9 percent of our sample MXM is relatively more important compared to 
BNS. Of those subjects who switched to BNS in choice 1HH, 40 percent stay with BNS 
even if the price in terms of BNS is decreased again in choice 1H. For these subjects MXM 
is important, but BNS also seems to play a role. Further, of those subjects who choose the 
option predicted by BNS in choice 1, 30 percent stick to this option in choice 1LL and 50 
percent of subjects choose option B, which is also predicted by BNS. Thus, for at least 30 
percent of our subject BNS is relatively important compared to MXM.37 Regarding the 
trade-off choices of BNS and SLF, we find that of those subjects who are selfish in choice 
2, the majority (61 percent) stay selfish in choice 2HH, while 18 percent switch to BNS. Of 
those who are selfish in choice 2HH, in turn, 85 percent choose the selfish option even in 
choice 2HHH, which entails 250 MU more unfulfilled basic needs as compared to the 
option predicted by BNS. Hence, for 19 percent of our sample SLF is a relatively important 
motive compared to BNS. Of those subjects who switched to BNS in choice 2HH, 50 percent 
stay with BNS in choice 2H. For those subjects, SLF seems to be important but they also 
care about BNS to a certain extent. Of those subjects who choose in line with BNS in choice 
2, 44 percent stick to BNS in choice 2LL, while 28 percent switch to SLF. Of those who 
choose the BNS option in choice 2LL, 88 percent stick to BNS even though this means 
giving up 250 MU of their own payoff in choice 2LLL. Hence, for 8 percent of our sample 
BNS is relatively important as compared to SLF.  
To summarize, a non-negligible fraction of our subjects is willing to give up a 
substantial amount of their own payoff or of the poorest person’s payoff in order to fulfill 
basic needs. In particular, to decrease the amount of unfulfilled basic needs by 100 MU, 
these subjects are willing to give up more than double this amount in terms of SLF or 
MXM. This confirms our earlier conjecture that BNS is a motive that plays a potentially 
important role in distributional decisions. 
                                            
36  Figure 8 and 9 in Appendix E show the fraction of subjects choosing each allocation in each 
choice. 
37  Choice 1L and 1LLL are hard to interpret and therefore excluded from the analysis, since both 
the choice of Option B and C in ILL was predicted by BNS, but only subjects who chose C were 
given choice 1LLL. 
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Estimation results: Choice models 
We further asses the importance of the motives in subjects’ decisions by estimating a 
conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) and a mixed logit model in order to account for 
heterogeneity in subjects’ tastes (Train, 2009). In these models, the characteristics of each 
option (i.e., the monetary values of the utility terms) enter as explanatory variables. This 
allows us to estimate the impact of each term of the utility function on the probability that 
an option is chosen. 
For the conditional logit model, let 
𝑉𝑖𝑘𝑚 = 𝛼
𝑆𝐿𝐹𝑆𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑘𝑚 + 𝛼
𝐵𝑁𝑆𝐵𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑘𝑚 + 𝛼
𝑀𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑘𝑚 
+𝛼𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑘𝑚 + 𝛼
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑚 + 𝛼
𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑘𝑚 
with the utility terms (𝑆𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑘𝑚, 𝐵𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑘𝑚, 𝑀𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑘𝑚, 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑘𝑚, 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑚, 𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑘𝑚) of each motive 
in alternative 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}  in choice 𝑚 ∈ {1, … , 5}  as given in Section 2.3.2 and the 
population parameters 𝛼𝑤, 𝑤 ∈ {𝑆𝐿𝐹, 𝐵𝑁𝑆, 𝑀𝑋𝑀, 𝐸𝐹𝐹, 𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝐸𝑁𝑉}. Hence, according to the 
conditional logit model, the probability that person 𝑖 chooses allocation 𝑘 in choice 𝑚 is 
given by: 
𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑚 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑉𝑖𝑘𝑚)
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑉𝑖𝐴𝑚) + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑉𝑖𝐵𝑚) + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑉𝑖𝐶𝑚)
 
(we largely follow Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, 2005). We estimate the model with choice 
data from the five main choices.38 To account for the dependence of individual decisions 
across choices, we allow for individual specific errors. Due to multicollinearity between 
SLF, EFF, GEN, and ENV, we estimate four different models, in each of which we exclude 
one of these variables and focus on assessing the impact of BNS and MXM.39 Table 2 
displays the odds ratios of the different specifications of the conditional logit model.40 The 
estimation reveals that BNS and MXM have a significant and positive impact in all 
specifications. In particular, the odds of an allocation (𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑚 (1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑚)⁄ ) increase by 0.5 
percent when the overall unfulfilled basic needs decrease by 1 MU (BNS) and by 1 percent 
if the income of Person 5 is increased by 1 MU (MXM). Due to the above mentioned 
collinearity, the odds ratios of the other motives can only be evaluated with caution. The 
respective linear combination of the excluded motive is significant in each model.41 This 
                                            
38  In Appendix F, we show that our results are robust to estimating our model with the five main 
choices plus the five additional choices (see Table 6).  
39  The multicollinearity is due to the construction of the utility terms (𝑆𝐿𝐹 = (𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝑁𝑉 −
𝐺𝐸𝑁)/5). 
40  The odds ratios indicate by what factor the odds of an option (𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑚 (1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑚)⁄ ) are multiplied 
in case the value of this option in terms of a motive is augmented by one unit (see Engelmann 
and Strobel, 2004). Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate a positive influence of the independent 
variable, odds ratios smaller than 1 a negative influence of a motive. 
41  Model 1 (𝐺𝐸𝑁 − 𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 5 ∗ 𝑆𝐿𝐹) : 𝜒2(1) = 50.38, 𝑝 < .0001 ; Model 2 (𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝑁𝑉 − 5 ∗ 𝑆𝐿𝐹) : 
𝜒2(1) = 12.76, 𝑝 = .0004 ; Model 3 (𝐺𝐸𝑁 − 𝐸𝑁𝑉 + 5 ∗ 𝑆𝐿𝐹): 𝜒2(1) = 19.23, 𝑝 < .0001; Model 4 
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suggests that the motives are jointly significant and that together they have a positive 
impact. Coming back to our descriptive evidence, we saw that in choice 2, a large fraction 
of subjects chooses the option that indicates that they attach a positive weight to SLF. 
Hence, it stands to reason that of these four motives, especially SLF is important to some 
subjects. 
Overall, this confirms our descriptive results that BNS, MXM, and SLF seem to be 
important drivers of subjects’ choices in our experiment. 
Table 2: Conditional logit models: Odds ratios 
 
(1) 
ENV 
excluded 
(2) 
GEN 
excluded 
(3) 
EFF 
excluded 
(4) 
SLF 
excluded 
𝛼𝑆𝐿𝐹 1.013*** 1.009*** 1.009***  
 (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0020)  
𝛼𝐵𝑁𝑆 1.005* 1.005* 1.005* 1.005* 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
𝛼𝑀𝑋𝑀 1.010*** 1.010*** 1.010*** 1.010*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
𝛼𝐸𝐹𝐹 0.999* 1.000  1.002*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
𝛼𝐺𝐸𝑁 1.001*  1.000 0.998*** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0004) (0.0004) 
𝛼𝐸𝑁𝑉  1.001* 1.001* 1.003* 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Notes: Odds ratios of the conditional logit models of subjects’ 
decisions in the five main choices. Pseudo R-Squared: 0.288, Chi-
squared: 112.8657 . * 𝑝 < .10 , ** 𝑝 < .05 , ***  𝑝 < .01 . Individual 
specific standard errors in parenthesis. 
The conditional logit model estimates the value that the average subject attaches to 
each motive. The choice patterns, however, suggest that the importance placed on the 
motives varies quite a lot across subjects. For example, 16 percent of subjects always 
choose in line with MXM and 26 percent always in line with SLF (see Figure 3). These two 
groups of subjects are likely to have very different tastes, since they seem to place a big 
weight on two different motives. To account for these differences we estimate a mixed logit 
model, which allows for taste heterogeneity. 
𝑈𝑖𝑚𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖
𝑆𝐿𝐹𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑚 + 𝛼𝑖
𝐵𝑁𝑆 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑚, 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] + 𝛼𝑖
𝑀𝑋𝑀 min(𝑥) + 𝛼𝑖
𝐸𝐹𝐹 ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑚
𝑛
𝑗=1
, 
                                            
((𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝑁𝑉 − 𝐺𝐸𝑁)/5): 𝜒2(1) = 42.30, 𝑝 < .0001. 
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+𝛼𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑚 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑚, 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] + 𝛼𝑖
𝐸𝑁𝑉 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑚 − 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑚, 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑚 
= 𝛼𝑖
𝑤𝑐𝑖𝑘𝑚
𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑚 
Let be the utility a subject 𝑖 derives from choosing an alternative 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶} in choice 𝑚 ∈
{1, … , 10}, where the coefficients 𝛼𝑖
𝑤 vary over dictators, 𝑐𝑖𝑘𝑚
𝑤  is a vector of distributional 
concerns, 𝑤 ∈ {𝑆𝐿𝐹, 𝐵𝑁𝑆, 𝑀𝑋𝑀, 𝐸𝐹𝐹, 𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝐸𝑁𝑉}  , and 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑚  is a random term that is 
independently and identically extreme value distributed. The coefficient vector has 
density 𝑔(𝛼|𝜃) with distribution parameters 𝜃. The mixed logit choice probability (i.e., the 
probability of the dictator’s choice sequence conditional on the parameters of the 
population distribution) is: 
𝑃𝑖(𝜃) = ∫ 𝑆𝑖(𝛼)𝑔(𝛼|𝜃) 𝑑𝛼, 
where 𝑆𝑖(𝛼𝑖) = ∏ 𝐿𝑖𝑘(𝑖,𝑚)𝑚(𝛼𝑖)
𝑀
𝑚=1  is the probability of the observed choice sequence 
conditional on knowing 𝛼𝑖
𝑤, in which 𝑘(𝑖, 𝑚) specifies alternative 𝑘 chosen by dictator 𝑖 in 
choice 𝑚, and with 𝐿𝑖𝑘(𝑖,𝑚)𝑚(𝛼𝑖) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝑖
𝑤𝑐𝑖𝑘(𝑖,𝑚)𝑚
𝑤 )
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝑖
𝑤𝑐𝑖𝑘𝑚
𝑤 )𝑀𝑚=1
. The mixed logit model estimates the 
population parameters 𝜃 based on the simulated log likelihood 𝑆𝐿𝐿(𝜃) = 𝑙𝑛 {
1
𝑅
∑ 𝑆𝑖(𝛼
𝑟)𝑅𝑟=1 } 
for each observation. For this maximum simulated likelihood estimation, 𝑅 is the number 
of draws of 𝛼 taken from 𝑔(𝛼|𝜃) (see Train, 2009; Hole, 2007). 
Table 3 displays the means and standard deviations of the mixed logit estimates. 
Again, due to multicollinearity between the motives SLF, EFF, GEN, and ENV, we 
estimate four different models, in each of which we leave out one of the motives. The 
estimations are conducted with 𝑅 = 5000 Halton draws and assuming that the coefficients 
are normally distributed in our sample.42 We estimate the models using subjects’ decisions 
in the five main choices plus the five additional choices in order to maximize the number 
of observations. We use individual specific standard errors to account for dependencies of 
choices across decisions of the same subject. The comparison of the estimated means with 
the sample means of the conditional distributions reveals that this is indeed a reasonable 
assumption and that the model is correctly specified (Train, 2009).  
  
                                            
42  For model (4), we use 6000 Halton draws. We chose these numbers because from this number 
onwards the coefficients remain stable (i.e., when estimating model (1), (2), and (3) with, e.g., 
6000, 7000, 9000, 10,000 draws and model (4) with 7000, 9000 or 10,000 draws, the coefficients 
remain approximately the same (Hensher and Greene, 2001). 
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Table 3: Mixed logit models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ENV GEN EFF SLF 
  excluded excluded excluded excluded 
𝛼𝑆𝐿𝐹 mean .0231*** .0132*** .0151*** 
 
  (.0036) (.0034) (.0039)  
 SD .0209*** .0218*** .0210***  
  (.0033) (.0036) (.0035)  
𝛼𝐵𝑁𝑆 mean .0042** .0039** .0041** .0039** 
  (.0019) (.0018) (.0020) (.0020) 
 SD .0143*** .0146*** .0146*** .0178*** 
  (.0030) (.0028) (.0031) (.0030) 
𝛼𝑀𝑋𝑀 mean .0146*** .0148*** .0148*** .0140*** 
  (.0023) (.0023) (.0023) (.0022) 
 SD .0146*** .0148*** .0146*** .0141*** 
 
 (.0022) (.0022) (.0023) (.0022) 
𝛼𝐸𝐹𝐹 mean –.0015* .0005 
 .0032*** 
 
 (.0007) (.0006)  (.0007) 
 SD .0017 .0017  .0036** 
  (.0012) (.0013)  (.0014) 
𝛼𝐺𝐸𝑁 mean .0020***  .0004 –.0023*** 
  (.0004)  (.0006) (.0006) 
 SD .0015**  .0012 .0031*** 
  (.0007)  (.0010) (.0006) 
𝛼𝐸𝑁𝑉 mean  .0022*** .0018** .0044*** 
   (.0005) (.0008) (.0006) 
 SD  .0020*** .0018** .0029*** 
   (.0006) (.0007) (.0006) 
SLL at convergence –620.9230 –620.1252 –620.1976 –648.6170 
LR 𝜒2 (df) 82.15 (5) 78.18 (5) 76.24 (5) 80.05 (5) 
Prob > 𝜒2 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the option subjects choose in the five main and the 
five additional choices. The independent variables are the utilities of the options in 
terms of each motive. Individual specific standard errors in parenthesis. 
SLL=Simulated log likelihood. SD= Standard deviation. LR 𝜒2  is the likelihood 
ratio test for the joint significance of the standard deviations (degrees of freedom in 
parenthesis) (Hole, 2007). 𝑁 = 2700. *𝑝 < .10, **𝑝 < .05, *** 𝑝 < .01. 
We find that in all models, the estimated coefficients of BNS, MXM, SLF, and ENV 
are significant and positive. This means that the average subject seems to attach a positive 
weight to these motives. Moreover, the estimated standard deviations reveal that there is 
significant heterogeneity in subjects’ tastes. This indicates that allowing for differences in 
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tastes in the mixed logit model is indeed a more suitable specification than assuming taste 
homogeneity as in the conditional logit model. The relation between a coefficient’s mean 
and its standard deviation provides information about the proportion of subjects who place 
a positive weight on the motive (Hole, 2007). For MXM, this share is about 84 percent in 
all models, while for SLF the share is between 73 and 87 percent. For BNS, about 60 
percent of subjects place a positive weight on the motive. For EFF, this share is between 
19 and 81 percent, for GEN between 23 and 93 percent, and for ENV between 84 and 94 
percent depending on the model. Note that, however, these numbers do not take into 
account how far away the different coefficients are from zero. 
To summarize, the estimation results, both of the conditional and the mixed logit 
model, confirm the conclusions drawn from the descriptive results. Subjects seem to care 
for their own income, the income of the least well-off person, and the fulfillment of basic 
needs. Further, to some extent, they also seem to dislike situations, in which another 
person has more than themselves. 
 
2.4.2 Robustness 
We provide results from two additional experiments to evaluate the robustness of our 
results under different incentives. 
 
Hypothetical choices 
In our experiment, subjects’ choices determine their own payoff and the payoff of other 
participants. However, the actual payments are smaller than the nominal amounts 
displayed in the choices and those that were referred to in the introductory text. Hence, it 
might be the case, for example, that individuals do not perceive that persons 4 and 5 are 
in need based on the income amounts in the societal frame. We are positive that the 
societal frame is salient to subjects when they make their decisions. Further, evaluating 
subjects’ answers to two open-ended questions at the end of the experiment suggests that 
subjects actually did decide in the societal frame.43 This makes us confident that subjects 
in general evaluated the choices with regards to monthly incomes. Nevertheless, we also 
tested whether our results hold when subjects’ choices are hypothetical in an additional 
experiment with 90 different subjects from the same subject pool.44 In a hypothetical 
setting, there only exists the societal frame in which the allocations can be compared. 
Subjects received the same set of choices and the same information text before making 
their decisions. 
We find that the prevalence of the different motives is largely robust to removing the 
incentives based on dictators’ decisions, with the exception that individuals behave less 
                                            
43  In the two open-ended questions, we asked subjects to describe how they took their decisions 
(see Section 2.5). In their answers, they, for example, used terms such as ‘income’ to refer to 
the monetary amounts in the choices, which suggests that they were thinking about the income 
amounts displayed to them in the choices as opposed to mere experimental ‘payoffs’. 
44  The experiment took place at the University of Cologne. The experimenters were the same two 
persons and the subjects were again recruited through ORSEE. Subjects received a fixed payoff 
of 10 Euros, independent of their own or other subjects’ decisions. 
 30 
 
selfishly. In the main choices in the hypothetical setting, 10–17 percent (with an average 
of 13 percent) of subjects choose in line with BNS in the five main choices (see Figure 4). 
A series of Chi-squared tests show that the differences in the fractions of subjects who 
choose in line with BNS between the hypothetical and the incentivized experiment are not 
statistically significant in any of the choices.45 The fraction of subjects choosing in line 
with a different other-regarding motive when it alone predicts an allocation is also 
comparable to the incentivized experiment. In the hypothetical experiment, however, 
fewer subjects choose the option that is only predicted by SLF in choice 2.46 That people 
behave less selfishly in a hypothetical setting might be due to lower costs (Forsythe et al., 
1994), which might be explained by social image concerns (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). 
Individual choice patterns reveal that 31 percent of subjects choose at least once in line 
with BNS. For these subjects, we can thus conclude that they attach a positive weight to 
concerns for BNS. About seven percent of subjects choose in line with the motive at least 
four out of five times. These findings are again comparable to the results of our main 
experiment. To summarize, this illustrates that the fulfillment of basic needs is an 
important driver of subjects’ choices and that these results also hold in a setting in which 
the allocations can be compared regarding all motives on a purely hypothetical basis. 
  
                                            
45  Chi-squared tests of the null-hypothesis that the fraction of subjects choosing the option that 
only BNS predicts is the same in the hypothetical and the incentivized experiment: Choice 1 
(MXM): 𝜒2(1) = .0539, 𝑝 = .816 , choice 2 (SLF): 𝜒2(1) = 3340, 𝑝 = .563 , choice 3 (EFF): 
𝜒2(1) = .7193, 𝑝 = .396 , choice 4 (GEN): 𝜒2(1) = 2.2716, 𝑝 = .131 , choice 5 (GEN): 𝜒2(1) =
1.9095, 𝑝 = .167. 
46  Chi-squared tests of the null-hypothesis that the fraction of subjects choosing the option that 
one motive alone predicts (Option A) is the same in the hypothetical and the incentivized 
experiment: Choice 1 (MXM): 𝜒2(1) = .8333, 𝑝 = .361, choice 2 (SLF): 𝜒2(1) = 5.3005, 𝑝 = .021, 
choice 3 (EFF): 𝜒2(1) = .0000, 𝑝 > .999 , choice 4 (GEN): 𝜒2(1) = .1170, 𝑝 = .732 , choice 5 
(GEN): 𝜒2(1) = .2469, 𝑝 = .619. 
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Figure 4: Choice fractions main choices (Hypothetical experiment) 
 
 
Notes: Fraction of subjects choosing Option C and thus attaching a positive weight to BNS 
(dark grey bars) and fraction of subjects choosing Option A and thus attaching a positive 
weight to the respective motive predicting this option (light grey bars) in the main choices 
(choice 1–5) of the hypothetical setting. The remaining subjects choose Option B (the option 
predicted by the four remaining motives), which is not depicted here. 
Increased stake sizes 
Another potential critique to the validity of our results is that stake sizes were small. 
Subjects’ expected hourly earnings for the 20 choices in the first part of the experiment 
were 11.71 Euros.47 Despite the fact that this is in the range of common incentive sizes in 
laboratory experiments, it is not clear to what extent our results hold in case of higher 
incentives (Engel, 2011). To investigate this question, we use data from an experiment 
conducted with a sample of 45 students at the International School of Economies in Tbilisi 
(Georgia). The experiment was a pilot study for the choice experiment in Tbilisi, which 
will be the focus of Chapter III. Subjects were exposed to the first ten choices of the main 
experiment with the amounts (including the threshold for basic needs satisfaction) 
adjusted to the Georgian context. In this experiment, subjects could expect to earn 18.21 
GEL per hour. This amount constitutes about 5.4 percent of the median monthly income 
in Georgia, which illustrates that incentives were quite substantial in this experiment.48 
As a comparison, the hourly expected earnings in our study in Cologne make up only 0.75 
percent of the median monthly income in Germany.49 The experiment was conducted on a 
                                            
47  The expected earnings for 10-20 choices in the first part of the experiment that lasted about 
45 minutes are 8.78 Euros. This number was calculated as the average payoff of all possible 
choices in the experiment given that roles are assigned at random, one choice is selected at 
random for payoff, and under the assumption that each option is chosen with equal probability. 
48  Figure based on the median net equivalent income per month in Georgia in 2013 of 337 GEL 
(Geostat, 2015a). 
49  Figure based on the median net equivalent income per month in Germany in 2010 of 1570 
Euros (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012b). 
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pen and paper basis and in English. The rest of the experimental setup was identical to 
the experiment in Cologne. 
Figure 5: Choice fractions main choices (Tbilisi) 
 
Notes: Fraction of subjects choosing Option C and thus attaching a positive weight to BNS 
(dark grey bars) and fraction of subjects choosing Option A and thus attaching a positive 
weight to the respective motive predicting this option (light grey bars) in the main choices 
(choice 1–5) in Tbilisi. The remaining subjects choose Option B (the option predicted by the 
four remaining motives), which is not depicted here. 
Our results again indicate that BNS plays a role in subjects’ decisions between the 
different allocations. In total, 33–47 percent (with an average of 39 percent) of subjects 
choose in line with the motive in the five main choices. A series of Chi-squared tests 
confirms that, if anything, subjects in Tbilisi place a higher weight on satisfying basic 
needs than our subjects in Cologne.50 Subjects in Tbilisi also seem to place a slightly lower 
weight on SLF, but a slightly higher weight on EFF.51 The remaining motives appear to 
be equally important in the two samples.52 Furthermore, the individual choice patterns 
indicate that BNS is a relatively important motive among subjects. 69 percent of subjects 
choose at least once the option that is only comparable with placing a positive weight on 
                                            
50  Chi-squared tests of the null-hypothesis that the fraction of subjects choosing in line with BNS 
is the same in the main experiment and in Tbilisi: Choice 1: 𝜒2(1) = 9.8182, 𝑝 = .002, choice 2: 
𝜒2(1) = 10.3846, 𝑝 = .001 , choice 3: 𝜒2(1) = 7.3931, 𝑝 = .007 , choice 4: 𝜒2(1) = 5.2427, 𝑝 =
.022, choice 5: 𝜒2(1) = 5.3799, 𝑝 = .020. 
51  Chi-squared tests of the null-hypothesis that the fraction of subjects choosing in line with SLF 
(EFF) is the same in the main experiment and in Tbilisi: Choice 2 (SLF): 𝜒2(1) = 2.8836, 𝑝 =
.089, choice 3 (EFF): 𝜒2(1) = 3.0375, 𝑝 = .081. 
52  Chi-squared tests of the null-hypothesis that the fraction of subjects choosing in line with MXM 
(GEN, ENV) is the same in the main experiment and in Tbilisi: Choice 1 (MXM): 𝜒2(1) = .1418,
𝑝 = .706, choice 4 (GEN): 𝜒2(1) = 1.3500, 𝑝 = .245 x2(1) = 1.3500, p = 0.245, choice 5 (ENV): 
𝜒2(1) = 1.3500, 𝑝 = .245. 
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the motive in the main choices. 24 percent do so at least four out of five times, while 18 
percent always choose in line with the motive. To summarize, this study shows that our 
findings on the importance of BNS are robust to increased stake sizes. If anything, we 
even find a higher prevalence of the motive, indicating that subjects in Tbilisi attach a 
relatively high importance to it compared to subjects in Cologne. 
Note that the fact that we find a substantially higher amount of choices in line with 
BNS could be due to the fact that subjects were more likely to know each other. The univer-
sity in which the experiment was conducted is a small institution in which students are 
quite familiar with each other. On the contrary, at the University of Cologne with more 
than 50,000 students it is a lot less likely that subjects knew each other (Universität zu 
Köln, 2016). Decisions in both experiments were anonymous. Nevertheless, the fact that 
subjects in Tbilisi knew that their choice would potentially not affect a total stranger could 
have influenced their decision. Interestingly, from the other-regarding motives targeted 
towards poorer persons than the decision maker, MXM, GEN, and BNS, only BNS was 
substantially higher than in the main experiment. One interpretation of this is that BNS 
becomes more important as anonymity decreases. However, since there are also other 
important differences between the two samples, this remains an open question for future 
research. 
 
2.5 QUALITATIVE DATA 
It could be argued that subjects choose allocations because of different reasons than the 
distributional motives under consideration. The individual choice patterns indicate that a 
majority of subjects is indeed motivated by these motives. However, to further shed light 
on subjects’ reasoning process, we asked subjects in the hypothetical experiment two open-
ended questions in the post experimental questionnaire.53 The questions were phrased as 
follows: “What did you consider when making your decision?” and “What criteria did you 
apply to make your decision?”.54 The answers to each of the two questions were coded with 
the help of three different student assistants of the University of Cologne independently 
from each other. They followed a strict coding protocol (see Table 7 in Appendix G). The 
protocol contained a detailed description of the coding categories corresponding to the six 
different motives. The coders were instructed to assign the respective code to an answer if 
it was consistent with a certain motive.55 
                                            
53  The hypothetical experiment is well suited to analyze self-reflection data, since confounding 
effects, such as rationalization and justification of choices is less likely to occur. 
54  English translation of the German original questions: “Worauf haben Sie bei Ihrer 
Entscheidung geachtet?” and „Nach welchen Kriterien haben Sie Ihre Entscheidung 
getroffen?“. 
55  First, two student assistants coded all answers. We then compared the two codings. If they 
matched, this answer was qualified as consistent with the respective motive(s). If any of the 
assigned codes differed, a third student assistant coded those answers again, independently 
from the first two coders. We then compared the codes of the three coders. An answer was 
rated as consistent with a motive when two of the three coders had assigned the same code to 
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For the analysis, we pooled the data of the two questions. 81 percent of subjects were 
assigned at least one code, while 28 percent argue in line with two or three of the motives. 
If subjects indeed choose an allocation because of the respective motive that predicts it, 
then those who choose repeatedly in line with a motive should mention the respective 
motive more often than other subjects. A series of Fisher’s exact tests confirms that this 
is the case for BNS, MXM, and SLF types. For ENV, GEN, and EFF types, this is, however, 
not the case.56 At the same time, BNS, MXM, and SLF types don’t mention any of the other 
motives more often than other subjects. This suggests that in general subjects who appear 
to attach a high importance to concerns for MXM, SLF, or BNS according to their choice 
patterns, also seem to do so in their explanations for their decisions. Hence, those subjects 
indeed seem to be primarily guided by considerations in line with the motives according 
to which we classified them based on their decisions in the five main choices. In case 
subjects classified as BNS types, the answers to the open-ended questions revealed, 
however, that some subjects aim at minimizing the sum of unfulfilled needs, while others 
want to minimize the number of persons falling below the threshold. In our choices, these 
two variations of basic needs fulfillment cannot be disentangled on the basis of choice data, 
since the minimum number of persons falling below the threshold always coincides with 
the minimum amount of unfulfilled basic needs. In Chapter III of this thesis, we further 
investigate by which of these variations subjects’ choices are driven. 
Altogether, this is further evidence for the fact that BNS is a conceptually different 
distributional motive from MXM. The analysis of the two open-ended questions reveals 
that subjects’ motives elicited by their allocation choices do, at least in the case of MXM, 
SLF, and BNS, reflect their (stated) reasons for choosing those allocations. Thus, these 
findings also lend additional support “to the behavioral relevance of social preferences 
models” (Jiang et al., 2016, p.164). 
 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our findings show that a non-negligible fraction of subjects cares for the satisfaction of 
basic needs. In our experiment, the motive can explain choices that cannot be explained 
by other established motives related to caring about the incomes of relatively poorer people 
in a society; maximin and generosity. Hence, we have established concerns for basic needs 
satisfaction as an important distinct distributional motive. Further, subjects are willing 
to sacrifice some of their own income, efficiency, and utility in terms of envy in order to 
satisfy additional basic needs. Altogether, this suggests that this motive is a potentially 
                                            
this answer. Answers in which subjects wrote that they wanted as many persons as possible 
to have an income above the threshold of 630 Euros were coded as consistent with BNS. In our 
choices, the minimum number of persons falling below the threshold always coincides with the 
minimum amount of unfulfilled basic needs. 
56  P-values of two-sided Fisher’s exact tests of the null-hypothesis that those subjects choosing 
five (at least four) times in line with a motive mention the respective motive equally often as 
other subjects: BNS: 𝑝 = .043 (. 001), MXM: 𝑝 = .009 (. 002), SLF: 𝑝 = .002 (. 002), EFF: 𝑝 =
𝑁/𝐴 (> .999), GEN: 𝑝 > .999 (. 999), ENV: 𝑝 < .999 (= .191). 
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important consideration in the distribution of incomes. 
Note that we assume that the desire to fulfill basic needs is a preference motive. An 
alternative approach is that subjects have a preference for complying with social norms, 
where basic needs satisfaction is one of them. In the information text, different social 
norms are triggered. Choices in the experiment would then reveal to which social norm 
subjects adhere in distributional decisions (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2015). 
A limitation of our study is that, while subjects’ decisions are incentivized, the depri-
vation of basic needs remains hypothetical. Nevertheless, the unincentivized assessment 
of fairness motives can yield valuable results (Gaertner and Schokkaert, 2012). In the 
following chapters, we will explore concerns for basic needs satisfaction in two different 
settings in which we incentivize the fulfillment of basic needs. In Chapter III, we run five-
player dictator games similar to the ones in the main experiment of the current chapter 
with a sample from the general population in Tbilisi (Georgia). By taking into account 
subjects’ current monthly income, dictators in the experiment decide about the final 
allocation of actual monthly incomes for themselves and four other persons. In Georgia, 
the social security system does not guarantee the fulfillment of basic human needs to 
everyone. Thus, if a dictator chooses an allocation in which all persons have an income 
above the national poverty line over an allocation in which, for example, two persons have 
an income below this threshold, she actively ensures that these persons have their basic 
needs satisfied in this month. In Chapter IV, we implement a variant of the dictator game 
in which receivers are at risk of being eliminated from subsequent rounds of the 
experiment if their final payoffs fall short of a certain threshold. By allocating money to 
the receiver, the dictator can help the receiver reach the threshold and thereby fulfill this 
person’s needs. Moreover, the dictator also has a strategic motive to help the receiver, 
since if less than two receivers remain in the game, it is stopped.
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B Instructions 
 
B.l Main experiment: German original text 
 
Instruktionen für das Experiment 
 
Sie nehmen nun an einem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Entscheidungsexperiment teil. 
Für Ihr Erscheinen erhalten Sie eine Aufwandsentschädigung in Höhe von 2,50 €. Im 
Verlauf des Experiments können Sie Geld in Form von „Talern“ hinzuverdienen. Am Ende 
des Experiments bekommen Sie alle im Experiment verdienten Taler in Euro 
umgerechnet ausgezahlt, wobei gilt: 
 
 
Die Höhe Ihres Verdienstes hängt von Ihren Entscheidungen und von den Entschei-
dungen anderer Teilnehmer ab. Sie erfahren zu keinem Zeitpunkt die Identität der 
anderen Teilnehmer. Genauso erfahren die anderen Entscheider zu keinem Zeitpunkt 
Ihre Identität. 
Alle Daten und Antworten werden anonym ausgewertet. Um Anonymität zu gewähr-
leisten, haben Sie eine persönliche Kabinennummer gezogen. 
Für die gesamte Dauer des Experiments ist es sehr wichtig, dass Sie nicht mit anderen 
Experimentsteilnehmern sprechen, Bitte legen Sie außerdem Ihre Handys, MP3-Player, 
Bücher, o.Ä. an die Seite. 
Bitte lesen Sie sich die Instruktionen für das Experiment sorgfältig durch. Wenn Sie 
während des Experiments etwas nicht verstehen sollten, schauen Sie bitte noch einmal in 
die Instruktionen. Falls Sie dann noch Fragen haben, geben Sie uns bitte ein Hand-
zeichen, Wir werden dann zu Ihnen an die Kabinen kommen und Ihre Fragen persönlich 
beantworten. 
Das Experiment besteht aus mehreren Teilen. Am Ende bitten wir Sie, noch einige Fragen 
zu beantworten. 
 
Erster Teil des Experiments  
15 Taler = 10 Eurocent 
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Im ersten Teil des Experiments geht es um verschiedene Möglichkeiten, wie Einkommen 
zwischen den Mitgliedern einer Gesellschaft verteilt werden können. Dazu treffen Sie 
Entscheidungen über die Aufteilung von Geldbeträgen in mehreren 
Entscheidungssituationen. In jeder Entscheidungssituation haben Sie die Wahl zwischen 
3 verschiedenen Aufteilungsmöglichkeiten. Jede dieser Aufteilungsmöglichkeiten 
beinhaltet die Zuteilung eines Betrages für Sie selbst und 4 andere Personen. Auf der 
Rückseite ünden Sie hierzu ein Beispiel für eine exemplarische Entscheidungssituation: 
Die Spalten A, B und C beschreiben die 3 Aufteilungsmöglichkeiten (Option A, B, C). 
zwischen denen Sie wählen können. Sie entscheiden immer aus der Perspektive von 
Person 2. In den Spalten von Option A, B, oder C sehen Sie die Beträge, die die Personen 
1, 2, 3, 4 und 5 erhalten, wenn Sie sich für die jeweilige Option entscheiden. Wenn Sie 
Option A wählen, erhält Person 1 den Betrag 1A, Sie würden in der Rolle von Person 2 
den Betrag 2A erhalten, Person 3 erhält den Betrag 3A, Person 4 bekommt den Betrag 
4A, und Person 5 den Betrag 5A. Wenn Sie Option B wählen, erhält Person 1 den Betrag 
1B, Sie als Person 2 den Betrag 2B, Person 3 den Betrag 3B, Person 4 den Betrag 4B, 
Person 5 den Betrag 5B. Wenn Sie Option C wählen, erhält Person 1 dementsprechend 
den Betrag 1C, Sie als Person 2 den Betrag 2C, Person 3 den Betrag 3C, Person 4 den 
Betrag 4C, Person 5 den Betrag 5C. 
 
So bestimmen sich die Auszahlungen: 
Nachdem alle Teilnehmer ihre Entscheidungen für alle Entscheidungssituationen ge-
troffen haben, werden die Teilnehmer zufällig in Gruppen von jeweils 5 Teilnehmern 
eingeteilt. Dann wird zufällig ein Teilnehmer in jeder 5er-Gruppe ausgelost, dessen 
Entscheidung auszahlungsrelevant für die jeweilige Gruppe ist. Dieser Teilnehmer ist 
Person 2. Den anderen 4 Teilnehmern einer Gruppe wird zufällig die Rolle der Personen 
1, 3, 4, oder 5 zugeordnet. Zuletzt wird zufällig für alle Teilnehmer eine bestimmte 
Entscheidungssituation für die Auszahlung ausgewählt. Die Beträge werden dann ent-
sprechend der jeweiligen Entscheidung der ausgewählten Person 2 einer Gruppe in dieser 
bestimmten Entscheidungssituation am Ende des Experiments an die Personen 1, 2, 3, 4, 
und 5 ausgezahlt. 
Beispiel 1: Ihnen wurde in Ihrer 5er-Gruppe die Rolle der Person 4 zugeordnet. Sie 
erhalten dann den Geldbetrag, den Person 4 gemäß der Entscheidung der ausgelosten 
Option A B C 
Person 1 (Andere Person) (Betrag 1A) (Betrag 1B) (Betrag IC) 
Person 2 (Sie, Sie selber) (Betrag 2A) (Betrag 2B) (Betrag 2C) 
Person 3 (Andere Person) (Betrag 3A) (Betrag 3B) (Betrag 3C) 
Person 4 (Andere Person) (Betrag 4A) (Betrag 4B) (Betrag 4C) 
Person 5 (Andere Person) (Betrag 5A) (Betrag 5B) (Betrag 5C) 
Ihre Wahl:    
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Person 2 in Ihrer Gruppe in der ausgewählten Entscheidungssituation erhält – wenn 
Person 2 in Ihrer Gruppe sich in der auszahlungsrelevanten Entscheidungssituation für 
Option B entschieden hat, dann erhalten Sie den Betrag 4B. Die anderen Teilnehmer 
erhalten gemäß ihrer Rolle die Beträge 1B, 2B, 3B, oder 5B. 
Beispiel 2: Ihnen wurde in Ihrer 5er-Gruppe die Rolle der Person 2 zugeordnet. Die 
Auszahlungsbeträge für alle Teilnehmer der Gruppe ergeben sich somit aus Ihrer Ent-
scheidung in der ausgewählten Entscheidungssituation. Sie erhalten dann den Betrag, 
den Person 2 gemäß Ihrer eigenen Entscheidung in der ausgewählten Entscheidungssitu-
ation erhält. Alle anderen Teilnehmer in Ihrer Gruppe erhalten gemäß ihrer zugelosten 
Rolle die Beträge, die sich aus Ihrer Entscheidung in der ausgewählten Entscheidungssi-
tuation ergeben: Wenn Sie sich in der auszahlungsrelevanten Entscheidungssituation für 
Option C entschieden haben, dann erhalten Sie den Betrag 2C, Die anderen Teilnehmer 
erhalten gemäß ihrer Rolle die Beträge 1C, 3C, 4C oder 5C. 
 
B.2 Main experiment: English translation57 
 
Instructions for the Experiment 
 
You are now taking part in an experiment involving economic decision-making. You will 
receive 2.50 € as a show-up fee. During the experiment, you will be able to earn money in 
the form of "coins". At the end of the experiment, all the coins you earned will be converted 
into Euros and paid out at the following rate: 
 
 
The amount you earn depends on your decisions or those of the other participants. At no 
time will the identity of the other participants be revealed. Neither will the other 
participants find out who you are. 
All data and answers will be evaluated anonymously. You have drawn a personal cubicle 
number to guarantee your anonymity. 
It is very important that you refrain from talking to the other participants at any time 
during the experiment. Please also put away your mobile phones, MP3 players, books etc. 
                                            
57  English translation of the German original text. This translation is identical to the instructions 
used in the study with the student sample in Tbilisi with the following exceptions: (1) The 
sentence “You will receive 2,50 € as a show-up fee” was deleted, since there was no show-up 
fee; (2) The sentence “At the end of the experiment, all the coins you earned will be converted 
into Euros and paid out at the following rate: 15 coins = 10 Eurocent” was changed to “At the 
end of the experiment, all the coins you earned will be converted into GEL and paid out at the 
following rate: 20 coins = 1 GEL”. 
15 coins = 10 Eurocent 
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Read the instructions for the experiment carefully. If you don’t understand anything 
during the experiment, take another look at the instructions. If you still have any 
questions, please give us a hand signal. We will then come to your cubicle and answer 
your questions in person. 
The experiment consists of several parts. At the end, we would like you to answer a few 
more questions. 
 
First part of the experiment 
 
The first part of the experiment addresses various ways in which income can be distributed 
between the members of a society. For this, you will make decisions about distributing 
monies in several situations. In each situation, you will have a choice of 3 different 
distribution schemes. Each of these schemes involves the division of an amount between 
yourself and 4 other people. You will find an example of such a situation on the back: 
Columns A, B, and C describe the 3 distribution schemes (options A, B, and C) from which 
you have to choose. You should always make your decisions from the perspective of person 
2. The columns for options A, B, and C show the amounts which persons 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
will receive if you choose the respective option. If you choose option A, person 1 will receive 
amount 1A. In the role of person 2, you will receive amount 2A, Person 3 will receive 
amount 3A, person 4 amount 4A, and person 5 amount 5A. If you choose option B, person 
1 will receive amount 1B, you as person 2 will receive amount 2B, person 3 amount 3B, 
person 4 amount 4B, and person 5 amount 5B. If you choose option C, person 1 will receive 
amount 1C, you as person 2 will receive amount 2C, person 3 amount 3C, person 4 amount 
4C, and person 5 amount 5C. 
 
How the payments are determined: 
After all the participants have made their decisions for all situations, they will be 
randomly divided into groups of 5. One participant in each group of 5 will then be drawn 
by lot. His decision will determine the payment received by his group. This participant is 
person 2. The other 4 participants in the group will be randomly allocated the roles of 
persons 1, 3, 4 or 5. Finally, a specific decision situation will be chosen at random to 
establish the amounts to be paid. These amounts will then be paid out to persons 1, 2, 3, 
Option A B C 
Person 1 (another person) (Amount 1A) (Amount IB) (Amount 1C) 
Person 2 (you, yourself) (Amount 2A) (Amount 2B) (Amount 2C) 
Person 3 (another person) (Amount 3A) (Amount 3B) (Amount 3C) 
Person 4 (another person) (Amount 4A) (Amount 4B) (Amount 4C) 
Person 5 (another person) (Amount 5A) (Amount 5B) (Amount 5C) 
Your choice:    
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4, and 5 at the end of the experiment according to the decision made by person 2 in the 
situation chosen. 
Example 1: You have been allocated the role of person 4 in your group of 5. You will then 
receive the amount due to person 4 according to the decision made by the group member 
chosen as person 2 in the situation selected – if person 2 decided on option B, you will 
receive amount 4B. The other participants will receive amounts 1B, 2B, 3B, or 5B. 
Example 2: You have been allocated the role of person 2 in your group of 5. The amounts 
paid to each group member will therefore be based on the decision you made in the 
situation chosen. You will receive the amount due to person 2 according to the decision 
you made in the respective situation. Depending on the roles they have been allocated, the 
other group members will receive the payment due to them according to your decision in 
the selected situation. If you decided on option C, you will receive amount 2C. The other 
participants will receive amounts 1C, 3C, 4C, or 5C depending on their roles. 
 
B.3 Hypothetical experiment: German original text 
 
Instruktionen für das Experiment 
 
Sie nehmen nun an einem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Entscheidungsexperiment teil. 
 
 
Sie erfahren zu keinem Zeitpunkt die Identität der anderen Teilnehmer. Genauso er-
fahren die anderen Entscheider zu keinem Zeitpunkt Ihre Identität. 
Alle Daten und Antworten werden anonym ausgewertet. Um Anonymität zu gewähr-
leisten, haben Sie eine persönliche Kabinennummer gezogen. 
Für die gesamte Dauer des Experiments ist es sehr wichtig, dass Sie nicht mit anderen 
Experimentsteilnehmern sprechen. Bitte legen Sie außerdem Ihre Handys, MP3-Player, 
Bücher, o.Ä. an die Seite. 
Bitte lesen Sie sich die Instruktionen für das Experiment sorgfältig durch. Wenn Sie 
während des Experiments etwas nicht verstehen sollten, schauen Sie bitte noch einmal in 
die Instruktionen. Falls Sie dann noch Fragen haben, geben Sie uns bitte ein Hand-
zeichen. Wir werden dann zu Ihnen an die Kabinen kommen und Ihre Fragen persönlich 
beantworten. 
Das Experiment besteht aus mehreren Teilen. Am Ende bitten wir Sie, noch einige Fragen 
zu beantworten. 
Erster Teil des Experiments 
 
Im ersten Teil des Experiments geht es um verschiedene Möglichkeiten, wie Einkommen 
Für Ihre Teilnahme erhalten Sie eine Aufwandsentschädigung in Höhe von 10 €. 
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zwischen den Mitgliedern einer Gesellschaft verteilt werden können. Dazu treffen Sie 
hypothetische Entscheidungen über die Aufteilung von Geldbeträgen in mehreren Ent-
scheidungssituationen. In jeder Entscheidungssituation haben Sie die Wahl zwischen 3 
verschiedenen Aufteilungsmöglichkeiten, Jede dieser Aufteilungsmöglichkeiten beinhal-
tet die Zuteilung eines Betrages für Sie selbst und 4 andere Personen, Im Folgenden ünden 
Sie hierzu ein Beispiel für eine exemplarische Entscheidungssituation: 
 
 
 
 
 
Die Spalten A, B und C beschreiben die 3 Aufteilungsmöglichkeiten (Option A, B, C). 
zwischen denen Sie wählen können. Sie entscheiden immer aus der Perspektive von 
Person 2, In den Spalten von Option A, B, oder C sehen Sie die Beträge, die die Personen 
1, 2, 3, 4 und 5 erhalten, wenn Sie sich für die jeweilige Option entscheiden. Wenn Sie 
Option A wählen, erhält Person 1 den Betrag 1A, Sie würden in der Rolle von Person 2 
den Betrag 2A erhalten, Person 3 erhält den Betrag 3A, Person 4 bekommt den Betrag 
4A, und Person 5 den Betrag 5A. Wenn Sie Option B wählen, erhält Person 1 den Betrag 
1B, Sie als Person 2 den Betrag 2B, Person 3 den Betrag 3B, Person 4 den Betrag 4B, 
Person 5 den Betrag 5B. Wenn Sie Option C wählen, erhält Person 1 dementsprechend 
den Betrag 1C, Sie als Person 2 den Betrag 2C, Person 3 den Betrag 3C, Person 4 den 
Betrag 4C, Person 5 den Betrag 5C. 
 
B.4 Hypothetical experiment: English translation 
 
Instructions for the Experiment 
 
You are now taking part in an experiment involving economic decision-making. 
 
 
At no time will the identity of the other participants be revealed. Neither will the other 
participants find out who you are. 
All data and answers will be evaluated anonymously. You have drawn a personal cubicle 
Option A B C 
Person 1 (Andere Person) (Betrag 1A) (Betrag 1B) (Betrag IC) 
Person 2 (Sie, Sie selber) (Betrag 2A) (Betrag 2B) (Betrag 2C) 
Person 3 (Andere Person) (Betrag 3A) (Betrag 3B) (Betrag 3C) 
Person 4 (Andere Person) (Betrag 4A) (Betrag 4B) (Betrag 4C) 
Person 5 (Andere Person) (Betrag 5A) (Betrag 5B) (Betrag 5C) 
Ihre Wahl:    
You will receive 10 € as a show-up fee. 
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number to guarantee your anonymity. 
It is very important that you refrain from talking to the other participants at any time 
during the experiment. Please also put away your mobile phones, MP3 players, books etc. 
Read the instructions for the experiment carefully. If you don’t understand anything 
during the experiment, take another look at the instructions. If you still have any 
questions, please give us a hand signal. We will then come to your cubicle and answer your 
questions in person. 
The experiment consists of several parts. At the end, we would like you to answer a few 
more questions. 
 
First part of the experiment 
 
The first part of the experiment addresses various ways in which income can be distributed 
between the members of a society. For this, you will make hypothetical decisions about 
distributing monies in several situations. In each situation, you will have a choice of 3 
different distribution schemes. Each of these schemes involves the division of an amount 
between yourself and 4 other people. You will find an example of such a situation on the 
back: 
Columns A, B, and C describe the 3 distribution schemes (options A, B, and C) from which 
you have to choose. You should always make your decisions from the perspective of person 
2. The columns for options A, B, and C show the amounts which persons 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
will receive if you choose the respective option. If you choose option A, person 1 will receive 
amount 1A, In the role of person 2, you will receive amount 2A, Person 3 will receive 
amount 3A, person 4 amount 4A, and person 5 amount 5A. If you choose option B, person 
1 will receive amount 1B, you as person 2 will receive amount 2B, person 3 amount 3B, 
person 4 amount 4B, and person 5 amount 5B. If you choose option C, person 1 will receive 
amount 1C, you as person 2 will receive amount 2C, person 3 amount 3C, person 4 amount 
4C, and person 5 amount 5C. 
Option A B C 
Person 1 (another person) (Amount 1A) (Amount IB) (Amount 1C) 
Person 2 (you, yourself) (Amount 2A) (Amount 2B) (Amount 2C) 
Person 3 (another person) (Amount 3A) (Amount 3B) (Amount 3C) 
Person 4 (another person) (Amount 4A) (Amount 4B) (Amount 4C) 
Person 5 (another person) (Amount 5A) (Amount 5B) (Amount 5C) 
Your choice:    
 
 46 
 
C Information text 
 
C.l Main experiment: German original text58 
 
Wichtige Information zum Experiment 
 
Eine wichtige gesellschaftliche Frage betrifft die Höhe der individuellen Einkommen. Die 
Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft haben die Möglichkeit, diese zu beeinflussen. Das kann 
beispielsweise dadurch geschehen, dass man dem Ärmsten ein zusätzliches Einkommen 
gibt. Auf der anderen Seite kann auch die Höhe des gesellschaftlichen Gesamteinkom-
mens eine Rolle spielen. Außerdem kann eine Gesellschaft die Unterschiedlichkeit der 
individuellen Einkommen berücksichtigen, beispielsweise im Vergleich zum mittleren 
Nettoeinkommen. In Deutschland liegt das mittlere Nettoeinkommen für eine allein-
stehende Person pro Monat bei 1570 Euro. Es gibt dabei Menschen, die mehr oder auch 
weniger als diesen Betrag zur Verfügung haben. Laut Experten des Statistischen 
Bundesamtes liegt die Armutsgrenze in Deutschland bei 40 Prozent des mittleren Net-
toeinkommens, also bei 630 Euro. Es wurde ermittelt, dass es Menschen mit einem 
Einkommen unterhalb dieser Grenze nicht möglich ist, die zum Leben notwendigen 
Ressourcen zu erwerben. 
 
C.2 Main experiment: English translation 
 
Important information about the experiment 
 
One important social issue is the amount of individual income. The members of a society 
are able to influence this, for example by paying extra income to the poorest. However, the 
income available to the society as a whole can also play a part. Moreover, the society can 
also take differences in individual income into account, for example when compared to the 
average net income. In Germany, the average monthly net income for a single person is 
1570 Euros. There are people who have more or less money at their disposal. According to 
experts at the federal statistical office, the poverty line is 40 percent of the median net 
income, i.e., 630 Euros. It was found that people whose income is lower than this amount 
are unable to acquire the resources required to subsist. 
 
C.3 Lab study Tbilisi: English original text 
 
Important information about the experiment 
 
One important social issue is the amount of individual income. The members of a society 
are able to influence this, for example by paying extra income to the poorest. However, the 
                                            
58  This text was used in the incentivized, as well as in the hypothetical experiment in Cologne. 
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income available to the society as a whole can also play a part. Moreover, the society can 
also take differences in individual income into account, for example when compared to the 
average net income. In Georgia, the average monthly net income for a single person is 274 
GEL. There are people who have more or less money at their disposal. According to experts 
at the National Statistics Office, the subsistence minimum is 130 GEL. It was found that 
people whose income is lower than this amount are unable to acquire the resources 
required to subsist. 
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F Robustness: Conditional logit 
 
Table 6: Conditional logit models: Odds ratios (robustness) 
 
(1) 
ENV 
excluded 
(2) 
GEN 
excluded 
(3) 
EFF 
excluded 
(4) 
SLF 
excluded 
𝛼𝑆𝐿𝐹 1.013*** 1.009*** 1.009***  
 (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0018)  
𝛼𝐵𝑁𝑆 1.003** 1.003** 1.003** 1.003** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
𝛼𝑀𝑋𝑀 1.008*** 1.008*** 1.008*** 1.008*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
𝛼𝐸𝐹𝐹 0.999** 1.000  1.002*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0004) 
𝛼𝐺𝐸𝑁 1.001***  1.000 0.998*** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
𝛼𝐸𝑁𝑉  1.001*** 1.001** 1.003*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Notes: Odds ratios of the conditional logit models of subjects’ 
decisions in the five main plus the five additional choices. Pseudo R-
Squared: 0.228, Chi-squared: 211.5989. *𝑝 < .10, ** 𝑝 < .05, *** 𝑝 <
.01. Individual specific standard errors in parenthesis. 
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G Coding protocol 
 
Table 7: Coding protocol 
Motive Description (German original)  Description (English translation) 
SLF 
Eigenen Betrag maximieren (hier: 
Betrag von Person 2). 
 
Maximize own amount (here: 
amount of Person 2). 
BNS 
Summe der unerfüllten basic needs 
minimieren (unerfüllte basic needs 
= Betrag der zum Erreichen der 
630 fehlt). Möglichst viele 
Personen haben einen Betrag 
größer als 630. 
 
Minimize sum of unfulfilled basic 
needs (unfulfilled basic needs = 
amount that is missing to reach the 
threshold of 630). Maximize the 
number of persons having an 
amount higher than 630. 
MXM 
Betrag der absolut ärmsten Person 
(hier: Person 5) maximieren. 
 Maximize amount of poorest person 
(here: Person 5). 
EFF Gesamteinkommen maximieren.  Maximize total income. 
GEN 
Summe der Abstände zwischen 
eigenem Betrag und den Beträgen 
der Personen 3, 4 und 5 
minimieren. 
 
Minimize sum of differences between 
own amount and the amount of 
Person 3, 4, and 5. 
ENV 
Abstand zwischen eigenem Betrag 
und dem Betrag von Person 1 
minimieren. 
 
Minimize difference between own 
amount and the amount of Person 1. 
Notes: Coding protocol for the open-ended questions in the post-experimental questionnaire. 
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CHAPTER III 
Basic needs at stake: Evidence from a high 
stakes experiment in Georgia59 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The results in Chapter II of this thesis suggest that concerns for the fulfillment of basic 
needs are an important driver of subjects’ decisions in situations in which subjects are 
provided with a social context for the choice situation. However, in the setting of Chapter 
II, subjects did not necessarily have incomes below the basic needs threshold in their 
everyday life. Hence, it remains an open question how the motive fares in a situation in 
which receivers cannot satisfy their basic needs in their everyday life. In this paper, we 
investigate whether the motive of basic needs satisfaction is an important behavioral 
driving force in such contexts. We also disentangle the motive from other distributional 
concerns, such as selfishness, maximin, efficiency, generosity, and envy and assess their 
importance. We run a high stake experiment with a sample from the general population 
in Tbilisi (Georgia) in which subjects decide about the distribution of actual monthly 
incomes.60 In contrast to Chapter II, we test the importance of these motives in decisions 
with (1) a real-world context (i.e., subjects are confronted with exactly the income amounts 
in the experiment in their everyday lives), (2) high stakes, and, most importantly, (3) the 
fulfillment of basic needs being at stake.61 We take a closer look at the nature of the 
principle of basic needs satisfaction, investigate its predictive power in a different decision 
                                            
59  This chapter is based on joint work Thomas Dohmen and Gari Walkowitz. The authors would 
like to thank participants of the ACCER 2014 Workshop on Exploring Culture and Behaviour 
by Economic and Psychological Experiments, the Spring School in Behavioral Economics 2015 
in San Diego, the Morality, Incentives and Unethical Behavior Conference 2015, the seminar 
of Economics and Management at Paderborn University, and in particular Hartmut Lehmann, 
Karine Torosyan, Norberto Pignatti for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to 
the VolkswagenStiftung for financial support via the project “Understanding Informal 
Employment in Transition: The Case of Georgia” (Hartmut Lehmann). We thank Ekaterine 
Mamistvalovi, Archil Dvalishvili, Salome Deisadze, Nino Khukhunaishvili, Akaki 
Mosakhlishvili, and Nino Alibegashvili for excellent research assistance, and Mikheil 
Sarjveladze for assistance in the German-Georgian translation of the experiment material. We 
further thank Karine Torosyan, Norberto Pignatti, Tako Jugheli, and staff members of PMCG 
for organizing the conduction of the experiments in Tbilisi. 
60  Tbilisi is the capital and largest city of Georgia with about a third of the population living in 
Tbilisi (Geostat, 2016a). 
61  Mueller (2012) uses high stakes to study distributive norms, but she does not consider concerns 
for basic needs satisfaction. 
 56 
 
context, and explore how it is influenced by core individual characteristics, such as gender, 
age, and income.  
Like in Chapter II, we employed a series of five-person dictator games in which the 
dictator chose between three different distributions of incomes among herself and four 
other subjects. We provided subjects with information about the monthly amount of money 
necessary to fulfill basic needs in Tbilisi and about the actual current monthly income 
(personal income) of the four other subjects they are matched with in the experiment. The 
payoff a subject received in an allocation chosen by the dictator was the difference between 
the amount allocated to them by the dictator and her personal income. In this way, the 
choices a dictator made were about final distributions of actual incomes among five 
genuine persons for the month of the experiment. Of the four subjects a dictator was 
matched with, the personal incomes of two subjects were below the threshold of basic 
needs satisfaction. Hence, choosing an allocation in which the income amount of one or 
two of these persons is higher than the threshold entailed satisfying their basic needs. 
Thus, subjects could judge the allocations based on the deprivation of basic needs in 
subjects’ everyday lives. The allocation choices were designed in such a way that we can 
disentangle the motive from other relevant distributional concerns, such as maximin, 
efficiency, generosity, envy, and selfishness. 
Georgia is especially suitable for the purpose of our study, since it is possible to 
incentivize the fulfillment of basic human needs in this context. In Georgia, a substantial 
share (10.1 percent in 2015) of the population is living with an income below the nationally 
defined subsistence level (Geostat, 2016b). Further, the poorly developed social security 
system does not sufficiently reach the people in need.62 This means that these people are 
actually deprived of their basic needs and thus we can incentivize the fulfillment of these 
needs in our experiment. A second advantage is that in Georgia the education level 
including this of the less wealthy is relatively high compared to other developing countries 
in which we would find a poorly developed social security system. 63  This facilitates 
conducting an experiment that is relatively complex. 
We find that concerns for the satisfaction of basic needs seem to play an important role 
in the motivation of subjects in this setting. Comparable to the results from the lab study 
in Cologne (see Chapter II), on average 22 percent of subjects choose in line with the 
motive in choices in which they have to forego utility in terms of all other motives. Looking 
at individual choice patterns, we see that the majority of subjects choose at least once in 
line with the motive. Furthermore, we find that subjects’ behavior can indeed be explained 
by a desire to minimize overall unfulfilled basic needs, as compared to solely minimizing 
the number of people in need as an alternative explanation. Moreover, concerns for basic 
needs satisfaction elicited in this setting are predictive of helping people in need in a 
different choice context at the expense of subjects’ own payoff. Finally, our findings suggest 
                                            
62  UNICEF Georgia and the University of York (2010) estimate that only 20 percent of officially 
poor households receive targeted social assistance - Georgia’s main program for social security 
-, while more than a third of poor households do not receive any social assistance at all. 
63  For example, the adult literacy rate in Georgia is 99.75 percent as compared to 83.44 percent 
in all middle income countries and 57.50 percent in low income countries (Worldbank, 2016). 
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that women are more likely to have stronger concerns for the fulfillment of basic needs 
than men, but that the motive is independent of subjects’ age and income. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview 
of the experimental design and procedures. Section 3.3 presents the results. Section 3.4 
concludes. 
 
3.2 EXPERIMENT 
3.2.1 Identification strategy and design 
Example of a choice and identification strategy 
We use the definitions of the different distributional motives, the assumptions about an 
individual’s utility function, and the identification strategy introduced in Chapter II of 
this thesis. Accordingly, we assume that an individual i can be motivated by a combination 
of six different motives – basic needs satisfaction (BNS), maximin (MXM), selfishness 
(SLF), efficiency (EFF), generosity (GEN), and envy (ENV) – that she trades off against 
each other. For a detailed description and the exact formulation of the utility function, see 
Chapter II, Section 2.3.2. 
Table 1: Example of a choice 
Option 1 2 3 
Person A 682 622 632 
Dictator 334 334 355 
Person B 203 326 307 
Person C 159 119 98 
Person D 72 72 93 
Prediction BNS GEN SLF 
   MXM 
   EFF 
   ENV 
Notes: Rows 2–6 show the income amounts 
(in Georgian Lari (GEL)) of the dictator and 
Person A–D in Option 1, 2, and 3. These 
rows were displayed to subjects when they 
made their decision. Rows 7–10 indicate 
which motive predicts which option. 
Like in Chapter II, subjects made a series of choices in five-player dictator games in 
each of which the dictator had to choose between three different distributions of income 
amounts among herself and four other subjects. Table 1 depicts an example of a choice. 
Rows 2–6 depict the amounts of the dictator and Person A–D for each option and choice. 
For instance, if a dictator chooses Option 1 in the example, Person A has an income amount 
of 682 Georgian Lari (GEL), the dictator an amount of 334 GEL, Person B an amount of 
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203 GEL, Person C an amount of 159 GEL, and Person D an amount of 72 GEL. We say 
that a motive predicts an option if the utility in terms of this motive is higher than in the 
remaining options. The last four rows of Table 1 indicate which option is predicted by 
which motive. If an option is predicted by only one motive, then choosing this option is only 
compatible with attaching a positive weight to the motive that alone predicts this option, 
since this option is worse in terms of the utility of all other motives. 
 
Incentivizing basic needs satisfaction 
Basic needs fulfillment was incentivized as follows. Dictators decided about the actual 
monthly income of receivers (Person A, B, C, and D) and themselves in the month of the 
experiment. These incomes were determined by the allocation in the dictator’s preferred 
income distribution. We supplemented subjects’ actual current monthly personal income 
so that it amounted to the income amount depicted in the respective allocation. Receivers, 
as well as the dictator, were people living in Tbilisi who had participated in a pre-survey. 
In this pre-survey, we had required information about these people's incomes. 
Table 2: Income categories 
Category Dictator Person A Person B Person C Person D N (dictators) 
I 220–329 590–617 171–197 69–95 32–68 31 
II 330–439 696–723 171–197 69–95 32–68 27 
III 440–549 799–826 171–197 69–95 32–68 26 
IV 550–659 975–1002 171–197 69–95 32–68 20 
V 660–769 1071–1112 171–197 69–95 32–68 9 
Notes: Personal income (in GEL) of dictators and receivers assigned to the role 
of Person A, B, C, and D in GEL in the respective income category (I–V) of the 
dictator. 
In particular, subjects were assigned to the group of dictators or of Persons A, B, C, or 
D (receivers) based on their personal income (see Table 2).64 We had five different income 
categories of dictators and of receivers in the role of Person A.65 For this reason, there were 
five different versions of the instructions, control questions, and decision booklets in which 
the respective personal incomes of subjects and the income amounts in the choices were 
adjusted accordingly. Before making their choices, dictators received information about 
the personal income of receivers they were matched with in the experiment. A dictator in 
income category I, for instance, was informed that she is matched to a receiver in the role 
of Person A whose personal income is between 590–617 GEL, Person B with 171–197 GEL, 
                                            
64  Receivers were drawn from the same subject pool as dictators. From the pool from which 
subjects for this experiment were drawn, subjects for two other experiments were selected as 
well. All subjects from this pool took the survey questionnaire. Most of these subjects also 
participated in one of the experiments. Each subject participated only in one of the experiments 
(see Section 3.2.2 and Figure 7 in Appendix A). 
65  We had five income categories in order to keep the income ranges of Person A and the dictator 
stated in the instructions small. 
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Person C with 69–95 GEL, and Person D with 32–68 GEL. The personal income was 
calculated on the basis of income information subjects provided in the pre-survey (see 
Section 3.2.2). In particular, the personal income was computed as their monthly 
disposable equalized income.66 Since receivers did not make choices, they were not present 
in the experiment.67  
Additionally, subjects received information about the threshold of basic needs 
satisfaction. For this purpose, dictators received an information text after reading the 
instructions and immediately before making their decisions on a piece of paper (see 
Appendix C).68 The text was similar to the one provided to subjects in the experiment of 
Chapter II, but was adjusted to the Georgian context. The experimenters made sure that 
all subjects had read the text, which remained on subjects’ desk while they made their 
decisions. In this text, they learned that the monthly necessary amount to fulfill a person’s 
basic needs is 140 GEL in Georgia. This amount was based on the nationally defined 
subsistence minimum for a single member household at the time of the experiment, which 
is calculated by the National Statistics Office of Georgia. The amount contains a minimum 
food basket (70 percent) and 30 percent of non-monetary items (Geostat, 2015b, 2016c). 
The personal incomes of two groups of receivers (Person C and D) were below this 
threshold of basic needs satisfaction. Hence, if in an allocation, these persons’ incomes 
were higher than 140 GEL, then their basic needs would be fulfilled for this month. If they 
were lower than this amount, they would be deprived of some of their basic necessities. 
Consequently, the choice of an option in which, for example, the income of Person C is 
higher than the threshold implied satisfying this person’s needs. Likewise, choosing an 
allocation in which her income is higher as compared to a different allocation, but not 
higher than the threshold entailed satisfying some of her needs.  
To summarize, the payoff a subject received in an allocation of a choice was the income 
amount in this allocation minus her personal income. The choices a dictator made were 
thus about actual distributions of monthly income. Knowing the amount of the threshold 
of basic needs satisfaction and the personal incomes of the persons they were matched 
with, dictators could satisfy basic needs of Person C and D in the experiment; genuine 
persons who were actually living with an income below the basic needs threshold in their 
real life. Dictators could thus – on top of other threshold-independent distributional 
considerations such as, maximin, efficiency, generosity, envy, or selfishness – judge the 
allocations based on the persons’ deprivation of basic needs. 
 
Choices 
Subjects first made decisions in 16 isolation choices (see Table 7 in Appendix D). In these 
                                            
66  Subjects provided their family income and the household size. Based on this, we calculated 
subjects’ monthly disposable equalized income. We used the “OECD modified equivalence” 
scale in order to account for household composition (a value of 1 is assigned to the household 
head, 0.5 to each additional adult, 0.3 to each child) (see OECD, 2013). 
67  Receivers answered the survey questionnaire or additionally participated in another 
experiments. 
68  For the complete instructions, see Appendix B. 
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choices, we systematically varied the utilities in terms of the different motives in the three 
different allocations such that it allows us to assess to which motive(s) the dictator 
attaches a positive weight (see beginning of this section). In particular, one motive alone 
predicted Option 1 and another motive alone predicted Option 3. The remaining four 
motives predicted Option 2. In this way, each motive was the only motive predicting an 
option five times.69 Choice 1–5, in which BNS alone predicts an option, are comparable to 
the five main choices in the experiment of Chapter II adjusted to the Georgian context. 
Subjects additionally made decisions in five income gap choices in which we explicitly 
tested one assumption of our model of concerns for basic needs satisfaction of Chapter II. 
In particular, we tested whether subjects indeed care about the sum of unfulfilled needs 
(i.e., the income gap) or, alternatively, about the number of persons below the basic needs 
threshold (i.e., headcount considerations).70 In the main choices, in order to be able to 
disentangle BNS from MXM, the option predicted by BNS had the smallest amount of 
unfulfilled basic needs, and, at the same time, the smallest number of persons with an 
income below the threshold. Hence, it is not clear which of the criteria induced subjects to 
choose this option. In the income gap choices, however, we kept the number of persons 
with an income below the threshold constant across options (see Table 8 in Appendix D).71 
Hence, by comparing decisions in the main choices to those in the income gap choices, we 
shed light on which of the two criteria subjects use when choosing in line with concerns 
for BNS. In particular, if subjects are concerned with minimizing the income gap, then 
choice fractions in the income gap choices should not be different from those in the main 
choices. If, on the contrary, subjects care mainly for minimizing the number of persons 
below the threshold, then the fraction of subjects choosing in line with the BNS option 
should be smaller in the income gap choices.  
Finally, we assess whether choosing in line with BNS in our discrete dictator games is 
predictive of choices entailing the fulfillment of basic needs of another person in a situation 
in which they could freely distribute an amount of money between different persons. For 
this purpose, dictators made a continuous dictator game choice (choice 24) after the 23 
discrete choices.72 In this decision, subjects were asked to distribute 200 GEL between 
                                            
69  It is not possible to have the motives SLF and GEN alone predict a different option at the same 
time. Thus, we employed one choice in which SLF alone predicted an option and GEN and EFF 
predicted a different option (choice 11) and a second choice in which GEN alone predicted an 
option and SLF and EFF predicted a different option (choice 12). 
70  The terms income gap and headcount are borrowed from the poverty measurement literature, 
where both are measures of the extent of poverty. The income gap is defined as the difference 
between the poverty threshold and the mean income of the poor (Chakravarty, 2009). Our 
definition of concerns for BNS takes into account the sum of the differences between the 
poverty threshold and the income of the poor. 
71  In order to not confuse MXM and BNS considerations, in these choices we kept the income of 
the poorest person (Person D) always the same (72 GEL). Thus, MXM does not make any 
prediction in these choices. Apart from that, the choices are similar to the main choices (choice 
1–5). 
72  Additionally, subjects were also exposed to two additional choices (choice 17 and 18) (see Table 
8 in Appendix D). 
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themselves and four other persons they were matched with. They could allocate an amount 
between 0 and 200 GEL to Person A, B, C, and D, where the total had to equal 200 GEL. 
The amount they did not allocate to any other person, they kept for themselves. For this 
decision, dictators were informed about the exact monthly income of the receivers (Person 
A–D) they would be matched with in case this choice was drawn for payoff (see Table 9 in 
Appendix E). In this way, dictators could make sure that Person C and D received enough 
to lift their income for this month above the threshold. To achieve this, they had to allocate 
at least 57 GEL to Person C and at least 90 GEL to Person D. We relate giving behavior 
in choice 24 to choices in the isolation choices. By this, we assess whether concerns for 
BNS are predictive for helping people in need in a different choice setting at the expense 
of subjects’ own payoff. 
The experiment consisted of three parts (see Figure 8 in Appendix A). This paper is 
about Part 1 of the experiment. In Part 1A, subjects made the 23 three-option five-player 
dictator game decisions, which have been explained above (see also Figure 9 in Appendix 
A). To make sure that subjects understood the instructions, they received a set of control 
questions after they had read the instructions (see Appendix F). 73  The experiment 
assistants corrected the control questions of each subject individually. In case a subject 
made a mistake, the assistant explained the relevant part of the instructions again and 
made sure the subject understood everything. If a subject answered control question 1 
incorrectly, they received an additional control question similar to question l. This 
question was then again corrected individually by the assistants. The experimental 
assistants were instructed to make a note in case a subject did not understand the 
instructions even after several rounds of explanation. This subject would then be excluded 
from the analysis.74 After the control questions, subjects received the information text. 
After everyone had read the text, they received the decision booklet with the 23 decisions. 
Each decision was depicted on a separate page, and pages were printed one-sided. Subjects 
were instructed to make decisions sequentially, without looking at previous decisions.75 
On the last pages of the booklet, subjects were confronted with the continuous dictator 
game decision (choice 24) including the corresponding instructions (Part 1B). Finally, they 
filled in a post experimental questionnaire in which they were asked questions related to 
the experiment (Part 1C). 
                                            
73  This is especially important in this setting, given that subjects were unfamiliar with taking 
part in economic experiments. 
74  This was not the case for any of the subjects. In total, 21 of the 113 subjects received the 
additional control question. 
75  Due to the fact that the experiment was paper-pencil based, and that the administration of the 
five different sets of decision booklets was already organizationally demanding, the order of 
the 23 choices, as well as the presentation of choice alternatives, was the same for all subjects. 
Within the isolation choices as well as within the additional and income gap choices, the order 
of choices was determined randomly before the experiment. The presentation of choice 
alternatives was balanced for each motive across the 23 choices, such that each motive was 
presented to subjects on Option 1, 2, and 3 five to six times. In this way, we control for possible 
confounding effects if subjects for some reason systematically have a preference for, for 
example, the middle option (Option 2). 
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Incentives 
Subjects were paid for one of their decisions in Part 1 or 3 of the experiment. Part 2 was 
not incentivized. After completing all three parts, the decision that determined payoffs 
was randomly determined for each subject. Subjects first drew a card from a bag to either 
select Part 1 with probability 0.2 or Part 3 with probability 0.8.76 Subjects next determined 
the decision in the respective part that was paid out, again by physically drawing a card 
from a bag (see Figure 11 in Appendix B).77 Dictators who received payment for a decision 
in Part 1 of the experiment were matched with four receivers (one subject for each role) 
corresponding to their respective income categories. These receivers got their payment at 
the end of the session in which they filled in the survey questionnaire. In case this session 
was before or on the same day of the session of the respective dictator, they could collect 
their payment later. 
 
3.2.2. Procedures 
The experiment took place in centralized sessions at the University of Georgia and the 
International School of Economies in Tbilisi (Georgia) between November 2015 and May 
2016, and involved a total of 113 dictators. Each session lasted about 2 hours. The 
experiment was paper-pencil based and conducted in Georgian. Instructions were 
translated from German into Georgian by translation and back-translation. The back-
translation makes sure that the translation is as accurate as possible and that the 
meaning of the original text is not altered (Brislin, 1970). All contact to subjects was 
administered by a team of helpers and experiment assistants in Georgian. Assistants were 
Georgian natives with Georgian as their mother tongue. 78  The team of experiment 
assistants was led by an experimental supervisor (also Georgian) who was responsible for 
coordinating all activities related to the execution of the experiment. Assistants and the 
supervisor were instructed in the conduction of the experiment by the authors. The 
training sessions took place in October 2015 in Tbilisi. At the end of this training a trial 
session of the experiment was conducted to make sure the procedures run smoothly and 
were absolutely clear to the experimenters. 
Subjects in the experiment were recruited from two different samples of the general 
population in Tbilisi (Georgia). The first sample contains respondents of a survey who had 
been recruited via the random walk method in 2013. The second sample consists of 
subjects directly recruited by the Georgian helper team. The study includes five steps (see 
Figure 7 in Appendix A). In the first step, subjects were approached by helpers in home 
visits. During these visits, helpers conducted a pre-survey in which they asked 
respondents – among other things – about their monthly disposable household income and 
                                            
76  The different payment probabilities were designed to balance the different stake sizes in Part 
1 and 3. 
77  In Part 3, this consisted again of a series of draws. We do not explain this here in detail, since 
Part 3 is not the focus of this paper. 
78  We also recruited Armenian assistants who were not fluent in Georgian. They took over ad-
ministrative tasks before, during, and after the experimental sessions without direct contact 
to the participants. 
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the number of (adult) family members. At the end of the pre-survey, respondents were 
invited to take part in the experiment and a survey questionnaire. If they agreed, they 
were told that they would be contacted again to be invited for a specific experimental 
session. In a second step, families were selected for and invited to the experiment. The 
selection of families was based on their monthly disposable equalized income per family 
member, which was calculated on the basis of the pre-survey data, as explained in Section 
3.2.1. Families were then invited via telephone for a specific session. If possible, all family 
members were invited to the same time slot. Subjects first took part in the experiment. In 
case multiple members of the same family showed up, only one person was allowed to take 
part in the experiment. The other family members took part in a different experiment or 
in the survey questionnaire only. All subjects were interviewed for the survey 
questionnaire, which lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. The survey was administered 
either in a home visit or within the centralized sessions.79  Finally, once subjects completed 
all parts of the study, they received their payment for participation. To diminish the role 
of social image concerns, subjects’ decisions were kept anonymous towards other 
participants and the experimenter throughout the whole experiment (Bénabou and Tirole, 
2006). To guarantee anonymity during the decision making process, subjects’ desks were 
separated by cardboard partitions that had been fixated at each desk (see Figure 10 in 
Appendix B). Further, subjects received their payment for the experiment from a person 
who had not been involved in the experimental session. As a result of the payment 
procedure outlined before, 25 percent of subjects were paid for Part 1. On average subjects 
earned about 67 GEL in this part of the experiment, where the exchange rate was 1 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜 =
2.6 𝐺𝐸𝐿  in November 2015. 80  Taking the median income in Tbilisi of 337 GEL as a 
reference, this amount constitutes about 6.1 daily median incomes (Geostat, 2015a). 
 
3.3 RESULTS 
In total, 113 dictators took part in the experiment with more subjects (henceforth, we will 
use the terms subject and dictator interchangeably) in the lower income categories (see 
Table 2 in Section 3.2.1).81 Since the 71 subjects sampled by the random walk method do 
not differ with respect to age, gender, and income from the other 42 subjects, we pool data 
of these subjects in our analysis.82 We also pool data of subjects from all five income 
                                            
79  For nine subjects the experiment as well as the survey questionnaire was conducted 
individually in their homes. 
80  Additional to the payments in the experiment subjects received a compensation of 20 GEL for 
filling in the survey questionnaire. Passive subjects received on average 53 GEL in their role 
of a receiver (Person A, B, C, D) in Part 1 of the experiment. 
81  This is mostly a result of selection, since we invited an approximately equal number of subjects 
per category to the experiment. 
82  The two samples do not differ significantly in terms of: gender: (𝜒2(1) = .0654, 𝑝 = .798), age: 
(𝑡(98) = −1.4441, 𝑝 = .152), income: (𝑡(111) = .4933, 𝑝 = .623) (tests performed on the basis 
of the number of observations for which data on the respective variables are available). 
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categories for the main analysis.83 Our subjects are representative of the population in 
Georgia with respect to age, but are slightly richer than the general population in Tbilisi.84 
In addition, women are overrepresented in our sample.85 All subjects made all decisions 
in the five main choices (BNS isolation choices) and the five income gap choices, 112 of 
them made decisions in all 16 isolation choices, 111 of them in all 23 discrete choice 
dictator games, we have 108 observations for choice 24, and 106 for all 24 dictator game 
decisions.86 
 
                                            
83  In Section 3.3.5, we analyze potential differences between these groups in terms of the 
distributive decisions they make. 
84  On average our subjects are 39.83 years old while the average age in Georgia is 37.43 years 
(United United Nations, 2014). The median net equivalent income in Tbilisi in 2013 was 337 
GEL, while in our sample it was 434 GEL (Geostat, 2015a). 
85  Further, in Georgia 48 percent of the population are male, while in our sample this share is 
only 38 percent (Geostat, 2015c). 
86  In total 111 dictators made decisions in the continuous choice dictator game, but we had to 
exclude three subjects from the analysis, since they allocated in total more than 200 GEL to 
the four receivers. 
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3.3.1 Main choices: Basic needs satisfaction 
 
We find that BNS is prevalent in every choice with 18 to 27 percent of dictators 
choosing in line with the motive when it alone predicts an option (see Figure 1, 
“Incentivized Tbilisi”). Individual choice patterns further show that the majority of 
dictators (61 percent) choose the allocation that is alone predicted by BNS at least once, 
revealing that these dictators attach a positive weight to the motive (see Figure 2, 
“Incentivized Tbilisi”). In this experiment, dictators are deciding about the actual monthly 
income of genuine persons. In other words, receivers (Person A, B, C, and D) will, in the 
month of the experiment, have the income amounts depicted in an allocation chosen by 
the dictator. This entails that dictators can actually satisfy real-life basic needs of Person 
C and D in the experiment; genuine persons who are living with an income below the basic 
needs threshold. We thus show that the motive is important in a setting in which the 
fulfillment of basic needs is actually at stake. This is the main contribution of this paper. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Choice fractions BNS: Choice 1–5 
 
Notes: Fraction of subjects choosing in line with BNS in main choices (choice 1–5) per 
study. The rest of subjects choose the option that is alone predicted by a different motive 
or the option predicted by the four remaining motives, both of which is not depicted here. 
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Figure 2: Reverse cumulative distribution: BNS per study
 
 
Next, we relate the results from the present study to those of our student sample in 
Cologne (see Chapter II). Results from the incentivized choices in Cologne might not be 
directly comparable to our results in Tbilisi. Besides disparities stemming from the fact 
that subjects are from different countries, there are several important differences. First, 
subjects in Cologne are drawn from a student subject pool, while subjects in Tbilisi are 
drawn from a sample of the general population. Second, the incentive structure is different 
in the two settings. For instance, while in Cologne, subjects were paid the respective 
amounts in the allocations converted to Euros, subjects in Tbilisi received the difference 
between their personal income reported in the pre-survey and the income amount in the 
allocations. Finally, and most importantly, in Tbilisi, receivers are genuine persons of 
whom two persons are actually living with an income below the subsistence minimum, i.e., 
they are actually in need. In Cologne, receivers are fellow students.  
We, therefore, exposed 90 subjects from the same subject pool to the same set of choices 
as in the incentivized study in Tbilisi, but in a hypothetical setting.87 Holding incentives 
                                            
87  Subjects were exposed to choices with the income amounts of dictators in income category I of 
the incentivized experiment in Tbilisi. The amounts in the hypothetical setting in Tbilisi are 
comparable to those used in in Cologne, since the dictator gets amounts with a similar relative 
distance to the amounts of the three poorer persons in the choices. In total, 108 subjects were 
in this experiment. We had to exclude 18 subjects because they had answered more than one 
of the five control questions wrongly. Subjects received 20 GEL as a fixed compensation for 
participation. For five subjects the experiment was conducted at their home. They received a 
participation reward of 10 GEL, since they did not have to incur travel costs. 
Notes: The reverse cumulative distribution indicates the fraction of subjects choosing more 
than x times in line with BNS in main choices (choice 1–5) per study. 
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constant, we compare results from the five main choices from the hypothetical setting in 
Tbilisi and Cologne.  
Figure 1 and 2 depict choice fractions and choice patterns, respectively, in line with 
BNS in the five main choices in the different experiments. Our results show that also in 
the hypothetical setting in Tbilisi, BNS is important in each choice with 19 to 32 percent 
of subjects choosing in line with the motive. In three of the five choices, these choice 
fractions are not statistically different from those in the hypothetical experiment in 
Cologne.88 With respect to choice patterns, we find that the share of subjects choosing at 
least four times in line with the motive is comparable across the two cities 
(𝜒2(1) = .3098, 𝑝 = .578). However, significantly more subjects choose at least once in line 
with BNS in Tbilisi than in Cologne (𝜒2(1) = 10.0088, 𝑝 = .002).89 Hence, results from the 
same experiment are largely comparable across cities. Furthermore, both choice fractions 
and choice patterns are comparable across the different settings within each city.90 It is 
thus probable, that if we replicated the incentivized study – with genuine persons as 
receivers – in Cologne, we would also find evidence for the existence of concerns for basic 
needs satisfaction.  
In sum, concerns for BNS are important across different subject pools and incentive 
structures. Across all four experiments, in the main choices, a substantial amount of 11 to 
27 percent of subjects chooses in line with the motive. Individual choice patterns further 
reveal that 31 to 61 percent of subjects do so at least once. These subjects choose the BNS 
option (a) even though this entails foregoing own income and utility in terms of all other 
motives under consideration, and (b) in decisions about actual monthly incomes of genuine 
persons – two of them living below the threshold of basic needs fulfillment in their everyday 
lives. 
                                            
88 Chi-squared tests of the null-hypothesis that the fraction of subjects choosing the option that 
only BNS predicts is the same in the hypothetical setting in Cologne and in Tbilisi: choice 1: 
(𝜒2(1) = 1.5226, 𝑝 = .217), choice 2: (𝜒2(1) = 3.8217, 𝑝 = .051), choice 3: (𝜒2(1) = 2.0142, 𝑝 =
.156), choice 4: (𝜒2(1) = 13.3432, 𝑝 < .001), choice 5: (𝜒2(1) = 1.9095, 𝑝 = .167). 
89  Interestingly, this is not confined to BNS. The fraction of subjects choosing at least once (four 
times) in line with a motive (conditional on choosing in line with it when it alone predicts an 
option) is significantly different for SLF (𝜒2(1) = 4.6238, 𝑝 = .032), EFF (𝜒2(1) = 6.4735, 𝑝 =
.011) , GEN (𝜒2(1) = 7.1200, 𝑝 = .008)  (MXM (𝜒2(1) = 3.1065, 𝑝 = .078) , and ENV (𝜒2(1) =
4.7445, 𝑝 = .029)).  
90 Choice fractions do not differ significantly in any choice. Chi-squared tests of the null-
hypothesis that the fraction of subjects choosing the option that only BNS predicts is the same 
in the hypothetical and the incentivized experiment in Tbilisi: choice 1: (𝜒2(1) = .1717, 𝑝 =
.679) , choice 2: (𝜒2(1) = .1373, 𝑝 = .711) , choice 3: (𝜒2(1) = .1734, 𝑝 = .676) , choice 4: 
(𝜒2(1) = 1.3745, 𝑝 = .241), choice 5: (𝜒2(1) = .3758, 𝑝 = .540). For test results in Cologne, see 
Chapter II, Section 2.4.2. With respect to choice patterns, only the fraction of subjects who 
choose at least four times in line with BNS is larger in the hypothetical than in the incentivized 
experiment in Tbilisi. Chi-squared tests of the null-hypothesis that the fraction of subjects 
choosing at least x times in line with BNS is the same in the hypothetical and the incentivized 
setting in Tbilisi: at least 1 time: (𝜒2(1) = −9014, 𝑝 = .342), at least 4 times: (𝜒2(1) = 3.7989,
𝑝 = .051), and in the hypothetical and the incentivized setting in Cologne: at least 1 time: 
(𝜒2(1) = .2269, 𝑝 = .634), at least 4 times: (𝜒2(1) = .6545, 𝑝 = .418). 
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3.3.2 Isolation choices 
We will now examine the importance of the other distributional motives from which we 
disentangled concerns for BNS. To the best of our knowledge, the importance of these 
motives has not yet been assessed in high stake decisions with a real-world context in 
which the fulfillment of basic human needs are at stake. In the five main choices, we can 
observe that – as found in our experiments in Cologne – MXM and SLF seem to be 
important motives in this context next to BNS (see also Engelmann and Strobel (2004, 
2005)). Further, in the present study, also EFF, GEN, and ENV are chosen by a 
substantial fraction of subjects (see Figure 12 and 13 in Appendix H).91 To study the 
importance of these motives more closely, we will now analyze data from all 16 isolation 
choices in which each motive alone predicts an option five times. In this way, we can also 
compare the individual choice patterns across motives. 
Figure 3 depicts the average percentage of subjects choosing in line with each motive 
in the choices in which this motive alone predicts an option. The general picture is quite 
similar to the results from the five main choices. Again, SLF is a very prevalent motive, 
chosen by over 40 percent of subjects. MXM and BNS are chosen by more and the 
remaining motives by less than a fifth of our subjects. Figure 4 reveals that as for BNS, 
the fraction of subjects choosing at least once in line with MXM is 61 percent. For SLF this 
share amounts to almost 80 percent. 24 percent of subjects even choose the selfish option 
four out of five times when it alone predicts this option. For all other motives, this share 
is below ten percent. 
Figure 3: Average choice fractions: Isolation choices 
Notes: Average percentage of subjects choosing in line with each motive 
in isolation choices (choice 1–16). The rest of subjects choose the option 
predicted by the four remaining motives, which is not depicted here. 
                                            
91  We also find similar results in the hypothetical setting in Tbilisi (see Figure 14 and 15 in 
Appendix H). 
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Figure 4: Reverse cumulative distribution: Isolation choices 
Notes: The reverse cumulative distribution indicates the fraction of subjects 
choosing more than x times in line with a motive when it alone predicts an option 
in isolation choices (choice 1–16). 
To study the importance of the different distributional motives in subjects’ decisions 
parametrically, we estimate a mixed logit model (Train, 2009; Hole, 2007) using the data 
from the 16 isolation choices. With this model we estimate the effect the utility of an option 
with respect to the different distributional principles has on the probability that an option 
is chosen while accounting for heterogeneity in subjects’ tastes. In particular, we assume 
that 
𝑈𝑖𝑚𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖
𝑆𝐿𝐹𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑚 + 𝛼𝑖
𝐵𝑁𝑆 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑚, 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] + 𝛼𝑖
𝑀𝑋𝑀 min(𝑥) + 𝛼𝑖
𝐸𝐹𝐹 ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑚
𝑛
𝑗=1
, 
+𝛼𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑚 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑚, 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] + 𝛼𝑖
𝐸𝑁𝑉 [− ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑚 − 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑚, 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑚 
= 𝛼𝑖
𝑤𝑐𝑖𝑘𝑚
𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑚 
is the utility a subject 𝑖  derives from choosing an alternative 𝑘 ∈ {1,2,3} in choice 𝑚 ∈
{1, … , 10}, where the coefficients 𝛼𝑖
𝑤 vary over dictators, 𝑐𝑖𝑘𝑚
𝑤  is a vector of distributional 
concerns, 𝑤 ∈ {𝑆𝐿𝐹, 𝐵𝑁𝑆, 𝑀𝑋𝑀, 𝐸𝐹𝐹, 𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝐸𝑁𝑉}  , and 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑚  is a random term that is an 
independently and identically extreme value distributed. For a detailed elaboration of the 
model, see Chapter II, Section 2.4.1. Table 3 displays the means and the standard 
deviations of the mixed logit estimations. Due to multicollinearity between the motives 
SLF, EFF, GEN, and ENV we estimate four different models, in each of which we leave 
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out one of the motives. The estimations are conducted with 𝑅 = 5000 Halton draws and 
assuming that the coefficients are normally distributed in our sample.92 We use individual 
specific standard errors to account for dependencies of choices across decisions of the same 
subject. The comparison of the estimated means with the sample average of the conditional 
distribution reveals that this is indeed a reasonable assumption and that the model is 
correctly specified (Train, 2009). 
  
                                            
92  We chose this number of draws because from this number onwards the coefficients remain 
stable (i.e., when estimating the models with e.g., 6000, 7000, 9000 draws the coefficients 
remain approximately the same (Hensher and Greene, 2001). 
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Table 3: Mixed logit models 
  
(1) 
ENV 
excluded 
(2) 
GEN 
excluded 
(3) 
EFF 
excluded 
(4) 
SLF 
excluded 
𝛼𝑆𝐿𝐹 mean .0556*** .0401*** .0566***  
  (.0083) (.0081) (.0087)  
 SD .0680*** .0708*** .0724***  
  (.0087) (.0072) (.0086)  
𝛼𝐵𝑁𝑆 mean .0176*** .0179*** 0177*** .0182*** 
  (.0040) (.0041) (.0040) (.0039) 
 SD .0263*** .0259*** .0256*** .0245*** 
  (.0060) (.0061) (.0061) (.0057) 
𝛼𝑀𝑋𝑀 mean .0200*** .0200*** .0198*** .0206*** 
  (.0056) (.0056) (.0055) (.0055) 
 SD .0483*** .0488*** .0478*** .0473*** 
  (.0072) (.0072) (.0069) (.0076) 
𝛼𝐸𝐹𝐹 mean .0007 .0037***  .0119*** 
  (.0014) (.0011)  (.0017) 
 SD .0073*** .0054***  .0118*** 
  (.0014) (.0015)  (.0017) 
𝛼𝐺𝐸𝑁 mean .0031***  .0032*** –.0081*** 
  (.0011)  (.0010) (.0015) 
 SD .0043***  .0031** .0105*** 
  (.0014)  (.0015) (.0015) 
𝛼𝐸𝑁𝑉 mean  .0037*** .0006 .0106*** 
   (.0012) (.0011) (.0014) 
 SD  .0071*** .0078*** .0096*** 
   (.0015) (.0014) (.0015) 
SLL at convergence –1555.0662 –1546.8135 –1550.1766 –1615.6452 
LR 𝜒2 (df) 75.99 (5) 77.13 (5) 76.69 (5) 84.84 (5) 
Prob > 𝜒2 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Notes: The dependent variable is the option subjects choose in the isolation choices. The 
independent variables are the utilities of the options in terms of each motive. Individual 
specific standard errors in parenthesis. SLL = Simulated log likelihood. SD = Standard 
deviation. LR 𝜒2 is the likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the standard 
deviations (degrees of freedom in parenthesis) (Hole, 2007). 𝑁 = 5376. *𝑝 < .10, **𝑝 <
.05, *** 𝑝 < .01. 
We find that in all models, the estimated coefficients of BNS, MXM, and SLF are 
significant and positive. Hence, the average subject seems to attach a positive weight to 
these motives. These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in Chapter II. 
Moreover, the estimated standard deviations again reveal that there is significant 
heterogeneity in subjects’ tastes. The relation between a coefficient’s mean and its 
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standard deviation reveals that between 75 and 77 percent of subjects place a positive 
weight on BNS, between 66 and 67 percent on MXM, and between 71 and 84 percent on 
SLF. For EFF, GEN, and ENV results are less clear. The coefficients vary, depending on 
the model, between being positive and highly significant and being insignificant (or 
negatively significant in the case of GEN). To summarize, the estimation results confirm 
that BNS, together with MXM and SLF, is an important driver of subjects’ decisions in 
the isolation choices. 
 
3.3.3 BNS revisited: Income gap choices 
Figure 5 depicts the fraction of subjects choosing in line with BNS in the income gap 
choices in comparison to the main choices. It can be seen that if anything there are more 
subjects choosing the BNS option in the income gap than in the main choices. A series of 
McNemar’s change tests shows that there is no significant difference between the number 
of subjects who choose BNS in main choice 1 (2, 3, 4, 5) and the number of subjects who 
choose BNS in income gap choice IG1 (IG2, IG3, IG4, IG5).93 Thus, subjects choosing the 
options only predicted by BNS in the main choices indeed seem to be motivated by a desire 
                                            
93  McNemar’s change tests of the null-hypothesis that the fraction of subjects choosing the option 
that only BNS predicts is the same in: choice 1 and IG1: McNemar's 𝜒2(1) = 1.52, 𝑝 = .280, 
choice 2 and IG2: McNemar's 𝜒2(1) = .26, 𝑝 = .736, choice 3 and IG3: McNemar's 𝜒2(1) < .01,
𝑝 > .999, choice 4 and IG4: McNemar's 𝜒2(1) < .01, 𝑝 > .999, choice 5 and IG5: McNemar's 
𝜒2(1) = 2.78, 𝑝 = .133 (exact p-values). 
Figure 5: Choice fractions BNS: Main and income gap choices 
 
Notes: Fraction of subjects choosing in line with BNS in main choices (dark grey 
bars) and income gap choices (light grey bars). The rest of subjects choose the 
option that a different motive predicts alone or the option predicted by the four 
remaining motives, both of which is not depicted here. 
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to minimize overall unfulfilled basic needs. Note that this does not imply that they do not 
also care about how many persons have an income higher than the threshold. It simply 
means that the fact that unfulfilled basic needs are smallest in the BNS option seems to 
be sufficient for them to prefer this option. 
 
3.3.4 Predictions across games: Choice 24 
Figure 6: Helping the needy 
We find that dictators in choice 24 give on average 49 percent of their endowment to the 
needy (Person C and D), whereas they only give 24 percent to the non-needy (Person A 
and B). 37 percent of subjects raise at least one needy person's income above the threshold 
of basic needs satisfaction (i.e., they allocate at least 57 GEL to Person C, and/or at least 
90 GEL to Person D). 14 percent of subjects raise the income of both Person C and Person 
D above the threshold (see Figure 6). All subjects helping only one needy person give this 
person more than she would need to reach the threshold. The median amount allocated on 
top of the threshold is higher for the poorer than for the richer needy person (10 versus 3 
GEL). Of those subjects helping both needy persons, 20 percent give both persons exactly 
the amounts they need to reach the threshold. More than 70 percent give both needy 
persons more than the amount they would need to reach the threshold. For this group of 
subjects the median amount allocated on top of the threshold is smaller for the poorer than 
for the richer needy (15 versus 20 GEL). 
To assess whether subjects’ decisions in line with BNS in the isolation choices have 
 
Notes: Fraction of subjects who allocate an amount to Person C and D that is 
sufficient to lift (1) neither Person C nor Person D, (2) Person C (richer needy), (3) 
Person D (poorer needy) or (4) both Person C and Person D above the threshold. 𝑁 =
108 . 
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predictive power for helping the needy in choice 24, we estimate the following logistic 
regression model: 
ℎ𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
𝐵𝑁𝑆𝑡𝐵𝑁𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖 , 
where hi is an indicator taking the value 1 if individual 𝑖 helps at least one person, 𝑡
𝐵𝑁𝑆 is 
the number of times individual 𝑖 chooses an option that is only predicted by BNS in the 
isolation choices, 𝜀𝑖  is the idiosyncratic error term. The second column of Table 4 reports 
the marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean. We can see that choosing one more 
time in line with BNS in the isolation choices increases the probability of helping at least 
one person in choice 24 by eight percentage points. If we extend the model to include the 
number of times a subject chooses in line with each of the five other motives as predictor 
variables, this effect remains stable (see third column of Table 4).94 Further, the other 
motives that also entail giving to people less rich than oneself (MXM, GEN) are not 
associated with a higher probability of helping the needy. Choosing more often in line with 
SLF, EFF, or ENV decreases the probability of helping in choice 24. These results indicate 
that concerns for BNS elicited in the discrete dictator game choices are indeed predictive 
of helping people in need in a different choice setting at the expense of subjects’ own payoff. 
It further reinforces our conclusion from Chapter II that concerns for BNS are 
conceptually different from other established distributional motives that entail a concern 
for persons poorer than oneself. 
  
                                            
94  We extend the model to ℎ𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
𝑘𝑇𝑖
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖  , where 𝑇𝑖
𝑘  is a vector of the number of times 
individual 𝑖  chooses in line with motive 𝑘  with 𝑘 ∈ {𝐵𝑁𝑆, 𝑀𝑋𝑀, 𝑆𝐿𝐹, 𝐸𝐹𝐹, 𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝐸𝑁𝑉} when it 
alone predicts an option in the isolation choices.  
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Table 4: Helping the needy 
 
BNS all motives 
𝛽𝐵𝑁𝑆 0.080* 0.096* 
 (0.043) (0.054) 
   
𝛽𝑀𝑋𝑀  0.006 
  (0.044) 
 
𝛽𝑆𝐿𝐹  –0.120*** 
  (0.041) 
 
𝛽𝐸𝐹𝐹  –0.103* 
  (0.054) 
 
𝛽𝐺𝐸𝑁  –0.022 
  (0.055) 
 
𝛽𝐸𝑁𝑉  –0.114** 
  (0.051) 
Notes: Logisitc regression estimates: Marginal 
effects evaluated at means of variables. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is 
equal to 1 if a subject helps at least one needy 
person in choice 24 (i.e., allocates an amount to at 
least one of the Person C or D that is sufficient for 
these persons to have an income of at least the 
threshold for basic needs satisfaction in this 
month). The independent variables are the 
number of times a dictator chooses in line with a 
motive when it alone predicts an option in the 
isolation choices. *𝑝 < .10, **𝑝 < .05, *** 𝑝 < .01, 
𝑁 = 106. 
 
3.3.5 Heterogeneity 
Findings from prior studies suggest that the propensity to act prosocial is related to 
individual characteristics, such as a subject’s gender, age, and income. For example, Engel 
(2011) finds in a meta-study on dictator game giving that women give more than men. 
Moreover, middle aged and elderly subjects are less likely to give nothing than children 
and students. Results from, for example, List (2011), Piff et al. (2010), and Smeets et al. 
(2015) suggest that prosocial behavior is related to a person’s income. We explore how 
concerns for BNS as a prosocial motive are related to these characteristics. In particular, 
we look at how they determine how often a subject chooses in line with the motive when 
it alone predicts an option in choice 1–5. Since we have very few observations of subjects 
choosing four and five times in line with BNS, we use three categories of the number of 
times a subject chooses in line with BNS: (1) never, (2) one or two times, and (3) at least 
three times. Figure 16a to 16c in Appendix I show the reverse cumulative distributions by 
gender, age, and income. We use five different age categories (1) below 25, (2) 25–32, (3) 
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33–44, (4) 44–55, (5) above 55, which we constructed based on age quintiles in our sample. 
The income categories correspond to those introduced in Table 2 (see Section 3.2.1).95 A 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test reveals that the distributions slightly differ between male 
and female subjects (𝑧 = −1.718, 𝑝 = .086) . If we look a little closer, we see that in 
particular women are more likely to choose at least three times in line with BNS than men 
(𝑧 = −2.059, 𝑝 = .040).96 A Kruskal-Wallis test reveals no difference in the distribution of 
the number of times subjects from different age (income) categories choose in line with 
BNS (𝜒2(4) = 1.351, 𝑝 = .853  (𝜒2(4) = .879, 𝑝 = .928)).97 A series of pairwise Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests further shows no differences between any of the age (income) 
categories.98 
To further investigate the demographic determinants of how strongly a subject cares 
for the satisfaction of basic needs, we estimate the probability that a subject chooses never, 
once or twice, or at least three times in line with the motive with the following ordered 
probit regression model: 
𝑏𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛾2𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾3𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖 . 
 
In this model 𝑏𝑖  is a categorical variable taking the value 0 if individual 𝑖 chooses 
never in line with BNS in choice 1–5, 1 if she does so one or two times, and 2 if she does 
so at least three times. The independent variables are subjects’ gender, and two categorical 
variables for subjects’ age and income, 𝜀𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error term. Table 5 shows the 
ordered probit estimates. The estimation confirms the non-parametric results of a gender, 
but no age or income effect on concerns for BNS.99 In terms of gender differences, women 
are more likely to choose more often in line with BNS than men. In particular, the 
marginal effects of the ordered probit estimation suggest that the probability to choose 
never in line with BNS is 18.18 percentage points lower for women (see Table 6). Further, 
women are 10.38 percentage points more likely to choose one or two times and 7.80 
percentage points more likely to choose at least three times in line with the motive. This 
is in line with prior results that women are more prone to engage in prosocial behavior 
                                            
95  Note that in which income category a dictator falls at the same time determines which type of 
choice sets she gets, since her income amounts in the choices and those of the person richer 
than herself (Person A) are adjusted for dictators’ income. 
96 Gender differences are insignificant if we compare the distributions of subjects choosing at 
least once (twice) in line with BNS versus the rest of subjects (𝑧 = −1.140, 𝑝 =
.254 (𝑧 = .522, 𝑝 = .601)). 
97  There are also no age (income) differences if we compare the distributions of subjects choosing 
at least once, twice, three times in line with BNS versus the rest of subjects: smallest p-value: 
. 764 (. 585). 
98  Smallest p-value: . 268 (. 367). 
99  Table 9 in Appendix I shows that estimates are robust to using subjects’ nominal age and 
income instead of categories and that there is neither a linear, nor a quadratic relation between 
these variables and the number of times subjects’ choose in line with BNS in choice 1–5. 
 77 
 
than men. Concerns for the satisfaction of basic needs, however, seem to be independent 
of subjects’ age and income. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of individual choice patterns (BNS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female .4445* (.2383) .4395* (.2476) .4748* (.2523) 
Age    
25–32  –.1356 (.3508) –.0899 (.3554) 
33–44  –.2413 (.3589) –.2290 (.3658) 
44–55  .0577 (.3499) .0776 (.3560) 
> 55  –.0029 (.3509) –.0050 (.3538) 
Income category    
II   –.2758 (.3284) 
III   –.3051 (.3276) 
IV   –.0468 (.3522) 
V   –.2763 (.4801) 
Constant 1 –.0474 (.1922) –.0985 (.2775) –.2316 (.3273) 
Constant 2 1.5408 (.2390) 1.4852 (.3102) 1.3616 (.3527) 
    
LL –94.3000 –93.0871 –92.4129 
LR of joint 
significance 
3.51 4.60 5.95 
Pseudo r-squared .0183 .0241 .0312 
N 101 100 100 
Notes: Ordered probit regression estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis. Categories 
of the dependent variable are: choosing in line with BNS in choice 1–5 (1) never, (2) 1 or 
2 times, (3) at least 3 times. The independent variables are subjects’ gender, age, and 
income (see Table 2 for the income categories). *𝑝 < .10, **𝑝 < .05, *** 𝑝 < .01. 
Notes: Ordered probit regression estimates (Model 3 in Table 5): Marginal 
effects evaluated at means of variables. Standard errors in parenthesis. The 
independent variables are the subject’s gender, age, income (see Table 2 for 
the income categories). 𝑁 = 100. *𝑝 < .10, **𝑝 < .05, *** 𝑝 < .01. 
Table 6: Determinants of individual choice patterns (BNS): 
Marginal effects 
 never 1 or 2 times at least 3 times 
Female –.1818* (.0964) .1038* (.0628) .0780* (.0406) 
Age    
25–32 .0341 (.1350) –.0183 (.0730) –.0159 (.0624) 
33 11 .0884 (.1415) –.0515 (.0853) –.0369 (.0583) 
44–55 –.0286 (.1308) .01339 (.0610) .0152 (.0702) 
> 55 .0019 (.1324) –.0009 (.0666 ) –.0009 (.0658) 
Income    
II .1032 (.1227) –.0524 (.0651) –.0508 (.0611) 
III .1147 (.1229) –.0595 (.0671) –.0552 (.0601) 
IV .01676 (.1264) –.0069 (.0527) –.0099 (.0739) 
V .1034 (.1837) –.0525 (.1056) –.0509 (.0812) 
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3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this experiment, dictators are deciding about actual monthly incomes. In other words, 
the dictator and the receivers (Person A, B, C, and D) will, in the month of the experiment, 
have the income amounts depicted in the allocation chosen by the dictator. This entails 
that dictators can actually satisfy basic needs of Person C and D in the experiment – 
genuine persons who are living with an income below the basic needs threshold in their 
everyday lives. We thus show that concerns for basic needs satisfaction are important in a 
setting in which the fulfillment of basic needs is actually at stake. In particular, in each 
choice, a substantial fraction of subjects chooses in line with the motive when it alone 
predicts an option. The majority of subjects do so at least once, revealing that they attach 
a positive weight to the motive. 
Overall, our findings in this experiment confirm our results and reinforce our 
conclusion of Chapter II: Concerns for basic needs satisfaction are an important behavioral 
driving force in decisions about the distribution of incomes. The motive should, therefore, 
be taken seriously in discussions about optimal design of redistributive policies. 
3.5 APPENDIX 
A Outline experiment 
 
Figure 7: Outline of the study 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Step 4 
 
Step 5 
Pre-survey → 
Select and 
invite 
participants 
→ Experiment → 
Survey 
questionnaire 
→ Payment 
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ან
თ
ი
დ
ან
).
  
 
 
ექ
სპ
ერ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
ი
ს
 1
 ნ
აწ
ი
ლ
ი
 
 ექ
სპ
ერ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
ი
ს
 ა
მ 
ნ
აწ
ი
ლ
შ
ი
 თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ან
 შ
ემ
თ
ხ
ვე
ვი
თ
ი
 შ
ერ
ჩე
ვი
ს 
(ლ
ატ
არ
ი
ი
ს)
 პ
რ
ი
ნ
ც
ი
პი
თ
 გ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 ი
ქნ
ებ
ა 
ო
თ
ხ
ი
 ს
ხ
ვა
 ა
დ
ამ
ი
ან
ი
. 
ეს
 ა
დ
ამ
ი
ან
ებ
ი
 
თ
ვი
თ
ო
ნ
 ა
რ
 ი
ღ
ებ
ენ
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ებ
ს.
 მ
აგ
რ
ამ
 თ
ქვ
ენ
ი
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ებ
ი
თ
 შ
ეგ
ი
ძლ
ი
ათ
 ა
მ 
ო
თ
ხ
ი
 ა
დ
ამ
ი
ან
ი
ს 
მი
სა
ღ
ებ
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ზ
ე 
დ
ა 
თ
ქვ
ენ
ს 
მი
სა
ღ
ებ
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ზ
ე 
მო
ახ
დ
ი
ნ
ო
თ
 ზ
ეგ
ავ
ლ
ენ
ა.
 ე
ქს
პე
რ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
შ
ი
 ე
ს 
ო
თ
ხ
ი
 პ
ი
რ
ო
ვნ
ებ
ა 
მო
ხ
სე
ნ
ი
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 ი
ქნ
ებ
ა 
რ
ო
გ
ო
რ
ც
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 A
, 
პი
რ
ი
 B
, 
პი
რ
ი
 C
 დ
ა 
პი
რ
ი
 D
. 
 ამ
 ე
ქს
პე
რ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
ი
ს 
ჩა
ტ
არ
ებ
ამ
დ
ე 
ჩვ
ენ
 გ
ამ
ო
ვკ
ი
თ
ხ
ეთ
 ა
მ 
თ
ი
თ
ო
ეუ
ლ
ი
 ო
თ
ხ
ი
 ა
დ
ამ
ი
ან
ი
ს 
ო
ჯ
ახ
ი
ს 
წ
ევ
რ
ი
, 
ი
სე
ვე
 რ
ო
გ
ო
რ
ც
 გ
ამ
ო
ვკ
ი
თ
ხ
ეთ
 თ
ქვ
ენ
ი
 ო
ჯ
ახ
ი
ს 
წ
ევ
რ
ი
 ს
ან
ამ
 ა
მ 
ექ
სპ
ერ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
შ
ი
 მ
ო
ნ
აწ
ი
ლ
ეო
ბ
ი
ს 
მი
სა
ღ
ებ
ად
 მ
ო
გ
ი
წ
ვე
ვდ
ი
თ
. 
ამ
 გ
ამ
ო
კი
თ
ხ
ვი
სა
ს 
გ
ავ
ი
გ
ეთ
 ო
ჯ
ახ
ებ
ი
ს 
ყო
ვე
ლ
თ
ვი
უ
რ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
. 
ო
ჯ
ახ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 მ
ო
ი
ც
ავ
ს 
ყვ
ელ
ა 
ფ
ი
ნ
ან
სუ
რ
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ს,
 რ
ო
მე
ლ
ი
ც
 ო
ჯ
ახ
ი
ს 
ყვ
ელ
ა 
წ
ევ
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ენ
ატ
ან
ი
სგ
ან
 შ
ედ
გ
ებ
ა,
 რ
ას
აც
 ა
კლ
დ
ებ
ა 
 ყ
ვე
ლ
ა 
გ
ად
ას
ახ
ად
ი
, 
რ
ო
მე
ლ
სა
ც
 ე
რ
თ
ი
 თ
ვი
ს 
მა
ნ
ძი
ლ
ზ
ე 
ო
ჯ
ახ
ი
ს 
ყვ
ელ
ა 
წე
ვრ
ი
 ი
ხ
დ
ი
ს.
 
 ამ
 
ი
ნ
ფ
ო
რ
მა
ც
ი
აზ
ე 
დ
აყ
რ
დ
ნ
ო
ბ
ი
თ
 
ჩვ
ენ
 
დ
ავ
თ
ვა
ლ
ეთ
 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 
(მ
ო
რ
გ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
) 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვ
ალ
ი
 
ერ
თ
 
სუ
ლ
 
მო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე.
 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
  
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 ე
რ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 მ
ო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
არ
 უ
დ
რ
ი
ს 
ო
ჯ
ახ
ი
ს 
წ
ევ
რ
ებ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
აზ
ე 
გ
აყ
ო
ფ
ი
ლ
 ო
ჯ
ახ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ს.
 ი
ს 
ი
თ
ვა
ლ
ი
სწ
ი
ნ
ებ
ს,
 რ
ო
მ 
გ
არ
კვ
ეუ
ლ
ი
 
დ
ან
ახ
არ
ჯ
ებ
ი
 (
მა
გ
. 
ქი
რ
ი
ს 
დ
ან
ახ
არ
ჯ
ი
, 
გ
ათ
ბ
ო
ბ
ი
ს 
დ
ან
ახ
არ
ჯ
ი
 დ
ა 
სხ
ვა
) 
არ
 ო
რ
მა
გ
დ
ებ
ა,
 რ
ო
ც
ა 
ო
ჯ
ახ
ი
ს 
წ
ევ
რ
თ
ა 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
ო
რ
ჯ
ერ
 ი
ზ
რ
დ
ებ
ა.
 ე
რ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 
მო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
გ
ამ
ო
თ
ვლ
ი
სა
ს 
ვი
ხ
ელ
მძ
ღ
ვა
ნე
ლ
ეთ
 
ო
ფ
ი
ც
ი
ალ
უ
რ
ი
 
სა
ერ
თ
აშ
ო
რ
ი
სო
 
მა
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
ელ
ი
 
ფ
აქ
ტ
ო
რ
ი
თ
. 
მა
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
ელ
ი
 ფ
აქ
ტ
ო
რ
ი
 დ
ამ
ო
კი
დ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
ა 
ო
ჯ
ახ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ად
გ
ენ
ლ
ო
ბ
აზ
ე 
(რ
ო
გ
ო
რ
ი
ა 
ზ
რ
დ
ას
რ
უ
ლ
თ
ა 
დ
ა 
ბ
ავ
შ
ვთ
ა 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
ო
ჯ
ახ
შ
ი
).
 ს
წ
ო
რ
ედ
 ა
მ
 
  
 გ
ზ
ი
თ
 დ
ავ
თ
ვა
ლ
ეთ
 ა
მ 
ექ
სპ
ერ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
შ
ი
 მ
ო
ნ
აწ
ი
ლ
ე 
პი
რ
თ
ათ
ვი
ს 
(თ
ქვ
ენ
, 
პი
რ
ი
 A
, 
B
, 
C
, 
D
) 
არ
სე
ბ
უ
ლ
ი
 თ
ვი
უ
რ
ი
 ე
რ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 მ
ო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
. 
 გ
თ
ხ
ო
ვთ
 
გ
აი
თ
ვა
ლ
ი
სწ
ი
ნო
თ
, 
რ
ო
მ 
ერ
თ
 
სუ
ლ
 
მო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 
შ
ეგ
ვი
ძლ
ი
ა 
შ
ევ
ად
არ
ო
თ
 
ყო
ვე
ლ
თ
ვი
უ
რ
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ს,
 
რ
ო
მე
ლ
ი
ც
 ც
ალ
კე
 მ
ც
ხ
ო
ვრ
ებ
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
უ
ნ
დ
ა 
ჰქ
ო
ნ
დ
ეს
 ი
მი
სთ
ვი
ს 
რ
ო
მ 
შ
ეი
ნ
არ
ჩუ
ნ
ო
ს 
არ
სე
ბ
უ
ლ
ი
 ც
ხ
ო
ვრ
ებ
ი
ს 
დ
ო
ნ
ე.
 ა
მ 
გ
ზ
ი
თ
 შ
ეგ
ვი
ძ
ლ
ი
ა 
შ
ევ
ად
არ
ო
თ
 
სხ
ვა
დ
ას
ხ
ვა
 პ
ი
რ
თ
ა 
ერ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 მ
ო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
. 
 თ
უ
 მ
აგ
ალ
ი
თ
ი
სა
თ
ვი
ს,
 ე
რ
თ
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
უ
ფ
რ
ო
 მ
აღ
ალ
ი
 ე
რ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 მ
ო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 ა
ქვ
ს,
 ვ
ი
დ
რ
ე 
მე
ო
რ
ეს
, 
შ
ეგ
ვი
ძლ
ი
ა 
ვი
ვა
რ
აუ
დ
ო
თ
 რ
ო
მ 
პი
რ
ვე
ლ
ი
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
ც
ხ
ო
ვრ
ებ
ი
ს 
დ
ო
ნ
ეც
 უ
ფ
რ
ო
 მ
აღ
ალ
ი
ა 
ვი
დ
რ
ე 
მე
ო
რ
ეს
ი
. 
 
თ
ქვ
ენ
ი
 კ
ო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 ე
რ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 მ
ო
ს
ახ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
შ
ემ
ო
ს
ავ
ალ
ი
 2
2
0
 დ
ა 
3
2
9
 ლ
არ
ს
 შ
ო
რ
ი
ს
 ა
რ
ი
ს 
 ჯ
გ
უ
ფ
ებ
ად
 
დ
ავ
ყა
ვი
თ
 
ერ
თ
 
სუ
ლ
 
მო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
მი
ხ
ედ
ვი
თ
 
ექ
სპ
ერ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
შ
ი
 
მო
ნ
აწ
ი
ლ
ე 
ი
ს 
პი
რ
ებ
ი
, 
რ
ო
მე
ლ
თ
ა 
ან
აზ
ღ
აუ
რ
ებ
აზ
ე 
ზ
ეგ
ავ
ლ
ენ
ი
ს 
მო
ხ
დ
ენ
ა 
შ
ეგ
ი
ძლ
ი
ათ
. 
ქვ
ემ
ო
თ
 მ
ო
ც
ემ
უ
ლ
 ც
ხ
რ
ი
ლ
შ
ი
 1
 –
 შ
ი
 წ
არ
მო
დ
გ
ენ
ი
ლ
ი
ა,
 თ
უ
 რ
ა 
დ
ი
აპ
აზ
ო
ნ
შ
ი
 მ
დ
ებ
არ
ეო
ბ
ს 
ო
თ
ხ
 
ჯ
გ
უ
ფ
შ
ი
 
გ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
უ
ლ
 
პი
რ
თ
ა 
ერ
თ
 
სუ
ლ
 
მო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
. 
ამ
 
ჯ
გ
უ
ფ
ებ
ი
დ
ან
 
თ
ი
თ
ო
 
–
 
თ
ი
თ
ო
 
პი
რ
ი
 
გ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
ა 
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ან
. 
მა
გ
ალ
ი
თ
ად
, 
ჯ
გ
უ
ფ
შ
ი
, 
სა
ი
დ
ან
აც
 თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ან
  
შ
ემ
თ
ხ
ვე
ვი
თ
ი
 შ
ერ
ჩე
ვი
ს 
(ლ
ატ
არ
ი
ი
ს)
 პ
რ
ი
ნ
ც
ი
პი
თ
 გ
ავ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ეთ
 A
 პ
ი
რ
ი
, 
ყვ
ელ
ა 
პი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
ერ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 მ
ო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 ა
რ
ი
ს 
5
9
0
–
დ
ან
 6
1
7
 ლ
არ
ამ
დ
ე.
  
 
  
ც
ხ
რ
ი
ლ
ი
 1
 
 
 
ერ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 მ
ო
ს
ახ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 
პი
რ
ი
 A
 
 
5
9
0
 ლ
არ
ი
  
–
 
6
1
7
 ლ
არ
ი
 
*
თ
ქვ
ენ
 *
 
 
2
2
0
 ლ
არ
ი
 
–
 
3
2
9
 ლ
არ
ი
 
პი
რ
ი
 B
 
 
1
7
1
 ლ
არ
ი
 
–
 
1
9
7
 ლ
არ
ი
 
  
 
პი
რ
ი
 C
 
 
6
8
 ლ
არ
ი
 
–
 
9
4
 ლ
არ
ი
 
პი
რ
ი
 D
 
 
3
2
 ლ
არ
ი
 
–
 
6
8
 ლ
არ
ი
 
 
 თ
ქვ
ენ
 გ
აქ
ვთ
 შ
ეს
აძ
ლ
ებ
ლ
ო
ბ
ა 
რ
ო
მ 
ექ
სპ
ერ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
ი
ს
 ჩ
ატ
არ
ებ
ი
ს 
თ
ვე
ს 
გ
აზ
არ
დ
ო
თ
 თ
ქვ
ენ
ი
 დ
ა 
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ან
 გ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 ო
თ
ხ
ი
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
 –
 A
, 
B
, 
C
 დ
ა 
D
 
პი
რ
ებ
ი
ს 
 
ერ
თ
 
სუ
ლ
 
მო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
. 
ამ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
ი
ღ
ებ
თ
 
გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ებ
ს 
არ
ჩე
ვა
ნ
ი
ს 
გ
ას
აკ
ეთ
ებ
ელ
 
რ
ამ
ო
დ
ენ
ი
მე
 
სი
ტ
უ
აც
ი
აშ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
თ
ან
ხ
ებ
ი
ს 
გ
ად
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
აზ
ე,
 ა
ნუ
 ე
ქს
პე
რ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
ი
ს 
თ
ვე
ს 
ერ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 მ
ო
სა
ხ
ლ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
ახ
ალ
ი
 კ
ო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
ს 
გ
ად
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
აზ
ე.
 ყ
ვე
ლ
ა 
სი
ტ
უ
აც
ი
აშ
ი
 ა
რ
ჩე
ვა
ნ
ი
 გ
აქ
ვთ
 გ
ას
აკ
ეთ
ებ
ელ
ი
 ს
ამ
 ს
ხ
ვა
დ
ას
ხ
ვა
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ს 
შ
ო
რ
ი
ს.
 თ
ი
თ
ო
ეუ
ლ
ი
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
 ა
ღ
წ
ერ
ს 
რ
ო
გ
ო
რ
 
შ
ეი
ძ
ლ
ებ
ა 
გ
ად
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
დ
ეს
 თ
ან
ხ
ებ
ი
 თ
ქვ
ენ
სა
 დ
ა 
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ან
 გ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
უ
ლ
 პ
ი
რ
ებ
ს 
შ
ო
რ
ი
ს 
(A
, 
B
, 
C
 დ
ა 
D
).
 ე
ქს
პე
რ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
ი
ს
 ბ
ო
ლ
ო
ს 
თ
ქვ
ენ
 დ
ა 
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ან
 
გ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 პ
ი
რ
ებ
ი
 თ
ქვ
ენ
ს 
მი
ერ
 ა
რ
ჩე
უ
ლ
ი
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
ს 
მი
ხ
ედ
ვი
თ
 მ
ი
ი
ღ
ებ
თ
 თ
ან
ხ
ას
. 
 ქვ
ემ
ო
თ
 შ
ეგ
ი
ძლ
ი
ათ
 ი
ხ
ი
ლ
ო
თ
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ი
ს 
მი
ღ
ებ
ი
ს 
სი
ტ
უ
აც
ი
ი
ს 
მა
გ
ალ
ი
თ
ი
: 
  
ვა
რ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
 1
 
 
ვა
რ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
 2
 
 
 
ვა
რ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
 3
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
A
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
6
2
7
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
A
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
6
3
7
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
A
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
6
4
7
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
*
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ვი
ს*
 
3
4
9
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
*
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ვი
ს*
 
3
3
9
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
*
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ვი
ს*
 
3
5
9
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
B
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
2
1
7
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
B
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
2
2
7
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
B
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
2
0
7
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
C
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
1
2
4
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
C
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
1
1
4
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
C
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
1
0
4
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
  
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
D
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
9
8
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
D
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
7
8
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
D
-პ
ი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
8
8
 
ლ
არ
ი
 
□
 
 
□
 
 
□
 
  აქ
 თ
ქვ
ენ
 ხ
ედ
ავ
თ
 გ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
ი
ს 
სა
მ 
ვა
რ
ი
ან
ტ
ს 
(ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
, 
1
,2
,3
),
 ს
აი
დ
ან
აც
 შ
ეგ
ი
ძ
ლ
ი
ათ
 ა
ი
რ
ჩი
ო
თ
 ე
რ
თ
ი
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
. 
თ
ი
თ
ო
ეუ
ლ
ი
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
-
1
,2
,3
, 
სვ
ეტ
ებ
შ
ი
 მ
ო
ც
ემ
უ
ლ
ი
ა 
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
რ
აო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა 
რ
ას
აც
 მ
ი
ი
ღ
ებ
ენ
  
A
,B
,C
,D
 პ
ი
რ
ებ
ი
 დ
ა 
თ
ავ
ად
 თ
ქვ
ენ
 რ
ო
დ
ეს
აც
 ა
რ
ჩე
ვა
ნ
ს 
გ
აა
კე
თ
ებ
თ
. 
 თ
უ
 1
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ს 
აი
რ
ჩე
ვთ
, 
A
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 6
2
7
 ლ
არ
ი
 ი
ქნ
ებ
ა,
 თ
ქვ
ენ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 3
4
9
 ლ
არ
ი
, 
B
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 2
1
7
 ლ
არ
ი
, 
C
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 1
2
4
 ლ
არ
ი
, 
ხ
ო
ლ
ო
 D
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 9
8
 ლ
არ
ი
. 
 თ
უ
 თ
ქვ
ენ
 მ
ე-
2
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ს 
აი
რ
ჩე
ვთ
, 
A
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 6
3
7
 ლ
არ
ი
 ი
ქნ
ებ
ა,
 თ
ქვ
ენ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
  
3
3
9
 ლ
არ
ი
, 
B
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 2
2
7
 ლ
არ
ი
, 
C
 
პი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 1
1
4
 ლ
არ
ი
, 
ხ
ო
ლ
ო
 D
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 7
8
 ლ
არ
ი
. 
 თ
უ
 მ
ე-
3
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ს 
აი
რ
ჩე
ვთ
, 
A
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 6
4
7
 ლ
არ
ი
 ი
ქნ
ებ
ა,
 თ
ქვ
ენ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 3
5
9
 ლ
არ
ი
, 
B
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 2
0
7
 ლ
არ
ი
, 
C
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 1
0
4
 ლ
არ
ი
, 
ხ
ო
ლ
ო
 D
 პ
ი
რ
ი
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 8
8
 ლ
არ
ი
. 
 ს
აბ
ო
ლ
ო
ო
დ
 რ
ა 
თ
ან
ხ
ას
 მ
ი
ი
ღ
ებ
თ
 თ
ქვ
ენ
  
დ
ა 
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ან
 გ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 პ
ი
რ
ებ
ი
 გ
ან
ი
სა
ზ
ღ
ვრ
ებ
ა 
შ
ემ
დ
ეგ
ნ
აი
რ
ად
: 
 ექ
სპ
ერ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
ი
ს 
გ
ან
მა
ვლ
ო
ბ
აშ
ი
 
2
3
 
ზ
ემ
ო
აღ
წ
ერ
ი
ლ
 
გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ას
 
მი
ი
ღ
ებ
თ
. 
 
დ
ამ
ატ
ებ
ი
თ
 
კი
დ
ევ
 
ერ
თ
 
გ
ად
აწ
ვე
ტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ას
 
მი
ი
ღ
ებ
თ
, 
რ
ო
მე
ლ
ი
ც
 
ზ
ემ
ო
თ
 ა
ღ
წ
ერ
ი
ლ
ი
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ებ
ი
ს 
მს
გ
ავ
სი
 ი
ქნ
ებ
ა.
 ა
მრ
ი
გ
ად
, 
სუ
ლ
 2
4
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
აა
 მ
ი
სა
ღ
ებ
ი
. 
თ
უ
 შ
ემ
თ
ხ
ვე
ვი
თ
ი
 (
ლ
ატ
არ
ი
ი
ს 
პრ
ი
ნ
ც
ი
პი
თ
) 
შ
ერ
ჩე
ვი
ს 
 შ
ედ
ეგ
ად
 თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ვი
ს 
ექ
სპ
ერ
ი
მე
ნ
ტ
ი
ს
 ე
ს 
(პ
ი
რ
ვე
ლ
ი
) 
ნ
აწ
ი
ლ
ი
 გ
ახ
დ
ა 
თ
ან
ხ
ი
ს 
გ
ან
მს
აზ
ღ
ვრ
ელ
ი
, 
თ
ქვ
ენ
ი
 2
4
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ი
დ
ან
 შ
ემ
თ
ხ
ვე
ვი
თ
 (
ლ
ატ
არ
ი
ი
ს 
პრ
ი
ნ
ც
ი
პი
თ
) 
შ
ეი
რ
ჩე
ვა
 ე
რ
თ
-ე
რ
თ
ი
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ა,
 რ
ო
მე
ლ
ი
ც
 გ
ან
სა
ზ
ღ
ვრ
ავ
ს 
რ
ა 
თ
ან
ხ
ას
 
მი
ი
ღ
ებ
თ
. 
თ
ი
თ
ო
ეუ
ლ
ი
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ი
ს 
შ
ერ
ჩე
ვი
ს
 შ
ან
სი
 თ
ან
აბ
არ
ი
ა.
 რ
აც
 ი
მა
ს 
ნ
ი
შ
ნ
ავ
ს
, 
რ
ო
მ
 თ
ი
თ
ო
ეუ
ლ
მა
 თ
ქვ
ენ
მა
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ამ
 შ
ეი
ძლ
ებ
ა 
 
თ
ან
აბ
არ
ი
 შ
ეს
აძ
ლ
ებ
ლ
ო
ბ
ი
თ
 გ
ან
სა
ზ
ღ
ვრ
ო
ს 
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ვი
ს
 დ
ა 
თ
ქვ
ენ
თ
ან
 გ
ან
აწ
ი
ლ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 პ
ი
რ
ებ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
გ
ად
ას
ახ
დ
ელ
ი
 თ
ან
ხ
ი
ს 
ო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ა.
  
რ
ეა
ლ
უ
რ
ად
 რ
ა 
თ
ან
ხ
ას
 მ
ი
ი
ღ
ებ
თ
 დ
ამ
ო
კი
დ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
ა 
ი
მა
ზ
ე 
თ
უ
 რ
ა 
არ
ჩე
ვა
ნ
ი
 გ
აა
კე
თ
ეთ
 ი
მ
 შ
ემ
თ
ხ
ვე
ვი
თ
 შ
ერ
ჩე
უ
ლ
 გ
ად
აწ
ყვ
ეტ
ი
ლ
ებ
ი
ს 
მი
სა
ღ
ებ
 ს
ი
ტ
უ
აც
ი
აშ
ი
. 
 
  
 გ
ად
ას
ახ
დ
ელ
ი
 თ
ან
ხ
ა 
შ
ემ
დ
ეგ
ნ
აი
რ
ად
 ი
ქნ
ებ
ა 
დ
აა
ნგ
არ
ი
შ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
: 
თ
ი
თ
ო
ეუ
ლ
ი
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 მ
ი
ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
ი
მ 
ფ
აქ
ტ
ო
ბ
რ
ი
ვ 
ან
აზ
ღ
აუ
რ
ებ
ას
, 
რ
აც
 ს
აჭ
ი
რ
ო
ა 
რ
ო
მ 
მა
ნ
 
მი
აღ
წ
ი
ო
ს 
თ
ქვ
ენ
 მ
ი
ერ
 შ
ერ
ჩე
უ
ლ
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
შ
ი
 მ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
გ
ან
სა
ზ
ღ
ვრ
უ
ლ
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ს.
 თ
ი
თ
ო
ეუ
ლ
ი
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 მ
ი
ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
ი
მ 
თ
ან
ხ
ას
 რ
აც
 ა
რ
ი
ს 
გ
ან
სხ
ვა
ვე
ბ
ა 
მი
სთ
ვი
ს 
მა
ნ
ამ
დ
ე 
გ
ამ
ო
თ
ვლ
ი
ლ
, 
ერ
თ
 
სუ
ლ
 
მო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
სა
 
(ც
ხ
რ
ი
ლ
ი
 
1
 
გ
ი
ჩვ
ენ
ებ
თ
 
რ
ა 
დ
ი
აპ
აზ
ო
ნშ
ი
ა 
გ
ან
ლ
აგ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ებ
ი
) 
 დ
ა 
თ
ქვ
ენ
 მ
ი
ერ
 ა
რ
ჩე
უ
ლ
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
შ
ი
 მ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
მი
თ
ი
თ
ებ
უ
ლ
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ი
ს 
ო
დ
ენ
ო
ბ
ას
 შ
ო
რ
ი
ს.
 
 მ
აგ
ალ
ი
თ
ი
: 
შ
ემ
დ
ეგ
ი
 მ
აგ
ალ
ი
თ
ებ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
გ
თ
ხ
ო
ვთ
 წ
არ
მო
ი
დ
გ
ი
ნ
ო
თ
, 
რ
ო
მ 
თ
ქვ
ენ
ი
 ე
რ
თ
 ს
უ
ლ
 მ
ო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვა
ლ
ი
 შ
ეა
დ
გ
ენ
ს 
3
0
9
 ლ
არ
ს,
 A
 
პი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
5
9
7
 
ლ
არ
ს,
 
 
B
 
პი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
1
7
7
 
ლ
არ
ს,
 
 
C
 
პი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
7
4
 
ლ
არ
ს,
 
 
D
 
პი
რ
ი
სთ
ვი
ს 
4
8
 
ლ
არ
ს 
(ა
ღ
ნ
ი
შ
ნ
უ
ლ
ი
 
ერ
თ
 
სუ
ლ
 
მო
სა
ხ
ლ
ეზ
ე 
კო
რ
ექ
ტ
ი
რ
ებ
უ
ლ
ი
 შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ებ
ი
 ც
ხ
რ
ი
ლ
ი
 1
 –
 შ
ი
 წ
არ
მო
დ
გ
ენ
ი
ლ
 დ
ი
აპ
აზ
ო
ნ
ებ
შ
ი
ა)
. 
მ
აგ
ალ
ი
თ
ი
 1
: 
წ
არ
მო
ი
დ
გ
ი
ნ
ეთ
, 
რ
ო
მ
 თ
ქვ
ენ
 ა
ი
რ
ჩი
ეთ
 პ
ი
რ
ვე
ლ
ი
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
. 
პი
რ
ვე
ლ
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
შ
ი
, 
A
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ად
 უ
სა
ზ
ღ
ვრ
ავ
თ
 6
2
7
 ლ
არ
ს,
 ს
აკ
უ
თ
არ
 
თ
ავ
ს 
3
4
9
 ლ
არ
ს,
 B
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
2
1
7
 ლ
არ
ს,
 C
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
1
2
4
 ლ
არ
ს 
დ
ა 
D
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
9
8
 ლ
არ
ს.
 ა
მი
ტ
ო
მ 
  
A
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
3
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(6
2
7
–
5
9
7
 ლ
არ
ი
).
  
თ
ქვ
ენ
 კ
ი
  
ი
ღ
ებ
თ
 4
0
 
ლ
არ
ს 
(3
4
9
–
3
0
9
 ლ
არ
ი
).
 შ
ეს
აბ
ამ
ი
სა
დ
 B
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
4
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(2
1
7
–
1
7
7
 ლ
არ
ი
).
  
C
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 კ
ი
 ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
5
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(1
2
4
–
7
4
 ლ
არ
ი
).
 D
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
5
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(9
8
–
4
8
 ლ
არ
ი
).
 
მ
აგ
ალ
ი
თ
ი
 2
: 
წ
არ
მო
ი
დ
გ
ი
ნ
ეთ
 თ
ქვ
ენ
 ა
ი
რ
ჩი
ეთ
 მ
ე-
2
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
. 
მე
-2
-ე
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
შ
ი
 A
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ად
 უ
სა
ზ
ღ
ვრ
ავ
თ
 6
3
7
 ლ
არ
ს,
 ს
აკ
უ
თ
არ
 თ
ავ
ს 
3
3
9
 
ლ
არ
ს,
 B
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
2
2
7
 ლ
არ
ს,
 C
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
1
1
4
 ლ
არ
ს 
დ
ა 
D
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
7
8
 ლ
არ
ს.
 A
 პ
ი
რ
ი
, 
ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
4
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(6
3
7
–
5
9
7
 ლ
არ
ი
).
 თ
ქვ
ენ
 მ
ი
ი
ღ
ებ
თ
 3
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(3
3
9
–
3
0
9
 
ლ
არ
ი
).
 B
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
5
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(2
2
7
–
1
7
7
 ლ
არ
ი
).
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 C
 4
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(1
1
4
–
7
4
 ლ
არ
ი
).
 D
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
3
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(7
8
–
4
8
  
ლ
არ
ი
).
 
მ
აგ
ალ
ი
თ
ი
 3
: 
წ
არ
მო
ი
დ
გ
ი
ნ
ეთ
, 
თ
ქვ
ენ
 ა
ი
რ
ჩი
ეთ
 მ
ე-
3
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
ი
. 
მე
სა
მე
 ვ
არ
ი
ან
ტ
შ
ი
 A
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
შ
ემ
ო
სა
ვლ
ად
 უ
სა
ზ
ღ
ვრ
ავ
თ
 6
4
7
 ლ
არ
ს,
 ს
აკ
უ
თ
არ
 თ
ავ
ს 
3
5
9
 
ლ
არ
ს,
 B
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
2
0
7
 ლ
არ
ს,
 C
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
1
0
4
 ლ
არ
ს 
დ
ა 
D
 პ
ი
რ
ს 
8
8
 ლ
არ
ს.
 A
 პ
ი
რ
ი
, 
ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
5
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(6
4
7
–
5
9
7
 ლ
არ
ი
).
  
თ
ქვ
ენ
 ი
ღ
ებ
თ
 5
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(3
5
9
–
3
0
9
 ლ
არ
ი
).
 
B
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
3
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(2
0
7
–
1
7
7
 ლ
არ
ი
).
  
C
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
3
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(1
0
4
–
7
4
 ლ
არ
ი
).
 D
 პ
ი
რ
ი
 ი
ღ
ებ
ს 
4
0
 ლ
არ
ს 
(8
8
–
4
8
 ლ
არ
ი
).
 
     
  
 B
.2
 E
n
g
li
sh
 t
ra
n
sl
a
ti
o
n
 
In
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
s
 f
o
r
 t
h
e
 e
x
p
e
r
im
e
n
t 
Y
o
u
 a
re
 n
o
w
 t
a
k
in
g
 p
a
rt
 i
n
 a
n
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
in
v
o
lv
in
g
 d
e
ci
si
o
n
-m
a
k
in
g
. 
 
In
 t
h
e
 c
o
u
rs
e
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
y
o
u
 c
a
n
 e
a
rn
 m
o
n
e
y
. 
A
t 
th
e
 e
n
d
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 t
h
e
 q
u
e
st
io
n
n
a
ir
e
 t
h
e
 m
o
n
e
y
 y
o
u
 e
a
rn
e
d
 w
il
l 
b
e
 p
a
id
 
o
u
t 
to
 y
o
u
 i
n
 c
a
sh
. 
W
it
h
 s
o
m
e
 o
f 
y
o
u
r 
d
e
ci
si
o
n
s 
y
o
u
 c
a
n
 a
ls
o
 i
n
fl
u
e
n
ce
 t
h
e
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 o
f 
o
th
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s.
 A
t 
n
o
 t
im
e
 w
il
l 
th
e
 i
d
e
n
ti
ty
 o
f 
th
o
se
 o
th
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s 
b
e
 
re
v
e
a
le
d
. 
N
e
it
h
e
r 
w
il
l 
th
o
se
 o
th
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s 
fi
n
d
 o
u
t 
w
h
o
 y
o
u
 a
re
. 
M
o
re
o
v
e
r,
 a
ll
 d
a
ta
 a
n
d
 a
n
sw
e
rs
 w
il
l 
b
e
 e
v
a
lu
a
te
d
 a
n
o
n
y
m
o
u
sl
y
. 
It
 i
s 
v
e
ry
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
th
a
t 
y
o
u
 r
e
fr
a
in
 f
ro
m
 t
a
lk
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 o
th
e
r 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
 a
t 
a
n
y
 t
im
e
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t.
 P
le
a
se
 a
ls
o
 p
u
t 
a
w
a
y
 y
o
u
r 
m
o
b
il
e
 p
h
o
n
e
s,
 M
P
3
 p
la
y
e
rs
, 
b
o
o
k
s 
e
tc
. 
 
R
e
a
d
 t
h
e
 i
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
s 
fo
r 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
ca
re
fu
ll
y
. 
If
 y
o
u
 d
o
n
't
 u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
 a
n
y
th
in
g
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t,
 t
a
k
e
 a
n
o
th
e
r 
lo
o
k
 a
t 
th
e
se
 
in
st
ru
ct
io
n
s.
 I
f 
y
o
u
 s
ti
ll
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
y
 q
u
e
st
io
n
s,
 p
le
a
se
 g
iv
e
 u
s 
a
 h
a
n
d
 s
ig
n
a
l.
 W
e
 w
il
l 
th
e
n
 c
o
m
e
 t
o
 y
o
u
 a
n
d
 a
n
sw
e
r 
y
o
u
r 
q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
in
 p
e
rs
o
n
. 
 
P
le
a
s
e
 s
tr
ic
tl
y
 f
o
ll
o
w
 a
ll
 w
r
it
te
n
 a
n
d
 o
r
a
l 
in
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
s
. 
In
 c
a
s
e
 y
o
u
 d
o
n
’t
 f
o
ll
o
w
 t
h
e
 i
n
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
s
, 
w
e
 r
e
s
e
r
v
e
 t
h
e
 r
ig
h
t 
to
 
e
x
c
lu
d
e
 y
o
u
 i
m
m
e
d
ia
te
ly
 f
r
o
m
 t
h
e
 e
x
p
e
r
im
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 A
L
L
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
. 
T
h
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
co
n
si
st
s 
o
f 
th
re
e
 p
a
rt
s.
 I
n
 P
a
rt
 1
 a
n
d
 3
 y
o
u
 m
a
k
e
 d
e
ci
si
o
n
s,
 w
h
ic
h
 d
e
te
rm
in
e
 y
o
u
r 
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 o
f 
o
th
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s.
 A
 r
a
n
d
o
m
 d
ra
w
 w
il
l 
d
e
te
rm
in
e
 w
h
e
th
e
r 
y
o
u
r 
d
e
ci
si
o
n
s 
in
 P
a
rt
 1
 o
r 
P
a
rt
 3
 w
il
l 
b
e
 r
e
le
v
a
n
t 
fo
r 
th
e
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
. 
P
a
rt
 1
 w
il
l 
b
e
 d
ra
w
n
 
w
it
h
 a
 c
h
a
n
ce
 o
f 
2
0
 p
e
rc
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 P
a
rt
 3
 w
it
h
 a
 c
h
a
n
ce
 o
f 
8
0
 p
e
rc
e
n
t.
 T
h
e
 r
a
n
d
o
m
 d
ra
w
 w
il
l 
b
e
 e
x
e
cu
te
d
 a
s 
fo
ll
o
w
s:
 A
t 
th
e
 e
n
d
 o
f 
th
e
 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t,
 y
o
u
 w
il
l 
d
ra
w
 a
 c
a
rd
 f
ro
m
 a
 b
a
g
. 
W
h
il
e
 y
o
u
 d
ra
w
 t
h
is
 c
a
rd
 y
o
u
 w
il
l 
n
o
t 
b
e
 a
b
le
 t
o
 l
o
o
k
 i
n
to
 t
h
e
 b
a
g
. 
In
 t
h
is
 b
a
g
, 
th
e
re
 a
re
 1
0
 
ca
rd
s.
 O
n
 2
 (
i.
e
. 
2
0
 p
er
ce
n
t)
 o
f 
th
e
se
 c
a
rd
s 
it
 i
s 
w
ri
tt
e
n
 “
P
a
rt
 1
”,
 o
n
 8
 (
i.
e
. 
8
0
 p
e
rc
e
n
t)
 o
f 
th
e
se
 c
a
rd
s 
it
 i
s 
w
ri
tt
e
n
 “
P
a
rt
 3
”.
 I
f 
y
o
u
 d
ra
w
 a
 c
a
rd
 
w
it
h
 “
P
a
rt
 1
”,
 y
o
u
r 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
in
 P
a
rt
 1
 w
il
l 
b
e
 r
e
le
v
a
n
t 
fo
r 
th
e
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
. 
If
 y
o
u
 d
ra
w
 a
 c
a
rd
 w
it
h
 “
P
a
rt
 3
”,
 y
o
u
r 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
in
 P
a
rt
 3
 w
il
l 
b
e
 
re
le
v
a
n
t 
fo
r 
th
e
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
. 
A
ll
 r
a
n
d
o
m
 d
ra
w
s,
 w
h
ic
h
 m
ig
h
t 
o
cc
u
r 
in
 t
h
e
 c
o
u
rs
e
 o
f 
th
is
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t,
 w
il
l 
b
e
 e
x
e
cu
te
d
 i
n
 a
 s
im
il
a
r 
w
a
y
 (
th
is
 
m
e
a
n
s 
th
a
t 
fo
r 
e
a
ch
 r
a
n
d
o
m
 d
ra
w
 y
o
u
 w
il
l 
d
ra
w
 a
 c
a
rd
 f
ro
m
 a
 b
a
g
).
 
 
  
 
P
a
r
t 
1
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
r
im
e
n
t 
In
 t
h
is
 p
a
rt
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
y
o
u
 w
il
l 
b
e
 r
a
n
d
o
m
ly
 a
ss
ig
n
e
d
 f
o
u
r 
o
th
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s.
 T
h
o
se
 p
e
rs
o
n
s 
d
o
 n
o
t 
ta
k
e
 a
n
y
 d
e
ci
si
o
n
s 
th
e
m
se
lv
e
s.
 Y
o
u
 
ca
n
, 
h
o
w
e
v
e
r,
 i
n
fl
u
e
n
ce
 t
h
e
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 o
f 
th
o
se
 f
o
u
r 
o
th
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s 
a
n
d
 y
o
u
r 
o
w
n
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 w
it
h
 y
o
u
r 
d
e
ci
si
o
n
s.
 I
n
 t
h
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
w
e
 w
il
l 
re
fe
r 
to
 t
h
o
se
 f
o
u
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s 
a
s 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 A
, 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 B
, 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 C
 u
n
d
 P
e
r
s
o
n
 D
. 
 
W
e
 i
n
te
rv
ie
w
e
d
 a
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
th
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 o
f 
e
a
ch
 o
f 
th
o
se
 f
o
u
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s 
b
e
fo
re
 t
h
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t.
 L
ik
e
w
is
e
, 
w
e
 i
n
te
rv
ie
w
e
d
 a
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
y
o
u
r 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 b
e
fo
re
 w
e
 i
n
v
it
e
d
 y
o
u
 t
o
 t
h
is
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t.
 I
n
 t
h
is
 i
n
te
rv
ie
w
, 
th
e
 r
e
sp
e
ct
iv
e
 m
o
n
th
ly
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 i
n
co
m
e
s 
w
e
re
 i
d
e
n
ti
fi
e
d
. 
T
h
is
 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 i
n
co
m
e
 i
n
cl
u
d
e
s
 a
ll
 m
o
n
e
ta
ry
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
 w
h
ic
h
 f
lo
w
 i
n
to
 t
h
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 d
u
e
 t
o
 a
ll
 m
e
m
b
e
rs
 o
f 
th
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 m
o
n
th
, 
le
ss
 
a
ll
 t
a
x
e
s 
a
n
d
 d
u
ti
e
s 
p
a
id
 b
y
 a
ll
 m
e
m
b
e
rs
 o
f 
th
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 m
o
n
th
. 
 
F
ro
m
 t
h
e
se
 i
n
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 w
e
 c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
n
 a
d
ju
s
te
d
 m
o
n
th
ly
 p
e
r
 c
a
p
it
a
 i
n
c
o
m
e
. 
T
h
e
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
 i
s 
n
o
t 
th
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
in
co
m
e
 d
iv
id
e
d
 b
y
 t
h
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 m
e
m
b
e
rs
. 
It
 r
a
th
e
r 
ta
k
e
s 
in
to
 a
cc
o
u
n
t 
th
a
t 
ce
rt
a
in
 c
o
st
s 
(l
ik
e
 f
o
r 
e
x
a
m
p
le
 r
e
n
t,
 h
e
a
ti
n
g
, 
e
tc
.)
 
d
o
 
n
o
t 
d
o
u
b
le
, 
if
 
th
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
m
e
m
b
e
rs
 
is
 
d
o
u
b
le
d
. 
T
o
 
d
e
te
rm
in
e
 
th
e
 
a
d
ju
st
e
d
 
p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 
in
co
m
e
 
w
e
 
u
se
d
 
th
e
 
o
ff
ic
ia
l 
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a
d
ju
st
m
e
n
t 
fa
ct
o
r.
 T
h
is
 a
d
ju
st
m
e
n
t 
fa
ct
o
r 
d
e
p
e
n
d
s 
o
n
 t
h
e
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 (
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
a
d
u
lt
s 
a
n
d
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
ch
il
d
re
n
 i
n
 t
h
e
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
).
 I
n
 e
x
a
ct
ly
 t
h
is
 m
a
n
n
e
r 
w
e
 c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
 t
h
e
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
m
o
n
th
ly
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
 f
o
r 
a
ll
 p
e
rs
o
n
s 
m
e
n
ti
o
n
e
d
 
in
 t
h
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
(y
o
u
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
, 
P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
B
, 
C
, 
D
).
 
P
le
a
se
 n
o
te
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
 o
f 
a
 p
e
rs
o
n
 i
s 
co
m
p
a
ra
b
le
 w
it
h
 a
 m
o
n
th
ly
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
 s
in
g
le
 p
e
rs
o
n
 w
o
u
ld
 h
a
v
e
 t
o
 h
a
v
e
 i
n
 
o
rd
e
r 
to
 h
a
v
e
 e
x
a
ct
ly
 t
h
e
 s
a
m
e
 l
iv
in
g
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 s
h
e
 c
u
rr
e
n
tl
y
 h
a
s.
 I
n
 t
h
is
 w
a
y
, 
th
e
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
s 
o
f 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
p
e
rs
o
n
s 
a
re
 
co
m
p
a
ra
b
le
. 
If
 a
 p
e
rs
o
n
, 
fo
r 
e
x
a
m
p
le
, 
h
a
s 
a
 h
ig
h
e
r 
a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
 t
h
a
n
 a
 s
e
co
n
d
 p
e
rs
o
n
, 
th
e
n
 o
n
e
 c
a
n
 a
ss
u
m
e
 t
h
a
t 
th
is
 p
e
rs
o
n
 
a
ls
o
 h
a
s 
a
 h
ig
h
e
r 
li
v
in
g
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 t
h
a
n
 t
h
e
 s
e
co
n
d
 p
e
rs
o
n
. 
Y
o
u
r
 a
d
ju
s
te
d
 p
e
r
 c
a
p
it
a
 i
n
c
o
m
e
 i
s
 i
n
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 2
2
0
 G
E
L
 a
n
d
 3
2
9
 G
E
L
. 
W
e
 d
iv
id
e
d
 t
h
e
 o
th
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s 
w
h
o
se
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 y
o
u
 c
a
n
 i
n
fl
u
e
n
ce
 i
n
to
 g
ro
u
p
s 
a
cc
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
ir
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
. 
In
 t
h
e
 t
a
b
le
 
b
e
lo
w
 (
T
a
b
le
 1
) 
it
 i
s 
sh
o
w
n
 i
n
 w
h
ic
h
 r
a
n
g
e
 t
h
e
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
s
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
u
r 
g
ro
u
p
s
 o
f 
p
e
rs
o
n
s,
 f
ro
m
 w
h
ic
h
 w
e
 r
a
n
d
o
m
ly
 a
ss
ig
n
 
y
o
u
 a
 p
e
rs
o
n
, 
li
e
. 
F
o
r 
e
x
a
m
p
le
, 
in
 t
h
e
 g
ro
u
p
 f
ro
m
 w
h
ic
h
 w
e
 r
a
n
d
o
m
ly
 a
ss
ig
n
 y
o
u
 a
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
a
ll
 p
e
rs
o
n
s 
h
a
v
e
 a
n
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 5
9
0
 a
n
d
 6
1
7
 G
E
L
. 
  
  
T
a
b
le
 1
 
 
 
A
d
ju
s
te
d
 p
e
r
 c
a
p
it
a
 
in
c
o
m
e
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 A
 
 
5
9
0
 G
E
L
 
–
 
6
1
7
 G
E
L
 
*
Y
o
u
 y
o
u
r
s
e
lf
*
 
 
2
2
0
 G
E
L
 
–
 
3
2
9
 G
E
L
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 B
 
 
1
7
1
 G
E
L
 
–
 
1
9
7
 G
E
L
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 C
 
 
6
8
 G
E
L
 
–
 
9
4
 G
E
L
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 D
 
 
3
2
 G
E
L
 
–
 
6
8
 G
E
L
 
 Y
o
u
 n
o
w
 h
a
v
e
 t
h
e
 p
o
ss
ib
il
it
y
 t
o
 i
n
cr
e
a
se
 –
 i
n
 t
h
e
 m
o
n
th
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
–
 y
o
u
r 
a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 
in
co
m
e
 o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
B
, 
C
, 
a
n
d
 D
 w
h
ic
h
 h
a
v
e
 b
e
e
n
 a
ss
ig
n
e
d
 t
o
 y
o
u
. 
F
o
r 
th
is
 p
u
rp
o
s
e
, 
y
o
u
 m
a
k
e
 p
a
y
o
ff
 r
e
le
v
a
n
t 
d
e
ci
si
o
n
s 
a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
in
c
o
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
, 
i.
e
. 
n
e
w
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 m
o
n
th
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t,
 i
n
 a
 s
e
ri
e
s 
o
f 
ch
o
ic
e
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s.
 I
n
 e
a
ch
 c
h
o
ic
e
 
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
, 
y
o
u
 c
a
n
 c
h
o
o
se
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 3
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
 o
p
ti
o
n
s.
 E
a
ch
 o
f 
th
e
se
 a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
 o
p
ti
o
n
s 
e
n
ta
il
s
 t
h
e
 a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
to
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 a
n
d
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
B
, 
C
, 
a
n
d
 D
 w
h
ic
h
 h
a
v
e
 b
e
e
n
 a
ss
ig
n
e
d
 t
o
 y
o
u
. 
A
t 
th
e
 e
n
d
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t,
 y
o
u
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 f
o
u
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
s 
w
h
ic
h
 
h
a
v
e
 b
e
e
n
 a
ss
ig
n
e
d
 t
o
 y
o
u
 w
il
l 
b
e
 p
a
id
 a
cc
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 o
p
ti
o
n
 y
o
u
 c
h
o
se
. 
In
 t
h
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 y
o
u
 s
e
e
 a
n
 e
x
a
m
p
le
 o
f 
a
n
 e
x
e
m
p
la
ry
 c
h
o
ic
e
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
: 
 
O
p
ti
o
n
 1
 
 
O
p
ti
o
n
 2
 
 
O
p
ti
o
n
 3
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
6
2
7
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
6
3
7
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
6
4
7
 
G
E
L
 
  
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 A
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 A
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 A
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
*
Y
o
u
*
 
3
4
9
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
*
 Y
o
u
 *
 
3
3
9
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
*
 Y
o
u
 *
 
3
5
9
 
G
E
L
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 B
 
2
1
7
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 B
 
2
2
7
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 B
 
2
0
7
 
G
E
L
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 C
 
1
2
4
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 C
 
1
1
4
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 C
 
1
0
4
 
G
E
L
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 D
 
9
8
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 D
 
7
8
 G
E
L
 
 
In
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 D
 
8
8
 G
E
L
 
□
 
 
□
 
 
□
 
H
e
re
 y
o
u
 s
e
e
 t
h
e
 3
 a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
 o
p
ti
o
n
s 
(O
p
ti
o
n
 1
, 
2
, 
3
) 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 w
h
ic
h
 y
o
u
 c
a
n
 c
h
o
o
se
. 
F
o
r 
e
a
ch
 o
f 
th
e
 t
h
re
e
 o
p
ti
o
n
s 
1
, 
2
, 
3
 w
e
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
 i
n
 a
 
co
lu
m
n
, 
w
h
ic
h
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
B
, 
C
, 
D
 w
o
u
ld
 g
e
t,
 i
f 
y
o
u
 c
h
o
o
se
 t
h
e
 r
e
sp
e
ct
iv
e
 o
p
ti
o
n
. 
If
 y
o
u
 c
h
o
o
se
 O
p
ti
o
n
 1
, 
th
e
n
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
 w
o
u
ld
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
6
2
7
 G
E
L
, 
y
o
u
 w
o
u
ld
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
3
4
9
 G
E
L
, 
P
e
r
so
n
 
B
 w
o
u
ld
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
2
1
7
 G
E
L
, 
P
e
rs
o
n
 C
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
1
2
4
 G
E
L
, 
a
n
d
 P
e
rs
o
n
 D
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
9
8
 G
E
L
. 
If
 y
o
u
 c
h
o
o
se
 O
p
ti
o
n
 2
, 
th
e
n
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
 w
o
u
ld
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
6
3
7
 G
E
L
, 
y
o
u
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 o
f 
3
3
9
 G
E
L
, 
P
e
rs
o
n
 B
 o
f 
2
2
7
 G
E
L
, 
P
e
rs
o
n
 C
 
o
f 
1
1
4
 G
E
L
, 
a
n
d
 P
e
rs
o
n
 D
 o
f 
7
8
 G
E
L
. 
 
If
 y
o
u
 c
h
o
o
se
 O
p
ti
o
n
 3
, 
th
e
n
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
 w
o
u
ld
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
6
4
7
 G
E
L
, 
y
o
u
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 o
f 
3
5
9
 G
E
L
, 
P
e
rs
o
n
 B
 o
f 
2
0
7
 G
E
L
, 
P
e
rs
o
n
 C
 
o
f 
1
0
4
 G
E
L
, 
a
n
d
 P
e
rs
o
n
 D
 o
f 
8
8
 G
E
L
. 
 
  
 T
h
e
 f
in
a
l 
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 f
o
r
 y
o
u
r
s
e
lf
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 w
h
ic
h
 h
a
v
e
 b
e
e
n
 a
s
s
ig
n
e
d
 t
o
 y
o
u
 a
r
e
 d
e
te
r
m
in
e
d
 a
s
 f
o
ll
o
w
s
: 
In
 t
h
e
 c
o
u
rs
e
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
y
o
u
 w
il
l 
m
a
k
e
 2
3
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 d
e
sc
ri
b
e
d
 d
e
ci
s
io
n
s.
 A
d
d
it
io
n
a
ll
y
, 
y
o
u
 w
il
l 
m
a
k
e
 o
th
e
r 
d
e
ci
s
io
n
, 
w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
si
m
il
a
r 
to
 t
h
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 d
e
sc
ri
b
e
d
 d
e
ci
s
io
n
s.
 H
e
n
ce
, 
in
 t
o
ta
l 
y
o
u
 w
il
l 
m
a
k
e
 2
4
 d
e
ci
si
o
n
s.
 
If
 f
o
r 
y
o
u
 t
h
is
 p
a
rt
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
is
 r
a
n
d
o
m
ly
 s
e
le
ct
e
d
 f
o
r 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t,
 t
h
e
n
 o
n
e
 o
f 
y
o
u
r 
2
4
 d
e
ci
si
o
n
s 
w
il
l 
b
e
 r
a
n
d
o
m
ly
 d
ra
w
n
 t
o
 d
e
te
rm
in
e
 
y
o
u
r 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t.
 E
a
c
h
 o
f 
y
o
u
r
 d
e
c
is
io
n
s
 i
s
 d
r
a
w
n
 w
it
h
 e
q
u
a
l 
p
r
o
b
a
b
il
it
y
. 
T
h
is
 m
e
a
n
s
 t
h
a
t 
e
a
c
h
 o
f 
y
o
u
r
 d
e
c
is
io
n
s
 c
a
n
 i
n
fl
u
e
n
c
e
 
y
o
u
r
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 
th
e
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 
o
f 
th
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
w
h
ic
h
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
a
s
s
ig
n
e
d
 
to
 
y
o
u
 
e
q
u
a
ll
y
. 
T
h
e
 
a
c
tu
a
l 
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 
a
r
e
 
d
e
te
r
m
in
e
d
 b
y
 y
o
u
r
 d
e
c
is
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e
 r
a
n
d
o
m
ly
 d
r
a
w
n
 c
h
o
ic
e
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
. 
T
h
e
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 a
re
 c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
s 
fo
ll
o
w
s:
 E
a
ch
 p
e
rs
o
n
 g
e
ts
 t
h
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
a
ct
u
a
ll
y
 p
a
id
 o
u
t,
 w
h
ic
h
 s
h
e
 n
e
e
d
s 
in
 o
rd
e
r 
to
 r
e
a
ch
 t
h
e
 i
n
co
m
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t 
in
 t
h
e
 o
p
ti
o
n
 y
o
u
 c
h
o
se
. 
F
o
r 
th
is
 p
u
rp
o
se
, 
e
a
ch
 p
e
rs
o
n
 g
e
ts
 p
a
id
 t
h
e
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 t
h
e
 b
e
fo
re
 c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 
in
co
m
e
 (
T
a
b
le
 1
 s
h
o
w
s 
in
 w
h
ic
h
 r
a
n
g
e
 t
h
e
se
 i
n
co
m
e
s 
li
e
) 
a
n
d
 t
h
e
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
in
 t
h
e
 o
p
ti
o
n
 y
o
u
 c
h
o
se
. 
P
le
a
se
 a
ss
u
m
e
 f
o
r 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 e
x
a
m
p
le
s 
th
a
t 
y
o
u
 c
u
rr
e
n
tl
y
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
 o
f 
3
0
9
 G
E
L
 a
n
d
 t
h
a
t 
P
e
rs
o
n
 A
 c
u
rr
e
n
tl
y
 
h
a
s 
a
n
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
co
m
e
 o
f 
5
9
7
 G
E
L
, 
P
e
rs
o
n
 B
 o
f 
1
7
7
 G
E
L
, 
P
e
rs
o
n
 C
 o
f 
7
4
 G
E
L
 a
n
d
 P
e
rs
o
n
 D
 o
f 
4
8
 G
E
L
 (
th
o
se
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
 
li
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 r
a
n
g
e
s 
g
iv
e
n
 i
n
 T
a
b
le
 1
).
 
E
x
a
m
p
le
 1
: 
Im
a
g
in
e
 y
o
u
 c
h
o
s
e
 O
p
ti
o
n
 1
. 
In
 O
p
ti
o
n
 1
 y
o
u
 a
ll
o
ca
te
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
6
2
7
 G
E
L
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
3
4
9
 G
E
L
 t
o
 y
o
u
, 
2
1
7
 G
E
L
 
to
 P
e
rs
o
n
 B
 ,
 1
2
4
 G
E
L
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 C
 a
n
d
 9
8
 G
E
L
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 D
. 
P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
3
0
 G
E
L
 (
6
2
7
–
5
9
7
 G
E
L
).
 Y
o
u
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
 a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
4
0
 (
3
4
9
–
3
0
9
 G
E
L
).
 P
e
rs
o
n
 B
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
4
0
 (
2
1
7
–
1
7
7
 G
E
L
).
 P
e
rs
o
n
 C
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
5
0
 (
1
2
4
–
7
4
 G
E
L
).
 P
e
rs
o
n
 D
 ,
 t
h
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
5
0
 (
9
8
–
4
8
 G
E
L
).
 
E
x
a
m
p
le
 2
: 
Im
a
g
in
e
 y
o
u
 c
h
o
s
e
 O
p
ti
o
n
 2
. 
In
 O
p
ti
o
n
 2
 y
o
u
 a
ll
o
ca
te
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
6
3
7
 G
E
L
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
3
3
9
 G
E
L
 t
o
 y
o
u
, 
2
2
7
 G
E
L
 
to
 P
e
rs
o
n
 B
, 
1
1
4
 G
E
L
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 C
 a
n
d
 7
8
 G
E
L
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 D
. 
P
e
rs
o
n
 A
 ,
 t
h
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
4
0
 G
E
L
 (
6
3
7
–
5
9
7
 G
E
L
).
 Y
o
u
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
 a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
3
0
 (
3
3
9
–
3
0
9
 G
E
L
).
 P
e
rs
o
n
 B
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
5
0
 (
2
2
7
–
1
7
7
 G
E
L
).
 P
e
rs
o
n
 C
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
4
0
 (
1
1
4
–
7
4
 G
E
L
).
 P
e
rs
o
n
 D
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
3
0
 (
7
8
–
4
8
 G
E
L
).
 
E
x
a
m
p
le
 3
: 
Im
a
g
in
e
 y
o
u
 c
h
o
s
e
 O
p
ti
o
n
 3
. 
In
 O
p
ti
o
n
 3
 y
o
u
 a
ll
o
ca
te
 a
n
 i
n
co
m
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
6
4
7
 G
E
L
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
3
5
9
 G
E
L
 t
o
 y
o
u
, 
2
0
7
 G
E
L
 
to
 P
e
rs
o
n
 B
, 
1
0
4
 G
E
L
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 C
 a
n
d
 8
8
 G
E
L
 t
o
 P
e
rs
o
n
 D
. 
P
e
rs
o
n
 A
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
5
0
 G
E
L
 (
6
4
7
–
5
9
7
 G
E
L
).
 Y
o
u
, 
  
 th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
 a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
5
0
 (
3
5
9
–
3
0
9
 G
E
L
).
 P
e
rs
o
n
 B
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
3
0
 (
2
0
7
–
1
7
7
 G
E
L
).
 P
e
rs
o
n
 C
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
3
0
 (
1
0
4
–
7
4
 G
E
L
).
 P
e
rs
o
n
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
re
ce
iv
e
s 
a
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
4
0
 (
8
8
–
4
8
 G
E
L
).
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C Information text 
C.l Georgian original text 
ექსპერიმენტთან დაკავშირებული მნიშვნელოვანი ინფორმაცია 
 
 
მნიშვნელოვანი სოციალური საკითხია ერთ სულ მოსახლეზე კორექტირებული შემოსავლის 
ოდენობა.  საზოგადოების წევრებს შეუძლიათ მასზე ზეგავლენა მოხდინონ.  მაგალითად ეს 
შესაძლებელია, თუ ძალიან გაჭირვებულებს დამატებით შემოსავალს მივცემთ. თუმცა 
შესაძლებელია, რომ საზოგადოების მთლიანმა შემოსავალმაც გარკვეული როლი ითამაშოს. 
გარდა ამისა საზოგადოებას შეუძლია გაითვალისწინოს განსხვავებები შემოსავალებს  შორის. 
საქართველოში საშუალო ყოველთვიური ერთ სულ მოსახლეზე კორექტირებული შემოსავალი 
340 ლარია. არიან ადამიანები, რომლებსაც ამ რაოდენობაზე მეტ ან ნაკლებ თანხა აქვთ 
განკარგულებაში. საქართველოს ეროვნული სტატისტიკური სამსახურის ექსპერტების 
თანახმად, საქართველოში საარსებო მინიმუმი 140 ლარს შეადგენს. დადგენილია, რომ ხალხს, 
ვისი ერთ სულ მოსახლეზე კორექტირებული შემოსავალი ამ თანხაზე ნაკლებია, არ შეუძლია  
ცხოვრებისათვის აუცილებელი რესურსების მოპოვება (აუცილებელი საკვები, საცხოვრებელი, 
ტანისამოსი). 
 
 
C.2 English translation 
Important information regarding the experiment 
 
One important social issue is the amount of adjusted per capita income. The members of 
a society are able to influence this, for example by paying extra income to the poorest. 
However, the income available to the society as a whole can also play a part. Moreover, 
the society can also take differences in adjusted per capita income into account, for 
example when compared to the monthly net median adjusted per capita income. In 
Georgia, the monthly net median adjusted per capita income for a single person is 340 
GEL. There are also people who have more or less than this amount at their disposal. 
According to experts at the National Statistics Office of Georgia, the subsistence minimum 
is 140 GEL. It was found that people whose adjusted per capita income is lower than this 
amount are unable to acquire the resources required to subsist (basic foods, shelter, 
clothes).  
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E Income receivers in choice 24 
Table 9: Income receivers in choice 24 
Income category dictator Person A Person B Person C Person D 
I 600 183 83 50 
II 714 183 83 50 
III 800 183 83 50 
IV 1000 183 83 50 
V 1071 183 83 50 
Notes: Personal income of receivers (in GEL) shown to dictators in income 
category I–V in choice 24. 
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G Experimental facilities 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  
Experiment room 
 
Figure 11:  
Payment 
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H Main choices: All motives 
Figure 12: Choice fractions: Choice 1–5 (incentivized setting) 
Notes: Fraction of subjects choosing Option 3 and thus attaching a positive weight to BNS 
(dark grey bars) and fraction of subjects choosing Option 1 and thus attaching a positive 
weight to the respective motive predicting this option (light grey bars) in main choices 
(choice 1–5) in the incentivized setting. The remaining subjects choose Option 2 (the option 
predicted by the four remaining motives), which is not depicted here. 
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Figure 13: Reverse cumulative distribution: Choice 1–5 (incentivized setting) 
Notes: The reverse cumulative distribution indicates the fraction of subjects choosing 
more than x times in line with a motive, conditional on choosing in line with this motive 
when it alone predicts an allocation in main choices (choice 1–5) in the incentivized 
setting. This means that for MXM, SLF, EFF, GEN, and ENV the motive has to be chosen 
when the respective motive alone predicts an option (in case of MXM this is, for example, 
Option A in choice 1) in order to qualify as choosing x times in line with this motive. 
 
Notes: Fraction of subjects choosing Option 3 and thus attaching a positive weight to BNS 
(dark grey bars) and fraction of subjects choosing Option 1 and thus attaching a positive 
weight to the respective motive predicting this option (light grey bars) in main choices 
(choice 1–5) in the hypothetical setting. The remaining subjects choose Option 2 (the 
option predicted by the four remaining motives), which is not depicted here. 
Figure 14: Choice fractions: Choice 1–5 (hypothetical setting) 
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Figure 15: Reverse cumulative distribution: Choice 1–5 (hypothetical setting) 
Notes: The reverse cumulative distribution indicates the fraction of subjects choosing more 
than x times in line with a motive, conditional on choosing in line with this motive when it 
alone predicts an allocation in main choices (choice 1–5) in the hypothetical setting. This 
means that for MXM, SLF, EFF, GEN, and ENV the motive has to be chosen when the 
respective motive alone predicts an option (in case of MXM this is, for example, Option A in 
choice 1) in order to qualify as choosing x times in line with this motive.  
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I Heterogeneity analysis 
Figure 16: Reverse cumulative distribution BNS: Choice 1–5 
(a) by gender 
 
(b) by age 
 107 
 
(c) by income 
Notes: The reverse cumulative distribution indicates the fraction of subjects choosing 
more than x times in line with BNS in choice 1–5 (a) by gender, (b) by age, (c) by income 
category (see Table 2 in Section 3.2.1 for the income categories). 
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Table 9: Determinants of individual  
choice patterns (BNS): Robustness 
 
Notes: Ordered probit regression estimates. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Categories of 
the dependent variable are: choosing in line 
with BNS in choice 1–5 (1) never, (2) 1 or 2 
times, (3) at least 3 times. The independent 
variables are subjects’ gender, age, age 
squared, income, and income squared. *𝑝 <
.10, **𝑝 < .05, *** 𝑝 < .01. 
 
 Model 1 
Female 
.4893** 
(.2440) 
Age 
–.0239 
(.0433) 
Age2 
.0003 
(.0005) 
Income 
–.0034 
(.0050) 
Income2 
2.96e-06 
(5.21e-06) 
Constant 1 
–.0474 
(.1922) 
Constant 2 
1.5408 
(.2390) 
  
LL –94.3000 
LR of joint significance 3.51 
Pseudo r-squared .0183 
N 101 
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CHAPTER IV 
Need games102 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the choice experiments of Chapter II and III, we have shown that concerns for basic 
needs satisfaction are an important distributional motive alongside selfishness, and other 
distributional motives such as maximin. Thereby, we assume that a person’s 
distributional preferences are affected by various motives, which are traded off against 
each other (Konow, 2001). In these experiments, satisfying basic needs entails forgoing 
own income. Cappelen et al. (2007), for example, show that most subjects attach a positive 
weight both to fairness concerns and self-interest.  
In this chapter, we introduce a strategic motive to satisfy basic needs. We address the 
question whether behavior in line with concerns for basic needs satisfaction can be 
reinforced if there are also strategic motives to satisfy these needs. In an evolutionary 
context, it might be good to satisfy basic needs of all members of one’s group, since the 
group’s survival depends on the survival of its members (Bowles and Gintis, 2005). 
Behavior in line with basic needs satisfaction in situations in which group survival is at 
stake might thus be hard-wired.  
For this purpose, we implemented an experimental game – the need game – which 
subjects played for multiple rounds. The need game is a variant of the dictator game 
(Forsythe et al., 1994) in which receivers are at risk of being eliminated from subsequent 
rounds of the experiment if their final payoff in a given round falls short of a certain 
threshold. The game was designed to mimic the fact that persons suffer (in this case 
exiting the experiment and hence being deprived from possible future gains in the 
experiment) when their needs are not met. By systematically varying the initial 
endowments of subjects, we manipulated whether the receiver is in need or not in three 
variants of the need game. There was a strategic motive for dictators to satisfy the 
receivers’ needs, i.e., to transfer at least as much as they need in order to reach the 
threshold that ensures participation in the next round. If only one receiver remained in 
the game, the game was stopped. Since dictators did not receive an endowment when the 
game ended, earnings not only of receivers but also of dictators depended on the survival 
of the receivers. Hence, besides a desire to satisfy receivers’ needs, dictator giving might 
also be influenced by the fact that they want to benefit from potential earnings in 
subsequent rounds. We thus expect to find that more subjects decide to fulfill the receiver’s 
                                            
102  This chapter is based on joint work with Thomas Dohmen and Gari Walkowitz. The authors 
are grateful to Kevin Breuer, Jonas Radbruch for excellent research assistance. 
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need in this game as compared to the experiment in Chapter II.103 
We find that the majority of dictators indeed transfer a sufficient amount to needy 
receivers. This amount constitutes half of the endowment that the dictator can distribute 
– a share that typically far less subjects are willing to give up (Engel, 2011). Most of these 
dictators, in turn, give exactly the amount necessary for the receiver to reach the threshold. 
This suggests that the main other-regarding motivation behind this increased generosity 
is the desire to fulfill the receiver’s need (as opposed to, for example, maximin concerns).104 
Hence, when need fulfillment is aligned with dictators’ self-interest to continue the game, 
the prevalence of behavior in line with concerns for basic needs satisfaction increases. 
The strategic motive to ensure survival of the receiver for reasons of self-interest (i.e., 
ensuring future own payoffs) should, however, not lead to strong increases in basic needs 
satisfaction. This is because the probability of the game ending is fairly low, due to the 
way that the experiment is parameterized. Only if dictators have sufficiently pessimistic 
beliefs about the amounts given by other dictators or exhibit a high degree of risk aversion, 
satisfaction of basic needs might result from self-interest. Otherwise, the self-interested 
choice is still not to give anything to the receiver. We observe that many dictators who 
repeatedly choose the selfish option in the choice experiment of Chapter II (henceforth: 
selfish dictators), satisfy receivers’ needs in the need game. We show that this does not 
seem to be due to risk aversion or pessimistic beliefs about giving behavior of other 
dictators. Hence, even though the selfish choice would be to give nothing at all, selfish 
dictators now choose to satisfy needs and by this give up half of their endowment. It might 
thus be that the salience of the importance of the threshold amount for the receiver’s – 
and ultimately also the group’s – survival has triggered dictators’ motives to satisfy basic 
needs which they bear in them alongside self-interest. This is consistent with the notion 
that human beings are predisposed to act in accordance with the motive in situations in 
which it is evolutionarily important (Bowles and Gintis, 2005). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the experi-
mental design, the identification strategy, and the procedures. Section 4.3 presents the 
results. Section 4.4 presents a concluding discussion. 
 
4.2 EXPERIMENT 
4.2.1 Design 
We parameterized the need game such that each player needed a payoff of 100 Monetary 
Units (MU) in order to avoid an undesirable consequence. In our parameterization, 
                                            
103  Results of Bartling et al. (2013) suggest that if there are strategic motives to behave in a fair 
way, selfish subjects can be induced to do so. In a game in which the principal can offer the 
agent two types of contracts, they find that the fraction of subjects offering the agent the better 
contract and not abusing their power to exploit the agent is significantly higher in the condition 
with the possibility of multiple interactions than in the one without the possibility to build a 
reputation. 
104  Maximin concerns would predict equalizing payoffs and thus give 150 MU to the receiver. 
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dictators were always endowed with an amount that exceeds this threshold, which was 
common knowledge in the experiment. In case the receiver had a payoff of less than 100 
MU after the allocation decision of the dictator, she exited the experiment with a 
probability that depended on the distance to the threshold. In particular, if a receiver fell 
Y MU short of the 100 MU, she did not proceed to the next round with a Y percent chance. 
For example, if a receiver had a payoff of 70 MU, she lacked 30 MU; and hence exited with 
a chance of 30 percent. This feature mimics the fact that in reality, a person faces more 
severe negative consequences the more money she lacks in order to purchase basic 
necessities. 
Table 1: Variants of the need game 
 Endowment D can 
Variant D R distribute 
1 300 100 200 
2 300 0 200 
3 400 100 200 
Notes: D: dictator; R: receiver 
We systematically varied subjects’ initial endowments in three variants (see Table 1). 
In all variants, the dictator could allocate up to 200 MU from her initial endowment to the 
receiver. In variant 1, the dictator got an endowment of 300 MU and the receiver of 100 
MU. In variant 3, the dictator’s endowment was increased to 400 MU. Hence, in both 
variants the receiver already had enough money to proceed to the next round (and hence 
to avoid any undesirable consequence). In variant 2, however, the receiver got an 
endowment of 0 MU. Thus, the receiver needed 100 MU in order to survive with certainty 
to the next round. 
Before the first round, in each session, one half of the 30 subjects was randomly 
assigned the role of the dictator, the other half the role of the receiver, and subjects learned 
which role they had been assigned to. The game was played for ten rounds in the following 
order. In rounds 1–3, dictators made one decision in each variant of the game in a 
randomized order. In rounds 4–6 and 7–9, this procedure was repeated. In the last round, 
each dictator made one final decision in variant 1 of the game.105 Receivers remained 
passive in all rounds, i.e., they did not make any decision. One round consisted of five steps 
(see Figure 3 in Appendix A). In step 1, subjects were randomly matched into pairs. In the 
case that in a round, there were fewer receivers than dictators (because a receiver had 
been eliminated), more than one dictator was matched to the same receiver. In step 2, the 
computer randomly determined which variant subjects played in this round. In step 3, 
both players in a pair were informed about the endowments of the dictator and the receiver 
in this round. In step 4, the dictator could allocate an amount of up to 200 MU from her 
                                            
105  This round only had the purpose to make decisions in round 9 meaningful and is not considered 
in the evaluation. 
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endowment to the receiver. In step 5, the computer checked for each receiver whether her 
payoff is at least 100 MU. If this was not the case, the computer randomly determined 
whether the receiver was eliminated from subsequent rounds. The probability of 
elimination depended on the receiver’s payoff. If a subject lacked Y MU, then she was 
eliminated with a Y percent chance. If a receiver was indeed eliminated, she did not take 
part in the remaining rounds of this part of the experiment. The dictator, however, took 
part in subsequent rounds.106 If only one receiver remained, the game was stopped. It was 
thus also in the dictators’ strategic interest to not eliminate all receivers.107 
At the end of the experiment, one round of the ten rounds was randomly selected for 
payment, where 150 MU equaled 1 Euro. The receiver’s payment depended on the decision 
of the dictator she had been assigned to in this round. In case a receiver had been assigned 
to more than one dictator, it was first randomly determined which of these dictators 
determine her payment. The dictator’s payment was determined by her own decision in 
the selected round. In case the game had already ended in the selected round or a receiver 
had not reached this round, the respective subjects did not receive any payoff for this part 
of the experiment. 
The need game tests one specific aspect of concerns for basic needs satisfaction. It 
assesses whether subjects are sensitive to a certain monetary threshold that implies the 
possibility of a negative consequence in case this threshold is not met. The adverse 
condition subjects face in the event of not reaching the threshold in the experiment mimics 
the fact that a person suffers negative consequences in case her basic needs are not met. 
If a person lacks, for instance, sufficient food, she is likely to suffer from hunger, increased 
health risks, and eventually increased mortality risk. Not ensuring a receiver’s ‘survival’ 
to the next round and thereby depriving her from possible future gains in subsequent 
rounds of the experiment is clearly not in the receiver’s interest. We thus assume that 
dictators in the experiment believe that the receiver would be better off if she did not have 
to face the consequence. Hence, the fact that a receiver does not meet the threshold with 
her initial endowment can evoke dictators’ considerations for the receiver’s need. 
 
4.2.2 Identification strategy 
We test whether dictators take into account the payoff threshold by varying subjects’ 
initial endowments in three variants (see Table 1). By this, we manipulate whether the 
receiver needs money from the dictator in order not to be threatened to be eliminated from 
the experiment. Variant 1 is similar to the choice situation in a standard dictator game. 
There is no binding payoff threshold and both subjects have the same fixed payoff (in this 
case of 100 MU).108 This variant allows us to gauge whether subjects in our experiment 
behave differently from what is typically observed in dictator games.109 
                                            
106  Since this entails that there are more dictators than receivers, it was randomly determined to 
which dictators the remaining receivers would be matched in subsequent rounds in case a 
receiver was eliminated. 
107  For the complete German original instructions and the English translation, see Appendix B. 
108  The fixed payoff can be viewed as, for instance, an additional show up fee. 
109  It could be that, for example, the fact of mentioning a payoff threshold alters dictators’ behavior 
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In order to assess the impact of the receiver’s need on giving behavior, we first compare 
giving in variant 2 and 3. In both variants, the dictator has a total endowment that is 300 
MU higher than that of the receiver. Giving a certain amount to the receiver in the two 
variants thus results in the same payoff difference between dictator and receiver. The 
crucial difference between the two variants is, however, the fact that the receiver in 
variant 2 is in need of 100 MU in order to survive with certainty to the next round, while 
in variant 3 she is not. Hence, if dictators on average care for helping the needy receiver, 
more dictators should give exactly 100 MU in variant 2 than in variant 3. By choosing a 
threshold of exactly 50 percent of the amount that the dictator can distribute, we 
parameterize the experiment such that it is possible to observe dictators’ reactions to the 
threshold.110 In a second step, we assess the share of dictators who would have put their 
receivers at risk of elimination if the dictators had given in variant 2 (with the receiver in 
need) what they gave in variant 1 and 3 (without the receiver in need). We further examine 
how dictators who give 100 MU in variant 2 choose in the choice experiment of Chapter 
II.  
 
4.2.3 Procedures 
The experiment took place at the University of Cologne and involved a total of 90 subjects 
who were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was programmed in 
ztree (Fischbacher, 2007). It was common knowledge that throughout the whole 
experiment subjects remained anonymous towards other participants and the 
experimenter. 111  The experiment was the third part of the experiment described in 
Chapter II (see Figure 6 in Appendix A of Chapter II). Note that subjects did not get to 
know the outcome of other parts of the experiment before the third part was finished. This 
was done in order not to potentially distort their behavior by this information. On average, 
subjects earned 1.20 Euros with earnings ranging from 0 to 2.67 Euros. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
compared to a standard setup of the dictator game. 
110  In a situation in which the threshold is so low that most dictators would in any case give more 
than the amount needed to reach the threshold, we cannot observe whether dictators increase 
their giving up to the threshold level in order to fulfill receivers’ needs. If the threshold was, 
for example, only 20 percent of the endowment to be allocated, we would expect that about 46 
percent of dictators give at least this amount (Engel, 2011). 
111 Anonymity of subjects makes potential social image concerns less likely, since they do not have 
to worry about what other people might think of their decisions (Hoffman et al., 1996). 
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4.3 RESULTS 
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution: 
Amount given per variant 
 
Notes: Cumulative distribution of amount given to receiver (in MU) per variant. N=135 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of the amount given to receivers (in MU) per 
variant. In variant 2, dictators are, on average, more generous than in variant 1 or 3 
(𝑡(44) = 11.3055, 𝑝 < .0001, 𝑡(44) = 7.8594, 𝑝 < .0001). The figure further reveals that 
this seems to be predominantly driven by dictators giving 100 MU to the needy receiver 
in variant 2: Almost half of choices are to give 100 MU. One could suspect that giving 100 
MU in variant 2 primarily occurs towards the end of the game, since the risk that too few 
receivers remain in the game is smaller. Figures 2a–2c show the cumulative distributions 
per triplet of rounds and reveal that this is not the case. Instead, giving 100 MU is stable 
across the triplet of rounds.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
112  Rounds 1–3 vs. 4–6: McNemar's 𝜒2(1) = .3173, 𝑝 = .6250 ; rounds 1–3 vs. 7–9: McNemar's 
𝜒2(1) = .0833, 𝑝 = .2500; 4–6 vs. 7–6: McNemar's 𝜒2(1) = .3173, 𝑝 ≥ .9999. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution: Amount given per variant 
a) rounds 1–3 
 
b) rounds 4–6 
 
c) rounds 7–9 
 
Notes: Cumulative distribution of amount given to receiver (in MU) per variant 
in each triplet of rounds. N=45. 
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On average, 64 percent of dictators give at least 100 MU to the needy receiver in 
variant 2, i.e., an amount sufficient to lift her above the threshold needed to stay in the 
game for sure. This percentage is a lot higher than the fraction of subjects satisfying basic 
needs in the choice experiment of Chapter II. It is unlikely that this giving behavior is 
predominately driven by other motives such as generosity or maximin. Generosity should 
lead to comparable giving behavior in variant 2 and 3, while the strict application of 
maximin should lead to a transfer of 150 in both variant 2 and 3. However, this is not 
observed in the data.113 Moreover, maximin entails giving 100 in variant 1, but not in 
variant 2, while concerns for basic needs satisfaction leads to giving 100 in variant 2. 
Strikingly, in variant 1 and 3 (in which the receiver is not in need), on average, only 7 and 
18 percent of dictators give at least 100 MU to the receiver, respectively. In variant 2, 
however, the modal amount transferred is 100 MU: on average, 47 percent give exactly 
100 MU and 64 percent of dictators transfer an amount that is larger or equal to 100 MU.  
Moreover, giving 100 MU in variant 2 constitutes a third of the dictator’s total 
endowment and half of the transferable amount. The experimental literature has found 
that typically about 17 percent of dictators give exactly half (Engel, 2011) of the total 
amount that can be transferred to the receiver. In variant 1, which resembles the standard 
dictator game with a fixed endowment of 100 MU for both dictator and receiver, on 
average, only 6 percent of dictators split the pie equally. This also shows that merely 
mentioning the threshold of 100 MU in the instructions of our experiment did not trigger 
a significant share of subjects to give exactly this amount. In variant 3, the average share 
of dictators giving 100 MU is 10 percent, which is also lower than the percentage found in 
the literature. In variant 2, however, the mean fraction of dictators giving exactly 100 MU 
to the – in this variant needy – receiver increases to 47 percent.  
In each triplet of rounds, the fraction of dictators giving 100 MU to the receiver is 
significantly greater in variant 2 than in variant 3 (rounds 1–3: McNemar's 𝜒2(1) = 16.20,
𝑝 = .0001, rounds 4–6: McNemar's 𝜒2(1) = 12.80, 𝑝 = .0003, rounds 7–9: McNemar's 
𝜒2(1) = 12.57, 𝑝 = .0004 (exact p-values)). Hence, despite the fact that in both variants, 
giving 100 MU entails a payoff difference of 100 MU between the dictator and the receiver, 
dictators are much more likely to give half when the receiver is in need of this amount in 
order to survive to the next round. This suggests that the dictators’ desire to prevent 
receivers from elimination is the driver for giving these 100 MU.114 We further see that of 
all dictators, 36 percent give exactly 100 MU all three times they are exposed to the needy 
receiver in variant 2. 
To get a glimpse at the significance of concerns for BNS among our dictators, we 
consider the share of dictators who would have let their receivers face the undesirable 
                                            
113  On average, less than 4 percent of subjects give exactly 150 MU in variant 2 and 3, respectively. 
114  As outlined in Chapter II, maximin or generosity concerns could still explain an increase in 
giving in variant 2. This is because the elimination from the experiment entails disutility for 
the receiver. If a dictator took into account this disutility, she could decide to give to the needy 
person because of maximin considerations rather than because she wants to fulfill her needs. 
Nevertheless, we believe that it is most plausible that giving exactly the amount to fulfill the 
receiver’s need is indeed motivated by a desire to satisfy this very need. 
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consequence if the dictators had given in variant 2 (with the receiver in need) what they 
gave in variant 1 and 3 (without the receiver in need). If dictators gave in variant 2 what 
they gave in variant 1 (variant 3), then, on average, 34 (30) dictators would put the 
receivers assigned to them at risk of being eliminated from subsequent rounds. In variant 
2, however, on average, only 10 dictators actually put receivers at risk of elimination. 
Hence, in expectation, on average 22 dictators (i.e., almost 50 percent) save their receivers 
in variant 2 by allocating a bigger share to them than in the other variants.115 
Table 2: Giving at least 100 MU in variant 2 
 # times in line with BNS in allocation choice of Chapter II 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Rounds 1–3 60.71 75.00 100.00 50.00 75.00 100.00 
Rounds 4–6 57.14 50.00 100.00 0.00 75.00 66.67 
Rounds 7–9 60.71 75.00 75.00 50.00 75.00 66.67 
N 28 4 4 2 4 3 
 
# times in line with SLF in allocation choice of Chapter II 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Rounds 1–3 83.87 50.00 – – 0.00 40.00 
Rounds 4–6 70.97 50.00 – – 0.00 40.00 
Rounds 7–9 74.19 50.00 – – 0.00 50.00 
N 31 2 0 0 2 10 
Notes: Percentage of dictators giving at least 100 MU to the needy receiver in 
variant 2 by the number of times dictators choose in line with BNS / SLF in the 
five main choices of the choice experiment in Chapter II. 
We now assess how dictators who give 100 MU in variant 2 choose in the choice 
experiment of Chapter II. Table 2 reveals that both dictators who often and those who 
seldomly or never choose in line with basic needs satisfaction in the choice experiment of 
Chapter II, give at least 100 MU to the needy receiver in variant 2. Interestingly, even 
dictators who always choose the selfish option in the five main choices of the choice 
experiment in Chapter II (henceforth: selfish dictators) do so – in fact 40 to 50 percent of 
selfish dictators.  
This does not seem to be due to risk aversion or pessimistic beliefs about giving 
behavior of other dictators. Selfish dictators who give at least 100 MU are not significantly 
more risk averse than those who give less (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: rounds 1–3: 𝑧 =
.650  𝑝 = .516 ; rounds 4–6: 𝑧 = −.433  𝑝 = .665 ; rounds 7–9: 𝑧 = .530  𝑝 = .596 ). 116 
                                            
115 ‘In expectation’ refers to the different probabilities of elimination in case a receiver has 𝑌 MU 
less than 100 MU. 
116  Risk aversion was measured by a self-reported risk index ranging from 0 (completely unwilling 
to take risk) to 10 (completely willing to take risk) (question: “How do you see yourself: Are you 
generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?”) 
(Dohmen et al., 2011). German original question: “Wie schätzen Sie sich persönlich ein: Sind 
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Regarding beliefs about other dictator’s giving behavior, they are even more optimistic 
about the number of receivers who are still in the game (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: rounds 
1–3: 𝑧 = −2.138  𝑝 = .033; rounds 4–6; 𝑧 = −1.390  𝑝 = .1645; rounds 7–9: 𝑧 = −2.305  𝑝 =
.021).117,118 On average, they believe that 12 receivers remain in the game, while for selfish 
dictators who give less than the threshold amount it is 8 receivers. A selfish dictator’s 
concern that the game might end if the receiver she is matched with in this round is 
eliminated is thus unlikely to be the reason for her giving behavior. Hence, although the 
selfish choice would be to give nothing at all, even a big share of selfish dictators chooses 
to satisfy needs and give up half of their endowment. Hence, the behavior of selfish types 
cannot be solely explained by selfish strategic motives. A plausible explanation for their 
behavior is that the salience of the importance of the 100 MU for the receiver’s – and 
ultimately also the group’s – survival has triggered dictators’ desire to ensure their very 
survival – even at relatively high costs. This is consistent with the notion that human 
beings are predisposed to act in accordance with the motive in situations in which it is 
evolutionarily important. 
 
4.4 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
In the choice experiments of Chapter II and III, we have demonstrated that basic needs 
satisfaction is important for a substantial amount of subjects across different subject pools 
and incentive structures. In the present chapter, we have shown that if there is a minimal 
selfish strategic incentive to satisfy needs in order to ensure the survival of the receiver in 
the game, the prevalence of behavior in line with concerns for basic needs satisfaction 
increases substantially. Even subjects displaying a considerable amount of self-interest in 
the choice experiment of Chapter II choose to satisfy the receiver’s need – and by this give 
up half of the amount that they can distribute – in the need game. These results cannot 
be explained by selfish subjects’ risk aversion or beliefs about other dictators’ giving 
behavior. This suggests that behavior in line with concerns for basic needs satisfaction is 
unlikely to be driven by pure self-interest. It is more plausible that these subjects carry 
both selfish motives and concerns for the satisfaction of basic needs inside them. We 
conclude that the salience of the importance of the 100 MU for the receiver’s – and 
                                            
Sie im Allgemeinen ein risikobereiter Mensch oder versuchen Sie, Risiken zu vermeiden?”; 0 
(gar nicht risikobereit) – 10  (sehr risikobereit). 
117  Subjects were asked the following question to assess their beliefs about the number of receivers 
who are still in the game after 2 (5, 7, 10) rounds of the game: “How many persons B (of 15) do 
you think, have reached round 2 [5, 7, 10]?”. German original question: “Wie viele Personen B 
(von 15), glauben Sie, haben Runde 2 [5, 7, 10] erreicht?”. Test results are based on the average 
of dictators‘ answers to these four questions. 
118  This is also true when taking into account all dictators (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests: Risk 
aversion: Rounds 1–3: 𝑧 = 1.164  𝑝 = .244 ; rounds 4–6: 𝑧 = 1.182  𝑝 = .237 ; rounds 7–9: 𝑧 =
1.258  𝑝 = .209; beliefs about the number of receivers still in the game: Rounds 1–3:;  𝑧 =
−3.439  𝑝 < .001 ); rounds 4–6: 𝑧 = −3.029  𝑝 = .002 ; rounds 7–9: 𝑧 = −4.063, 𝑝 < .001 . On 
average, those dictators who give at least 100 MU believe that 12 receivers remain in the game, 
while those who give less are with 9 receivers also less optimistic. 
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ultimately also the group’s – survival might have triggered dictators’ desire to fulfill 
receivers’ needs in the need game. We remark that this is consistent with the notion that 
human beings are predisposed with several motives and act in accordance with a given 
motive in situations in which this motive is evolutionarily important.119 
An important challenge in the measurement of people’s concerns for the fulfillment of 
basic needs is to disentangle the motive from other distributional concerns aimed at 
generosity towards those who are less well off than themselves. Relevant motives in this 
realm are, for example, the desire to maximize the welfare of the least well-off person 
(maximin (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Engelmann and 
Strobel, 2004, 2005)), or to minimize the inequality between oneself and persons who are 
worse off (generosity (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, 2005; 
Blanco et al., 2011)). Even though it is most plausible that the social motive behind giving 
100 MU in the need game is the desire to fulfill the receiver’s need and by this ensure her 
survival in the game, other motives, such as maximin and generosity might also play a 
role (see Section 4.3). Further, the dynamic element in the game introduces (minimal) 
strategic concerns that might increase the prevalence of behavior in line with concerns for 
basic needs satisfaction. The choice experiments described in Chapter II and III, have, on 
the one hand, the advantage to disentangle concerns for basic needs satisfaction clearly 
from these motives. The disadvantage is, on the other hand, that the implementation is 
quite complex and comprehensive.120 
We therefore propose to develop a modified version of the need game that is – as the 
original need game from this chapter – easy to implement in a laboratory setting, and at 
the same time suitable to measure concerns for basic needs satisfaction in an 
unconfounded way. For this purpose, we propose to implement the need game in a one-
shot setting, in which subjects play three rounds of the game, pairs are not rematched and 
roles within pairs are fixed. A possible adverse consequence for the receiver in case she 
does not have a sufficient amount to reach the threshold is a tedious task (e.g., correctly 
count the number of ‘2’s in a list containing ‘2’s and ‘Z’) that subjects have to fulfill at the 
end of the experiment without any extra payment, while the rest of subjects is allowed to 
leave already (see, for example, Abeler, 2011).121  Having to face this consequence is likely 
to entail negative implications for affected receivers within the experiment. After the 
experiment, it can be assumed that subjects would prefer to get their payment 
immediately and leave, rather than first having to solve this task. We hence expect that 
dictators in the experiment believe that the receiver would be better off if she did not have 
                                            
119  Social preference models, as well as our theoretical model of Chapter II assume that people 
can be motivated both by self-interest and social motives (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; Charness and Rabin, 2001; Cappelen et al., 2007). Frohlich et al. (2004), for example, 
further show how the prevalence of selfishness varies depending on the context. 
120  Subjects have to read rather long-winded instructions and an information text. Further, the 
setup requires a multiple of five subjects per session, since subjects are matched into groups 
of five in order to determine payoffs. 
121  Ideally, the adverse consequence would be the deprivation of a basic need, such as water or 
food. This is, however, difficult to implement due to ethical considerations. 
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to face this consequence. Thus, the fact that a receiver does not meet the threshold with 
her initial endowment can evoke dictators’ considerations for the receiver’s need. 
In order to make sure that behavior is indeed driven by concerns for basic needs 
satisfaction, it is plausible to relate it to decisions in the choice experiment. In particular, 
we propose to expose dictators both to a set of choices similar to the isolation choices in 
Chapter III, and to the three variants of the need game.122 We plan to relate giving 
(exactly) as much as the receiver needs to reach the threshold to the number of times a 
dictator chooses in line with a given motive when it alone predicts an option in the choice 
experiment. Thereby, we assume that the more often a subject chooses in line with a 
motive, the more important this motive is to her. We expect that choosing selfishly in the 
choice experiment is negatively related to helping the needy receiver, since allocating 
money to the receiver is costly for the dictator and there is no strategic motive for the 
dictator to help the receiver. If choosing in line with basic needs satisfaction in the choice 
experiment is positively related to helping the needy receiver in variant 2 of the need game 
(but not to giving the threshold amount in variant 1 and 3, in which the threshold is not 
binding), then this suggests that concerns for basic needs satisfaction are indeed the social 
motive driving dictators’ decisions in this game. If additionally the latter is not related to 
choosing in line with maximin or generosity in the choice experiment, then it is unlikely 
to be explained by these motives. If this is the case, giving behavior in this one-shot need 
game can serve as a measure for concerns for basic needs satisfaction. 
It is possible that the motive for basic needs satisfaction plays a central role in 
experiments designed to measure other social preferences, such as altruism or generosity, 
particularly when payoffs of receivers are very low (see also Chapter II, Section 2.4.1). 
Researchers might thus be interested in eliciting the motive, for instance as a control 
variable. The need game is straightforward to implement in a laboratory setting in an 
incentive compatible way. It can thus be incorporated easily into an existing experiment 
in order to obtain a measure of concerns for basic needs satisfaction. 
This workhorse experiment is suitable to test relevant manipulations in order to 
explore the motive further. Relevant propositions are, for example, how a person’s 
responsibility for being in need affects the propensity to incur costs to fulfill those needs 
(e.g., Konow, 2001; Schwettmann, 2012), whether the institutionalized guarantee of basic 
needs fulfillment entails efficiency losses, and the further exploration of how exactly 
individuals take into account needs fulfillment in distributional decisions in order to 
inform theoretical formulation of the motive. Chapter VI of this thesis elaborates on these 
propositions. 
 
4.5 APPENDIX 
A Outline experiment 
                                            
122  Hereby, it is important to expose some subjects first to the choice experiment and some first to 
the need game. In this way, it is possible to control for possible confounding effects that making 
decisions in the respective other experimental setup might have on the other experiment. 
  
   
 
F
ig
u
re
 3
: 
E
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
ta
l 
D
e
si
g
n
 
S
ta
g
e
 1
 
S
ta
g
e
 2
: 
R
o
u
n
d
s
 
R
o
le
  
a
ss
ig
n
m
e
n
t:
  
D
ic
ta
to
r 
(D
) 
 -
  
R
e
ce
iv
e
r 
(R
) 
S
te
p
 1
 
S
te
p
 2
 
S
te
p
 3
 
S
te
p
 4
 
S
te
p
 5
 
M
a
tc
h
in
g
 i
n
to
 
p
a
ir
s
 
E
n
d
o
w
m
e
n
t:
 
E
D
 -
 E
R
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 s
e
le
ct
io
n
 o
f 
v
a
ri
a
n
t:
 
1
) 
3
0
0
 -
 1
0
0
 
2
) 
3
0
0
 -
 0
 
3
) 
4
0
0
 -
 1
0
0
 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 o
n
 
o
w
n
 a
n
d
 
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t’
s 
e
n
d
o
w
m
e
n
t 
D
 d
e
ci
d
e
s 
a
b
o
u
t 
tr
a
n
sf
e
r 
( 𝑀
)  
o
f 
0
 –
 2
0
0
 
to
 R
. 
P
a
y
o
ff
s:
 
D
: 
𝑃 𝐷
=
𝐸
𝐷
−
𝑀
 
R
: 
𝑃 𝑅
=
𝐸
𝑅
+
𝑀
 
If
 i
n
 t
h
is
 p
e
ri
o
d
 𝑃
𝑅
<
1
0
0
: 
R
 i
s 
e
li
m
in
a
te
d
 f
ro
m
 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 
ch
a
n
ce
: 
 1
0
0
−
𝑃 𝑅
 p
e
rc
e
n
t.
 
 122 
 
B Instructions for the experiment 
B.1 German original text 
Dritter Teil des Experiments 
Dieser Teil des Experiments besteht aus 10 Entseheidungsrunden. In jeder Runde geht es 
um die Aufteilung eines Betrages in Höhe von 200 Talern zwischen zwei Personen, die im 
Folgenden als Person A und als Person B bezeichnet werden. Zu Beginn des Experiments 
wird erneut zufällig (und unabhängig vom letzten Teil des Experiments) bestimmt, welche 
Rolle Sie übernehmen. Es gibt zu Beginn des Experiments genauso viele Personen A wie 
Personen B. 
Person A bestimmt in jeder Runde (also insgesamt 10 mal), wie der Betrag von 200 Talern 
zwischen ihr und (einer jeweils neu zugeordneten) Person B aufgeteilt wird. Person B trifft 
keine Aufteilungsentseheidung. Jede Runde besteht aus 4 Schritten. Im Folgenden wird 
der Ablauf einer Runde genau beschrieben: 
Schritt Beschreibung 
1. Schritt Jeder Person A wird ein Teilnehmer mit der Rolle von Person B zufällig 
zugeordnet. (Diese Zuordnung besteht eine Runde. Am Anfang der nächsten 
Runde gibt es eine neue zufällige Zuordnung.) 
2. Schritt Person A erhält eine individuelle Ausstattung zwischen 300 und 400 Talern, 
Person B erhält eine individuelle Ausstattung zwischen 0 und 100 Talern. 
Die Ausstattungen für Person A und B werden jeweils zufällig vom 
Computer bestimmt. 
3. Schritt Person A und Person B erfahren die Höhe der individuellen Ausstattungen 
von beiden Personen. 
4. Schritt Person A kann einen Betrag in Höhe von 200 Talern von ihrer Ausstattung 
zwischen sieh und Person B aufteilen. Dabei kann Person A jeden Betrag  
(in 1 Taler-Schritten) zwischen 0 und 200 Talern an Person B schicken. 
Damit ist die Entseheidungsrunde für beide Personen beendet. 
Am Ende einer Runde haben Person A und Person B jeweils die Beträge, die aus ihrer 
jeweiligen Ausstattung in dieser Runde und der Aufteilungsentseheidung von Person A 
in dieser Runde resultieren: 
• Person A hat ihre individuelle Ausstattung abzüglich des Betrages, den sie an 
Person B geschickt hat. 
• Person B hat ihre individuelle Ausstattung zuzüglich des Betrages, den ihr Person 
A geschickt hat. 
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Nach Beendigung einer jeden Runde werden diese Beträge von Person A und Person 
B vom Computer überprüft. Die Höhe der individuellen Beträge bestimmt, ob eine Person 
die nächste Runde erreicht oder nicht. Erreicht eine Person die nächste Runde nicht, ist 
für diese Person der dritte Teil des Experiments beendet. Dabei werden zwei Fälle 
unterschieden: 
Fall 1: 
Wenn eine Person am Ende einer Runde einen Betrag in Höhe von 100 Talern oder mehr 
hat, erreicht sie die nächste Runde mit Sicherheit. 
Fall 2: 
Wenn eine Person am Ende einer Runde einen Betrag von weniger als 100 Talern hat, 
erreicht sie die nächste Runde mit einer bestimmten Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht. 
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass eine Person die nächste Runde nicht erreicht, hängt davon 
ab, wie viele Taler dieser Person zum Erreichen der 100 Taler fehlen und bestimmt sieh 
wie folgt: Fehlen einer Person Y Taler zum Erreichen der 100 Taler, dann erreicht 
diese Person die nächste Runde mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von Y Prozent 
nicht. Das bedeutet, je mehr Taler einer Person zum Erreichen der 100 Taler fehlen, desto 
höher ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass diese Person die nächste Runde nicht erreicht. 
Umgekehrt bedeutet dies, je weniger Taler einer Person zum Erreichen der 100 Taler 
fehlen, desto geringer ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass diese Person die nächste Runde 
nicht erreicht. Ob eine Person, die weniger als 100 Taler am Ende einer Runde hat, die 
nächste Runde erreicht, wird auf Basis der erreehneten Wahrscheinlichkeit vom 
Computer bestimmt. 
 
Hier sehen Sie 4 Beispiele für die oben beschriebenen Fälle: 
Fall Konsequenz 
Eine Person hat am Ende 
einer Runde 150 Taler. 
Die Person erreicht die nächste Runde sicher. 
Eine Person hat am Ende 
einer Runde 100 Taler. 
Die Person erreicht die nächste Runde sicher. 
Eine Person hat am Ende 
einer Runde 60 Taler. 
Die Person erreicht die nächste Runde mit einer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von 40% nicht, d.h. die Person 
erreicht die nächste Runde mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit 
von 60%. 
Eine Person hat am Ende 
einer Runde 30 Taler. 
Die Person erreicht die nächste Runde mit einer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von 70% nicht, d.h. die Person 
erreicht die nächste Runde mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit 
von 30%. 
Nach der Überprüfung der Beträge und der Bestimmung des Erreichens der nächsten 
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Runde beginnt für die Teilnehmer, die die nächste Runde erreicht haben, diese nächste 
Runde. 
So bestimmen sich die Auszahlungen: 
Am Ende des Experiments wird zufällig ausgewählt, welche der 10 Runden auszahlungs-
relevant wird, Person A und Person B bekommen dann die Beträge, die aus Ihrer je-
weiligen Ausstattung in der ausgewählten Runde und aus der Aufteilungsentseheidung 
von Person A in dieser Runde resultieren: 
• Person A bekommt ihre eigene Ausstattung abzüglich des Betrages, den sie in 
dieser Runde an Person B geschickt hat. 
• Person B bekommt ihre eigene Ausstattung zuzüglich des Betrages, den ihr Person 
A in dieser Runde geschickt hat. 
Eine Person, die diese auszahlungsrelevante Runde nicht erreicht hat, 
erhält eine Auszahlung in Höhe von 0 Talern. 
 
Bitte beachten Sie außerdem: 
Durch die beschriebene Prozedur kann es Vorkommen, dass sieh zu Beginn einer Runde 
eine ungleiche Anzahl von Personen A und B in diesem Teil des Experiments befinden. 
Für den Fall, dass in einer Runde mehr Personen A als Personen B vorhanden sind, 
werden mindestens einer Person B jeweils mehrere Personen A zufällig zugeordnet. Für 
Person B ist dann in dieser Runde die Aufteilungsentseheidung einer der zufällig zuge-
ordneten Personen A relevant. Welche Person A dies ist, wird am Ende dieser Runde 
zufällig bestimmt. Wenn in einer Runde weniger als 2 Personen B vorhanden sind, wird 
dieser Teil des Experiments vorzeitig beendet. In diesem Fall wird die auszahlungsre-
levante Runde für alle Teilnehmer aus der Menge der absolvierten Runden der zuletzt 
verbliebenen Teilnehmer bestimmt. 
Beträge, die durch das Nichterreichen einer Runde von einer Person nicht ausgezahlt 
werden (durch die Entscheidungen von überschüssigen Personen A), werden von den 
Experimentatoren in anderen Experimenten an die Teilnehmer ausgezahlt, d.h. diese 
Beträge gehen nicht verloren. 
B.2 English translation 
 
Third part of the experiment 
This part of the experiment consists of 10 decision rounds. Each round is about the 
distribution of an amount of 200 coins between two persons who, henceforth, will be 
labeled Person A and Person B. At the beginning of the experiment, it will again be 
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randomly (and independently of the previous part of the experiment) determined which 
role you will have. At the beginning of the experiment, there are exactly as many Persons 
A as Persons B. 
Person A decides in each round (i.e., 10 times in total), how to distribute the amount of 
200 coins between herself and (the each round anew assigned) Person B. Person B does 
not make any distribution decision. Each round consists of 4 steps. In the following, the 
procedure in each round is outlined in detail: 
Step Description 
Step 1 Each Person A will be matched with another participant in the role of Person 
B. (This matching lasts for one round. At the beginning of the next round, there 
will be a new random matching.) 
Step 2 Person A gets an individual endowment between 300 and 400 coins. Person B 
gets an individual endowment between 0 and 100 coins. The endowments of 
Person A and B will be randomly determined by a computer. 
Step 3 Person A and Person B are informed about the amounts of the individual 
endowments of both persons. 
Step 4 Person A can distribute an amount of 200 coins of her endowment between 
herself and Person B. Thereby, Person A can send each amount (in 1-coin 
steps) between 0 and 200 coins to Person B. 
Therewith, the decision round ends for both persons. 
At the end of each round, Person A and Person B have the amounts that result from their 
respective endowment in this round and the distribution decision of Person A in this 
round: 
• Person A has her individual endowment minus the amount she sent to Person B, 
• Person B has her individual endowment plus the amount Person A sent to her. 
At the end of each round these amounts are cheeked by the computer. The individual 
amounts determine whether a person reaches the next round or not. If a person does not 
reach the next round, the third part of the experiment ends for this person. Thereby, two 
eases exist: 
Case 1:  
If, at the end of a round, a person has an amount of 100 coins or more, she reaches the 
next round with certainty. 
Case 2:  
If, at the end of a round, a person has an amount of less than 100 coins, she does not 
reach the next round with a certain probability. 
 126 
The probability with which a person does not reach the next round depends on the amount 
of coins a person lacks for reaching the 100 coins and is determined as follows: If a person 
is lacking Y coins for reaching the 100 coins, then she does not reach the next 
round with a chance of Y percent. This means that the more coins a person is lacking 
for reaching the 100 coins, the higher the probability that a person does not reach the next 
round. Conversely, this means that the fewer coins a person is lacking for reaching the 
100 coins, the lower the probability that a person does not reach the next round. Whether 
a person indeed reaches the next round, is randomly determined by a computer on the 
basis of the calculated probability. 
Here you can see four examples for the above described eases: 
Case Consequence 
At the end of the selected 
round, a person has 150 coins. 
This person reaches the next round with certainty. 
At the end of the selected 
round, a person has 100 coins. 
This person reaches the next round with certainty. 
At the end of the selected 
round, a person has 60 coins. 
This person does not reach the next round with a chance 
of 40%, i.e., this person reaches the next round with a 
chance of 60%. 
At the end of the selected 
round, a person has 30 coins. 
This person does not reach the next round with a chance 
of 70%, i.e., this person reaches the next round with a 
chance of 30%. 
After the computer has cheeked the amounts and determined whether a person reaches 
the next round, the next round starts for those participants who have reached this next 
round. 
Payments are determined as follows: 
At the end of the experiment, one of the 10 decision rounds will be selected randomly for 
payment. Person A and Person B get the amounts that result from their endowment in 
the selected round and the distribution decision of Person A in this round. 
• Person A receives her individual endowment minus the amount she sent to Person 
B. 
• Person B receives her individual endowment plus the amount Person A sent to 
her. 
 
A person who has not reached this round relevant for payment 
receives a payment of 0 coins. 
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Please further note the following: 
Due to the described procedure, there may be an unequal number of Persons A and 
Persons B at the beginning of a round in this part of the experiment. In case in a round, 
there exist more Persons A than Persons B, to at least one Person B there will be randomly 
assigned more than one Person A, respectively. For Person B, the distribution decision of 
one of the randomly assigned Persons A is then relevant for payment. It will be randomly 
determined at the end of the respective round which of these Persons A this is. If in a 
round there are fewer than 2 Persons B, this part of the experiment ends prematurely. In 
this case, the round relevant for payment will be drawn from all completed rounds of the 
last remaining participants. 
 
Amounts not paid out due to a person not reaching a round (due to decisions by surplus 
Persons A) will be paid to participants in other experiments by the experimenters. This 
means that these amounts will not be lost. 
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CHAPTER V 
Redistributional attitudes, preferences, and 
beliefs of the wealthy123 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Due to the problem of rising economic inequality, economic scholars have argued for 
increasing taxes for the economic elite, for example, by augmenting taxes on wealth 
(Piketty and Saez, 2013). In recent years, this issue also entered prominently into political 
discussions in a variety of countries.124 Norton and Ariely (2011) further document that 
people prefer a distribution of wealth that is more equal than the actual one. Yet, wealth 
taxes – which would mainly affect the rich – remain extremely low (OECD, 2018c; Evans, 
2013).  
One explanation is the disproportional political influence of the rich (Gründler and 
Köllner, 2017; Gilens and Page, 2014; Giger et al., 2012; Rosset et al., 2013). Such an 
argument implicitly assumes that the rich are less supportive of redistribution than other 
groups in society. This conjecture has been confirmed empirically (e.g., Fong, 2001; Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). We assess attitudes towards 
redistribution of a sample of Dutch millionaires125, and compare them to a control sample 
that is more representative of the population in the Netherlands (henceforth: general 
population). We confirm the above conjecture, as we find that in our study, the wealthy 
are less inclined towards redistribution than the general population as measured by their 
political orientation, their general attitude towards income inequality, and their attitudes 
towards raising taxes on income or wealth. 
These differences in redistributional attitudes could stem from disparities in 
preferences to level income inequality that arises from sources, such as luck, or individual 
effort (i.e., their preferences for redistribution) (Konow, 2000; Almås et al., 2017), in beliefs 
about the role of these sources in determining individual incomes (Piketty, 1995; Fong, 
                                            
123  This chapter is based on joint work with Paul Smeets. The experiment was designed and 
executed together with Lasse Jessen, Alain Cohn, and Marko Klašnja. The authors would like 
to thank participants of the BEELab Proposal Meeting at Maastricht University, and 
participants of seminars at University of California Los Angeles, Harvard Business School, 
and the CPB Netherlands Bureau of Policy Analysis for helpful comments and suggestions. 
We are grateful to Niels Mourmans for excellent research assistance. 
124  See for example, Mayeda (2017), Cohen (2015), Steffen (2017), and van Uffelen (2014). 
125  This sample consists of clients from ABN AMRO MeesPierson, which is a private bank in the 
Netherlands that exclusively serves clients who have more than 1 million Euros in their bank 
account (see also Section 5.2.1). 
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2001), and in constraints and prices (e.g., the absolute monetary amounts at stake). In 
this chapter, we focus on the role of both subjects’ preferences for redistribution and beliefs 
about the sources of income inequalities in determining the observed differences in 
redistributional attitudes. 
In a second step, we therefore elicit preferences for redistribution in a controlled, 
incentive compatible experiment both for the wealthy and the general population. In 
particular, we employed third-party redistribution situations in which spectators made a 
choice that had real monetary consequences for two workers who had completed the same 
work assignment. In our experiment, spectators’ choices only affected workers’ payments, 
not their own. Spectators were told that one worker had been allocated 6 US dollars for 
completing the assignment, while the other worker received nothing. Spectators were 
randomly allocated to one of two treatments in which we varied the rule that the initial 
allocations of workers’ earnings had been based upon. In treatment LUCK, we randomly 
determined which of the two workers got paid for the task. In treatment MERIT, the 
worker who performed better on the task in the pair of workers would earn 6 US dollars. 
Spectators were then given the possibility to redistribute the initial earnings between the 
workers.126 In this way, we can assess the degree to which spectators are willing to level 
income differences in earnings that are due to luck or individual effort, while controlling 
for subjects’ beliefs about the role of luck and effort, and holding stake sizes constant 
across subject pools. We find that millionaires and the general population are indeed 
remarkably similar in terms of their preferences for redistribution both when differences 
in earnings are due to luck, or individual performance. For given beliefs about the source 
of income inequalities, heterogeneity in their preferences to level income differences that 
stem from luck or effort can thus not explain the observed differences in redistributional 
attitudes between the two samples. 
Beliefs about how income differences came about are, however, a possible explanation 
for the observed differences in redistributional attitudes – even if preferences for 
redistribution are similar for the two samples. Suppose, for example, two persons who 
prefer to decrease income inequality caused by luck but not one caused by individual effort. 
Imagine further that one person believes that income inequality is mainly caused by luck, 
while the other person beliefs that it is mainly caused by differences in individual effort. 
The former will be in favor of redistribution, while the latter will be against it. Beliefs 
about the role of luck and effort thus determine how preferences for redistribution 
translate into redistributional decisions or attitudes. In the experiment, we control for 
beliefs by design, by inducing a specific belief in each treatment. In the LUCK treatment, 
spectators know that differences in earnings are due to pure luck (i.e., they are randomly 
determined), while in the MERIT treatment, they know that earnings are determined by 
performance in a task. Redistribution decisions are thus assumed to reflect spectators’ 
undistorted preferences for redistribution. When indicating their attitudes towards 
redistribution in the field (e.g., towards existing redistributive policies in the 
Netherlands), however, subjects’ answers are likely to be influenced by both their actual 
                                            
126 Our design strongly builds on Almås et al. (2017). 
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preferences to reward luck and effort and by their beliefs about the role of luck and effort 
in determining incomes. Consequently, even if millionaires have similar preferences for 
redistribution as people from the general population, differences in beliefs can cause them 
to exhibit different attitudes towards redistribution.  
In order to measure subjects’ beliefs, they were asked to assess how important they 
think luck and hard work is for determining success in life. We find that, compared to the 
general population, millionaires attach more importance to hard work and less importance 
to luck. Most importantly, our results from a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis 
(Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) show that in particular the difference in the importance 
attached to hard work accounts for a significant part of the gap in attitudes towards 
redistribution.  
As a final step, we examine possible explanations for the observed differences in beliefs 
between the wealthy and the general population in our study. First, according to Piketty 
(1995), experiences in social mobility are important for shaping people’s beliefs about what 
matters for getting ahead in life, which then ultimately influences their attitudes towards 
redistribution.127 A person who experienced upward social mobility, for example, is more 
likely to believe that individual effort is important for being successful – at least if her 
wealth does not stem from an inheritance or from winning in a lottery. Arguably, 
millionaires are in general more likely to have experienced upward social mobility than 
subjects from the general population. These differences in social mobility experience could 
thus be a driver for the observed differences in beliefs. Second, millionaires have an 
incentive to not increase taxes, while for poorer people this incentive is smaller or even 
reverse. Since the wealthy would actually be affected by, for example, increasing the 
wealth or income taxes, they have an incentive to not increase those taxes further. By 
contrast, people with lower income or wealth are more likely to profit from tax-funded 
redistribution either by transfer payments or indirectly via the progressivity of the tax 
system (Causa and Hermansen, 2018). A rich person might thus have a higher incentive 
to develop the belief that hard work is important for success in life in order to keep a 
positive image of their social group and view the system that facilitated their advancement 
as just (Jost et al., 2004). 
To study these explanations further, we look at three main groups among our sample 
of wealthy subjects: (1) millionaires who got rich through an inheritance, (2) millionaires 
who got rich from their salary, and (3) millionaires who got rich through their own 
business.128 It is plausible to assume that those who got rich from their salary or their own 
business are more likely to have experienced upward social mobility than those who got 
rich through an inheritance. Thus, if among the wealthy, employees and entrepreneurs 
attach a greater importance to hard work and less importance to luck than do heirs, then 
                                            
127  According to Piketty (1995), experienced social mobility can influence people’s attitudes 
towards redistribution by altering beliefs “regarding societies’ mobility parameters” (p.554) 
(i.e., predetermined factors as opposed to individual effort).  
128  These three groups constitute 87 percent of our sample of millionaires. For the general 
population, 75 percent of the sample consists of employees. We thus limit our analysis to the 
millionaire sample. 
 132 
the mere experience of upward social mobility could be a driver for the differences in 
beliefs between the wealthy and people from the general population. If, however, there are 
no differences (i.e., people with similar stakes in redistribution have similar beliefs), then 
the difference in stakes in redistribution in the field might be a reason for the observed 
differences in beliefs between the wealthy and the general population.  
Our results are mixed. While we find that among the wealthy, heirs indeed believe 
that hard work is less important than do entrepreneurs and employees, we find no 
difference in the importance both groups attribute to luck. Our evidence thus reveals that 
differences in beliefs about what determines success in life might stem from differences in 
actual experienced social mobility, and from an incentive of millionaires to develop a 
narrative in order to keep a positive self-image. Interestingly, our results also reveal that 
in terms of redistributional attitudes (and also preferences for redistribution measured in 
the experiment) entrepreneurs are the group that differs from the rest of millionaires. 
Differences in beliefs in the importance of hard work between heirs and the rest of 
millionaires did thus not translate into differences in redistributional attitudes. We 
further present suggestive evidence that being confronted with merit considerations in 
professional life is an important channel for shaping preferences for and attitudes towards 
redistribution, explaining the observed differences between entrepreneurs and other types 
of millionaires. 
This chapter contributes to the literature that assesses the role of beliefs and 
preferences in shaping redistributional attitudes. While so far, researchers have been 
mostly concerned with either beliefs (Fong, 2001; Alesina et al., 2001; Corneo and Grüner, 
2002) or preferences (Fisman et al., 2015; Almås et al., 2017), we simultaneously look at 
the effect of both factors. This allows us to assess whether they both have an independent 
impact on participants’ redistributional attitudes. While we confirm that both preferences 
and beliefs can generally predict attitudes towards redistribution for millionaires, this is 
not true for the general population. Moreover, the observed differences between 
millionaires and the general population in redistributional attitudes can only be explained 
by differences in the importance they attach to hard work. 
Our findings further add to the literature concerned with differences in 
redistributional attitudes, preferences, and beliefs between an economic elite and people 
from the general public. Our results confirm a large body of literature asserting that richer 
people have a less favorable attitude towards redistribution (e.g., Alesina and Guiliano, 
2009; Alesina and Ferrera, 2005; Piketty, 1995; Norton and Ariely, 2011; Fong, 2001). As 
outlined above, this chapter further offers an explanation for this disparity. Moreover, we 
do not find that the wealthy are different in terms of their social preferences (in our case 
their preferences for redistribution) as might be inferred, for example, from results of Piff 
et al. (2010), Smeets et al. (2015), and Fisman et al. (2015). This might be, among other 
reasons, due to the fact that, in our experiment, we control for selfish considerations and 
the marginal utility of money, as decisions in the experiment only have monetary 
consequences for third parties, but not for the decision makers themselves. Our results 
are rather in line with Piketty’s (1995) conjecture that “people from different social 
backgrounds share wide consensus about abstract principles of distributive justice […]”, 
e.g., that, “[p]eople can deserve unequal rewards only on the basis of features – such as 
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effort – that are subject to voluntary control”, (p. 555) as expressed in their preferences 
towards redistribution in the experiment. We can further confirm results of Fong (2001) 
that richer people believe more strongly in self-determination, since in our sample the 
wealthy had a stronger believe in hard work for determining success in life.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the research 
design. Section 5.3 presents the results. Section 5.4 concludes. 
 
5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.2.1 Outline and sample 
Participants of our study were drawn from two different subject pools. The first sample 
consists of clients from ABN AMRO MeesPierson, which is a private bank in the 
Netherlands that exclusively serves clients who have more than 1 million Euros in their 
bank account.129 We will refer to subjects from this subject pool as millionaires or wealthy. 
We are confident that our millionaire sample is a representative portray of Dutch 
millionaires.130 Subjects were asked to participate in the experiment as part of a survey 
on philanthropy conducted by the bank.131 Participation in the survey as well as in the 
experiment was voluntary and not remunerated. The experiment was the second of five 
parts in the survey. In the first part, subjects answered a few demographic questions, as 
well as questions about life satisfaction and their risk attitude. After the experiment, 
subjects answered a series of other questions including our questions about what they 
believe determines success in life, as well as our questions about their political orientation 
and their attitudes towards income inequality and specific taxes. In total, our sample of 
millionaires consists of 304 individuals.132 The second sample consists of 212 subjects of a 
nationally representative sample drawn from Flycatcher, an internet survey panel of a 
diverse adult population living in the Netherlands.133 We will refer to subjects from this 
                                            
129  Note that, however, about 26 percent of our millionaire sample reported a total wealth of less 
than 1 million Euros. 
130  Van Lanschot (2015) reports that 5 percent of millionaires are younger than 40 years, while 
75 percent are older than 50 years. In our millionaire sample, 5.26 percent are younger than 
40 years and 83 percent are older than 50 years. They further state that 20 percent of 
millionaires are women, which with about 30 percent is slightly higher in our sample. Further, 
78 percent of our millionaires are married or living together, which is comparable to 70 percent 
married or living in a registered partnership reported in Arts (2017). Moreover, 16 percent of 
our millionaires live in a single-person household, which is close to 18 percent reported in Arts 
(2017). 
131  Participants knew that the questionnaire was about philanthropy. However, they have only 
been exposed to questions about their philanthropic activities and attitudes after the 
experiment.  
132  In total, 445 millionaires took part in both the survey and the experiment. The additional 141 
millionaires were exposed to a third treatment, which will not be the focus of this chapter. 
Additionally, 245 millionaires took part only in the survey. Naturally, we restrict our sample 
of millionaires to those who participate both in the survey and the experiment. 
133  Additionally, 94 subjects from the general population were exposed to a third treatment of the 
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pool as general population. These subjects completed the experiment as well as a post 
experimental questionnaire including the beliefs and the redistributional attitudes 
questions. As a reward for their participation, participants from Flycatcher received 
points, as is usual in this panel. 
 
5.2.2 Redistributional attitudes 
Subjects were asked four questions to measure their attitude towards redistribution 
ranging from a very broad question about their political orientation to questions regarding 
specific taxes in the Netherlands. The first question was a self-assessment of whether 
subjects are politically oriented towards the left or right, respectively. 134  The second 
question asked about their general attitude towards income inequality outside the 
experiment. The third and fourth question assessed their support for raising the wealth 
and income taxes in the Netherlands.135 Table 1 shows the English translation of the 
questions posed to subjects, as well as the scale. The original Dutch questions can be found 
in Table 6 in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
experiment, which, as mentioned before, will not be the focus of this chapter. 
134  The distinction between left and right is one of the most important dimensions of political 
ideology (Jost, 2006). Self-assessed political orientation (left-right) is related to the fairness 
dimension of moral foundations (Van Leeuwen and Park, 2009 (Dutch student sample); 
Nilsson and Erlandsson, 2015; Kivikangas et al., 2017). 
135  It might be argued that subjects do not view taxes entirely as an instrument for redistribution. 
Unfortunately, we did not ask subjects about their assessment on what the Dutch government 
spends taxes. In the Netherlands, however, social expenditures make up almost half (49.3 
percent in 2013) of the total governmental spending (OECD, 2018b).  
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Table 1: Questions on redistributional attitudes 
Question  Scale 
(i) Political orientationa 
In politics, one talks about left and right. Where would you 
place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “left” 
and 10 means “right”. 
 
0: left – 
10: right 
(ii) Income inequalityb 
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: “A society should aim to equalize 
incomes.” 
 
1: strongly disagree – 
7: strongly agree 
(iii) Taxes   
Wealth tax 
Currently, everyone pays 1.2% tax on wealth above 21,000 
euro.  In your opinion, should people with wealth beyond 1 
million euro pay a lower, the same, or a higher wealth tax?  
 1: a much lower tax rate; 
2: a bit lower tax rate; 
3: the same; 
4: a bit higher tax rate; 
5: a much higher tax rate 
Income tax 
The marginal tax rate for annual incomes above 57,585 euro 
in the Netherlands is currently 52%. In your opinion, should 
the tax rate for people with annual incomes above 57,585 
euro be lower, stay the same, or higher? 
 1: a much lower tax rate; 
2: a bit lower tax rate; 
3: the same; 
4: a bit higher tax rate; 
5: a much higher tax rate 
Notes: a Adapted from World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 2012). b Adapted from Almås 
et al. (2017). English translation of the original questions. For questions in Dutch, see 
Appendix A. 
5.2.3 Preferences for redistribution 
Our experimental design builds strongly on Almås et al. (2017). We employed third-party 
redistribution situations in which spectators made a choice that had real monetary 
consequences for two workers who had completed the same work assignment. Spectators’ 
choices only affected workers’ payments, not their own. Subjects were randomly exposed 
to one of two treatments that only differ in the source of the initial earnings inequality 
between the two workers. For an outline of the experimental design, see Figure 8 in 
Appendix B. 
 
Workers 
Workers received a flat payment of 1 US dollar for completing a work assignment and a 
short questionnaire. After reading the instructions and completing a practice task to 
ensure understanding, all workers worked on the same real-effort task for 5 minutes. After 
completing the task and answering the questionnaire, workers were informed that they 
would potentially earn additional money. To determine their bonus payments, workers 
were randomly matched in pairs. One of the two workers in the pair earned an additional 
6 US dollars (henceforth, worker A), whereas the other worker received nothing 
(henceforth, worker B). The basis for the initial allocation of bonus payments (i.e., the 
source of income inequality) varied across treatments using a between-subjects design. 
Workers were further told that they were matched to a spectator and that this spectator 
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could decide about the final allocation of the bonus payments between the two workers.136 
Workers’ task consisted of double checking entries from a digitized list of participant 
IDs and finding as many mistakes as possible. In particular, they saw a handwritten list 
of IDs on the left side of the screen and a digitized list on the right side of the screen. They 
were instructed to check every row and type in the correct ID in case the digitized ID did 
not correspond to the handwritten ID. Each ID consisted of two letters followed by eight 
numbers. 
 
Spectators 
Each spectator was assigned to one worker-pair and made one redistribution choice that 
had real monetary consequences for these two workers, but not for herself. Spectators were 
first informed about the nature of the task, the 1-US dollar show-up fee for the workers, 
and the basis for the bonus allocation depending on the treatment. Spectators were further 
told that workers only learned about the potential bonus payment and the way it would 
be determined after they had completed the task. In a second step, spectators decided 
whether and how much of the bonus payment they want to redistribute from worker A to 
worker B.137 They could choose any possible combination of allocation in 1-US dollar steps, 
including not redistributing at all (i.e., 6/0, 5/1, …, 0/6 US dollars (income worker A/Income 
worker B)).138 This choice serves as the basis for our measure of implemented inequality. 
 
Implemented inequality 
We are interested in spectators’ preferences for redistribution – in particular in the income 
inequality they implement. The income inequality implemented by spectator i in the choice 
experiment is equal to: 
𝑒𝑖 =
|Income worker 𝐴𝑖−Income worker 𝐵𝑖|
Total income
= |2𝑦𝑖 − 1| ∈ [0,1] ,  (1) 
where 𝑦 is the share of total income allocated to the worker with zero initial earnings by 
spectator i, i.e., to the unlucky/worse performing worker B (see Almås et al., 2017). The 
implemented inequality is equal to one in both treatments before any redistribution, and 
is equal to zero if a spectator decided to completely equalize workers’ incomes (see Table 
2). 
  
                                            
136  For the complete worker instructions, see Appendix C. 
137  For easier implementation, in the spectator instructions worker A is always the worker who 
receives the 6.00 US dollar, and worker B always the worker who receives 0 US dollar. 
138  For the complete spectator instructions, see Appendix D. 
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Table 2: Redistribution choice and 
implemented inequality 
Redistribution choicea 
Implemented 
inequality 
6 / 0 1 
5 / 1 0.667 
4 / 2 0.333 
3 / 3 0 
2 / 4 0.333 
1 / 5 0.667 
0 / 6 1 
Notes: a Income worker A / income worker B. 
This measure of inequality treats subjects who implement inequality that is favorable 
for the unlucky/worse performing worker B equally as those subjects who accept inequality 
that is favorable for the lucky/better performing worker A. For example, both a spectator 
who allocates everything to worker B and a spectator who allocates everything to worker 
A implement an income inequality of 1. In our sample, there are only five people who 
redistributed more than 3 US dollars (i.e., who implemented an inequality favorable for 
the unlucky/worse performing worker B). Since we are primarily interested in inequality 
acceptance when it is favorable for the lucky/better performing worker A, we drop these 
cases from our analysis.139 Hence, we can assert that the less a spectator redistributes from 
worker A to worker B, the higher the inequality implemented by her and thus the higher 
her inequality acceptance.140 
 
Treatments 
Independent of the treatment, one of the two workers in each pair was allocated initial 
earnings of 6 US dollars (worker A) and the other worker received nothing (worker B). The 
basis for this initial allocation (i.e., the source of income inequality) varied across two 
different treatments using a between-subjects design. In the LUCK treatment, we 
randomly determined which of the two workers got paid for the task. In the MERIT 
treatment, the worker in each pair who performed best on the assignment earned 6 US 
dollars. Performance was determined as the total number of mistakes found. In particular, 
workers received one point for each wrong ID they had entered correctly and they were 
deducted one point for each ID they had entered wrongly. 
 
                                            
139  In Appendix F, we redo the main analysis including these five subjects to demonstrate that 
results are not affected by dropping these individuals. 
140  It can be argued that the fact that the default distribution is set at 6/0 US dollars influences 
redistribution behavior. This was done in order to ensure comparability of the result to those 
of Almås et al. (2017). When comparing redistributional preferences of millionaires to those of 
subjects from the general population, the influence of this default effect is not likely to 
influence the results, since it is not clear why these two groups should be affected differently. 
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Incentives 
Workers received a 1-US dollar show-up fee and a bonus payment between 0 and 6 US 
dollar. The amount of the final bonus payment of workers was determined by the decision 
of the spectator they had been matched with. 
Spectators’ decisions did not have any monetary consequences for themselves. 
 
Procedures 
The experiment was conducted online and computer-based. Workers were recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT is an international online market place on which 
workers can be hired anonymously to complete tasks online. Workers received the 1-US 
dollar show-up fee directly after completing the assignment. They received the bonus 
payment once we collected all responses from the spectators. 
 
5.2.4 Beliefs 
Subjects were posed the following question about the importance of different factors for 
success in life: “How important do you think are each of the following factors for getting 
ahead in life?” Thereby, they were asked about five factors in a randomized order: “How 
important is: a) Hard work; b) Being lucky; c) Being intelligent; d) Having connections; e) 
Coming from a wealthy family”.141 In this chapter, we focus on the factors “Hard work” 
and “Being lucky”, since these two factors correspond to those in the two experimental 
treatments. Subjects were asked to provide their answers on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 
means “Not important at all” and 7 means “Very important”. 
 
5.2.5 Source of wealth 
To determine how millionaires got rich we asked them the following question: “What was 
the main source of your household’s wealth?”.142 In total, 97 percent of our millionaire 
sample answered this question. Among them are 100 heirs, 66 whose main source of 
wealth is their salary, and 91 for whom it was income from self-employment.143 To validate 
our self-reported measure of subjects’ main source of wealth, we first look at demographic 
data of subjects (see also Table 7 in Appendix E).  
 
 
                                            
141  Dutch original question: “Hoe belangrijk zijn volgens u de volgende factoren om vooruit te 
komen in het leven?”: a) hard werken, b) geluk hebben, c) intelligent zijn, d) connecties hebben, 
e) uit een rijke familie komen. Answer categories: 1 “helemaal niet belangrijk” – 7 “zeer 
belangrijk”. 
142  Dutch original question: “Wat is de belangrijkste bron geweest voor het vermogen van uw 
huishouden?”. 
143  Beside the three categories mentioned in the text (inheritance, salary, own business) 
respondents could also select property, lottery, or other. Dutch original answer categories: 
Erfenis of familievermogen, inkomen uit loondienst, inkomen uit eigen bedrijf, onroerend goed, 
loterij, anders. 
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We can see that heirs have on average a lower job prestige (SIOPS score (Ganzeboom and 
Treiman, 1996)) than employees.144,145 Furthermore, both entrepreneurs and employees 
are less likely to be female than heirs.146 Moreover, 69 percent of those who say their main 
source of wealth was their own business also say that they currently own their own 
company (see employment status in Table 7 in Appendix E). For comparison, among heirs 
this share is 16 percent and among employees 11 percent. Of those who got rich through 
their salary, 79 percent also indicate that they are employed at the moment. We further 
look at data from Statistics Netherlands who assess that 30 percent of working 
millionaires are entrepreneurs (CBS, 2017). In our study, this is true for 39 percent of 
working millionaires. Hence, altogether, we are confident that we have a valid measure of 
millionaires’ main source of wealth. 
 
5.3 RESULTS 
5.3.1 Sample characteristics 
Table 3 shows sample characteristics of the wealthy and subjects from the general 
population. Among the wealthy, there are fewer women, wealthy subjects are on average 
slightly older, and are a lot more likely to hold a university degree than subjects from the 
general population. Moreover, they are more likely to perceive their social status as high 
and hold jobs with a high prestige.147 Because we recruited millionaires, they are a lot 
more likely to have a high income and high wealth. For an overview of sample 
characteristics of millionaires by source of wealth, see Table 7 in Appendix E. 
 
 
 
                                            
144  Treiman’s Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS) is a coding for job 
prestige based on occupational prestige polls and the International Standard Classification of 
Occupation 1988 (ISCO88), where the higher the score, the higher the prestige assigned to this 
job (Ganzeboom and Treimann, 1996). The lowest assigned value is 6 (ISCO category 6154: 
Hunters & trappers [incl. whaler]), the highest is 78 (ISCO category 2310: Higher education 
teaching professionals [incl. university professor]). For our sample, a student assistant coded 
subjects’ reported occupations acoording to ISCO88 and then assigned the respective SIOPS 
score according to Ganzeboom and Treimann (1996). 
145  Results of Chi-squared tests: 𝜒2(1) = 6.7051, 𝑝 = .010. This makes intuitive sense, since their 
job is not the major way in which heirs obtained their wealth, whereas for entrepreneurs this 
is the case. The difference between heirs and employees is (marginally) insignificant (𝜒2(1) =
1.7934, 𝑝 = .181), whereas employees and entrepreneurs are very similar in their job prestige 
(𝜒2(1) = 0.0038, 𝑝 = .951). 
146  Female are less likely to be self-employed than men (Blanchflower, 2004). Results of Chi-
squared tests: Employees vs. heirs: 𝜒2(1) = 3.1189, 𝑝 = .077; Entrepreneurs vs. heirs: 𝜒2(1) =
6.4665, 𝑝 = .011. 
147  Non-parametric test results: female: 𝜒2(1) = 9.7296, 𝑝 = .002; age: 𝑡(514) = −8.0416, 𝑝 < .0001; 
university degree: 𝜒2(1) = 161.2696, 𝑝 < .001 ; high social status: 𝜒2(1) = 92.1715, 𝑝 < .001 ; 
𝜒2(1) = 30.9043, 𝑝 < .001. 
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Table 3: Sample characteristics 
 General population Wealthy 
Variable % of sample N % of sample N 
Female 42.92 212 29.61 304 
Age 51.24 
(16.08)a 
212 
 
61.37 
(12.50) a 
304 
 
University degree 8.49 212 64.47 304 
Income  198  253 
low (€0–€49,999) 56.56  15.02  
middle (€50,000–€99,999) 36.87  33.20  
high (more than €100,000) 7.58  51.78  
Wealth  190  251 
low (€0–€9,999) 40.53    
middle (€10,000–€99,999) 30.53    
high (more than €100,000) 28.95    
low (€0–€1 million)   24.30  
middle (€1 million–€5 million)   61.75  
high (more than €5 million)   13.94  
High subjective social statusb 59.69 196 94.81 289 
High prestige jobc 34.26 108 69.78 139 
Notes: Sample characteristics of the wealthy and subjects from the general 
population. a Mean (standard deviation); b Answer > 50 to the question: “In our 
society, there are groups at the top and at the bottom of the income distribution. 
If 1 was the bottom and 100 the top, where would you put yourself on this 
scale?”. 148  c Treiman’s Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale 
(SIOPS) (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996): Score > 55. 
5.3.2 Redistributional attitudes of the wealthy and subjects from the 
general population 
Figure 1 shows summary statistics of spectators’ redistributional attitudes as measured 
by their political orientation, their attitude towards income inequality, and towards 
raising income and wealth taxes, respectively. We can see that for all four questions, 
millionaires’ answers are significantly different from those of the general population. In 
particular, they are more inclined towards the political right, have a less favorable attitude 
towards equalizing incomes, and are less likely to support higher wealth and income taxes. 
Results from OLS regressions confirm our parametric results even when adding relevant 
demographic control variables (see Table 9 in Appendix G). Altogether, in our study, the 
wealthy are hence less supportive of redistribution than subjects from the general 
                                            
148  Dutch original question: „In onze samenleving zijn er groepen aan de bovenkant en onderkant 
van de inkomensverdeling. Als 1 de onderkant is en 100 de top van de schaal, waar zou u 
zichzelf plaatsen op die schaal?“. 
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population. 
Figure 1: Redistributional attitudes  
 
Notes: Mean answers by sample. Support for higher wealth/income tax: 
Percentage of sample who is in favor of a higher tax rate (answer 4: a bit higher 
tax rate or 5: a much higher tax rate). Differences between the general 
population and the wealthy are staistically significant in all measures of 
attitudes towards redistribution (political orientation: Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney: 𝑧 = −4.480, 𝑝 ≤ .001 , income inequality: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: 
𝑧 = 10.371, 𝑝 ≤ .001 , support for higher wealth (income) taxes: 𝜒2(1) =
109.5985, 𝑝 ≤ .001 (𝜒2(1) = 30.1286, 𝑝 ≤ .001)). 
5.3.3 The role of preferences and beliefs 
Preferences for redistribution 
Table 4 shows the number of spectators from each sample per treatment in the 
experiment. 
 
Table 4: Number of spectators 
per sample and treatment 
 Treatment 
Sample Luck Merit 
General population 109 103 
Wealthy 149 155 
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Figure 2 depicts the mean implemented inequality in earnings between the two 
workers per treatment and sample. We can see that spectators from both samples 
implement on average a higher degree of inequality in the MERIT than in the LUCK 
treatment (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: General population: 𝑧 = −10.699, 𝑝 ≤ .0001 , 
Wealthy: 𝑧 = −11.558, 𝑝 ≤ .0001). In other words, both groups of spectators are more 
inequality accepting if differences in initial earnings are due to luck rather than when 
they are due to individual merit (i.e., workers’ performance in the task). These results are 
in line with previous findings in the literature (e.g., Frohlich et al., 2004; Cappelen et al., 
2007; Almås et al., 2017).  
Figure 2: Mean implemented inequality  
per treatment and sample 
 
The novel result is that we do not find a difference in inequality acceptance across 
samples neither in the LUCK (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: 𝑧 = −.140, 𝑝 = .8888) nor in the 
MERIT treatment (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: 𝑧 = .345, 𝑝 = .7299). Interestingly, even the 
distributions of the inequality implemented by spectators of the different samples are 
remarkably similar (see Figure 9 in Appendix I)149. 
Results of a series of OLS regressions with and without demographic control variables 
again confirm our non-parametric results and show that millionaires are not different 
from the general population in terms of their preferences for redistribution in neither 
treatment. Results of a pooled estimation across treatments with an interaction term for 
treatment and sample reveal that there is also no difference in the treatment effect 
                                            
149  A pair of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveals that the two distributions are not statistically 
different neither in the LUCK ( 𝐷 = 0.0348, 𝑝 > .999 ), nor in the MERIT treatment ( 𝐷 =
0.1130, 𝑝 = .412). 
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between the two samples (see Table 11 in Appendix J). 
 
Beliefs about success in life 
Figure 3 depicts subjects’ beliefs about success in life by sample. A pair of Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests reveals that the wealthy attach a greater importance to working hard (𝑧 =
−4.520, 𝑝 ≤ .0001) and less importance to being lucky (𝑧 = 1.879, 𝑝 = .0603).150  
Figure 3: Mean beliefs about success in life per sample 
 
Notes: Mean and standard errors of subjects’ answers to the two beliefs 
about success in life questions (Luck / Hard work) by sample. 
Predicting differences in redistributional attitudes 
We use a detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Jann, 
2008) in order to examine how much of the difference in redistributional attitudes between 
the wealthy and the general population is due to differences in preferences for 
redistribution, or participants’ beliefs about the importance of hard work and luck, 
respectively. The (mean) difference in redistributional attitude  
𝑙 ∈ {𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑥, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥}) 
can be decomposed as follows: 
∆𝑙= {𝐸(𝑒𝐺) − 𝐸(𝑒𝑊)}′𝛽
∗ + {𝐸(𝑒𝐺)
′(𝛽𝐺 − 𝛽
∗) + 𝐸(𝑒𝑊)′(𝛽
∗ − 𝛽𝑊)}, 
where 𝐸(𝑒𝐺) is the expected value of the income inequality implemented by the general 
                                            
150  A series of OLS regressions with and without demographic controls confirm these non-
parametric results (see Table 10 in Appendix H). 
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population, 𝐸(𝑒𝑊) is the expected value of the income inequality implemented by the 
wealthy, 𝛽𝐺 and 𝛽𝑊 the coefficient of the general population and the wealthy, respectively, 
and 𝛽∗ is a nondiscriminatory coefficient vector. The first summand is the part of the 
difference in redistributional attitude l that is due to differences in the predictor variables 
(i.e., the explained part of the difference), and the second summand is the part that is due 
to differences in observed differences between the two groups. Since we are interested in 
the contribution of the single predictors (i.e., implemented inequality, beliefs in the 
importance of hard work and luck, respectively), we estimate a detailed decomposition 
model with the total of the explained part being the sum of the contributions of each single 
predictor. We estimate 𝛽∗ from a pooled model with a group indicator (Jann, 2008).151 
We find that the difference in the importance attached to hard work accounts for a vast 
majority of the explained part of the outcome differences between the wealthy and the 
general population in all measures of redistributional attitudes (see Table 5). For political 
orientation, for example, the wealthy attaching a greater importance to hard work 
accounts for about 85 percent of the explained part of the gap in political attitude. The 
contribution to the difference in political orientation and attitudes towards income 
inequality is statistically significant, while the contribution to the difference in attitudes 
towards increasing income taxes is marginally insignificant. The difference between the 
wealthy and the general population in the importance attached to luck or their preference 
for redistribution does not seem to be important for explaining the outcome differences in 
any measure of redistributional attitudes. Overall, the differences in preferences and 
beliefs account for about 17 percent of the difference in political orientation, and for 6 
percent of the difference in attitudes towards income inequality. Furthermore, when 
looking at the prediction regressions per sample, we see that both choices in the 
experiment and beliefs in hard work can generally predict redistributional attitudes of 
millionaires, but not of the general population (see Table 12 in Appendix K). We hence 
partly confirm findings on the impact of preferences and beliefs on attitudes towards 
redistribution (e.g., Almås et al., 2017; Fong, 2001). However, it is only for beliefs about 
the importance of hard work that the difference between the wealthy and the general 
population can explain differences in redistributional attitudes between the two groups. 
Our results thus add to the literature on the importance of beliefs in predicting attitudes 
towards redistribution in the field (Fong, 2001; Alesina et al., 2001; Corneo and Grüner, 
2002) and offer one possible explanation for why richer people are found to have a less 
favorable attitude towards redistribution (e.g., Alesina and Guiliano, 2009; Alesina and 
Ferrera, 2005; Piketty, 1995; Norton and Ariely; 2011; Fong, 2001). 
To summarize, we see that millionaires and subjects from the general population 
                                            
151  Results are also qualitatively robust to specifications of the model from the viewpoint of either 
group instead of using the nondiscriminatory coefficient vector 𝛽∗, with the exception that 
when estimating the model from the viewpoint of the wealthy, also the contribution of the 
belief about hard work to the difference in attitudes towards the wealth tax becomes 
significant, and when estimating the model from the viewpoint of the general population, the 
contribution of the belief about luck (instead of the belief about hard work) to the difference in 
attitudes towards income inequality becomes significant. 
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display remarkably similar preference for redistribution in the experiment, in which we 
control for beliefs about the role of luck and effort. Due to differences in these beliefs, 
however, preferences translate into different redistributional attitudes in the field. In 
particular, millionaires attach a greater importance to hard work and, therefore, express 
less support for, for instance, equalizing incomes. 
Table 5: Differences in redistributional attitudes 
 Political 
orientation 
Income 
inequality 
Wealth  
tax 
Income  
tax 
Mean outcome difference     
Coefficient –.9068 1.6538 .8188 .4926 
Standard error .2043 .1510 .0674 .0694 
P-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Implemented inequality     
Coefficient –.0113 –.0008 –.00004 .0005 
Standard error .0258 .0154 .0006 .0036 
P-value .661 .957 .954 .884 
Belief luck     
Coefficient –.0116 .0348 .0041 .0021 
Standard error .0177 .0227 .0063 .0050 
P-value .513 .125 .508 .611 
Belief hard work     
Coefficient –.1323 .0657 .01326 .0239 
Standard error .0512 .0307 .01229 .0146 
P-value .010 .032 .281 .102 
Total     
Coefficient –.1552 .0996 .0174 .0266 
Standard error .0620 .0417 .01460 .0168 
P-value .012 .017 .234 .113 
     
N 481 504 501 495 
Notes: Estimates of twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with the 
nondiscriminatory coefficient vector  𝛽∗ being estimated from a pooled model with a 
group indicator (Jann, 2008). Implemented inequality, belief luck, and belief hard 
work refers to the contributions of these single predictors to the mean difference in 
each of the measures of subjects’ redistributional attitudes. Total refers to the part of 
the difference in a redistributional attitude that is due to observed differences in all 
three predictor variables. The total unexplained part is the difference between the 
mean outcome difference and the total of the explained part and is not displayed here. 
5.3.4 Source of wealth 
Figure 4 depicts millionaires’ mean belief about the importance of luck and hard work for 
success in life by source of wealth. A pair of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests reveals that 
heirs indeed attach less importance to hard work than employees (𝑧 = −2.288, 𝑝 = .0221) 
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and entrepreneurs (𝑧 = −2.841, 𝑝 = .0045).152 While the latter is also confirmed by OLS 
regressions (also when adding demographic control variables), the former is not (see Table 
13 in Appendix L). There is no difference between either of the groups of millionaires in 
the importance they attach to luck for getting ahead in life.153  
Interestingly, our results reveal that in terms of redistributional attitudes as well as 
preferences for redistribution, entrepreneurs are the group that differs from the rest of 
millionaires. In particular, they favor less redistribution than the other two groups of 
millionaires, both in and outside the experiment. In comparison to heirs and employees, 
respectively, entrepreneurs are oriented more towards the political right and less likely to 
support higher wealth taxes. They are also less supportive of decreasing income inequality 
than heirs (see Figure 5). 154  In the experiment, entrepreneurs are more inequality 
accepting than heirs both in the LUCK (  𝑧 = −1.770, 𝑝 = .0767 ) and in the MERIT 
treatment (𝑧 = −2.712, 𝑝 = .0067), and than employees in the MERIT treatment (𝑧 =
−1.700, 𝑝 = .0892 ) (see also Figure 6). 155  Heirs and employees, on the contrary, are 
statistically indistinguishable both in their redistributional attitudes, as well as in the 
level of inequality they implement between the two workers in either treatment of the 
experiment. 156  All results are largely confirmed by OLS estimates with and without 
demographic control variables (see Table 15 and 16 in Appendix N and O). 
  
                                            
152  There is no difference between employees and entrepreneurs in the importance they attach to 
hard work: 𝑧 = −0.128, 𝑝 = .8983. 
153  Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests: Heirs vs. employees: 𝑧 = −7.05, 𝑝 = .4810; Heirs vs. 
entrepreneurs: 𝑧 = −0.693, 𝑝 = .4881; Employees vs. entrepreneurs: 𝑧 = 0.051, 𝑝 = .9591.  
154  Political orientation (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests): Entrepreneurs vs. heirs: 𝑧 = −3.485, 𝑝 =
.0005 ; entrepreneurs vs. employees: 𝑧 = −1.951, 𝑝 = .0510 . Wealth tax (Chi-squared tests): 
Entrepreneurs vs. heirs:  𝜒2(1) = 6.9081, 𝑝 = .009 ; entrepreneurs vs. employees:  𝜒2(1) =
5.1512, 𝑝 = .023. Income inequality (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests): Entrepreneurs vs. heirs: 
𝑧 = 2.055, 𝑝 = .0399 ; entrepreneurs vs. employees: 𝑧 = 0.947, 𝑝 = .3439 . Income tax (Chi-
squared tests): Entrepreneurs vs. heirs:  𝜒2(1) = 0.0937, 𝑝 = .759 ; entrepreneurs vs. 
employees: 𝜒2(1) = 0.3953, 𝑝 = .530. 
155  For an overview of the number of millionaires by source of wealth and treatment, see Table 14 
in Appendix M. 
156  Redistributional attitudes: Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests: Political orientation: 𝑧 =
−1.352, 𝑝 = .1762; Income inequality: 𝑧 = 0.924, 𝑝 = .3555. Results of Chi-squared tests: Wealth 
tax:  𝜒2(1) = 0.0283, 𝑝 = .866 ; Income tax:  𝜒2(1) = 0.8165, 𝑝 = .366 . Implemented inequality: 
Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests: LUCK: 𝑧 = −1.033, 𝑝 = .3015 ; MERIT: 𝑧 =
−0.928, 𝑝 = .3534. 
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Figure 4: Mean beliefs about success in life by source of wealth 
Notes: Mean and standard errors of millionaires’ answers to the two beliefs about 
success in life questions (Luck/Hard work) by source of wealth. 
Figure 5: Redistributional attitudes by source of wealth 
 
Notes: Mean answers of millionaires by source of wealth. Support for higher 
wealth/income tax: Percentage of sample who is in favor of a higher tax rate (answer 
4: a bit higher tax rate or 5: a much higher tax rate). 
not important at all  1
2
3
4
5
6
very important  7
Luck Hard work
Inheritance Salary Business
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Figure 6: Mean implemented inequality by source of wealth 
 
Notes: Mean and standard errors of implemented inequality 
by millionaires in the experiment by source of wealth. 
One plausible explanation for the otherness of entrepreneurs is that they are more 
likely to have been confronted with merit considerations in their professional life.157 As 
business owners, they are likely to have had experience with evaluating workers’ 
performance, effort related payment, or determining payment schemes in order to increase 
workers’ performance. These experiences might bias them towards favoring rewarding 
individual effort and thus having a less positive attitude towards redistribution. In our 
sample, 55 percent of entrepreneurs are a CEO (ISCO code 1210) or general manager 
(ISCO code 1310).158  For heirs and employees, this share is only 16 and 27 percent, 
respectively. These differences are statistically significant (entrepreneurs vs. heirs 
( 𝜒2(1) = 15.3538, 𝑝 < .001 ); entrepreneurs vs. employees ( 𝜒2(1) = 5.4427, 𝑝 = .020 )). 
Among the wealthy, we also see that CEOs and general managers are less in favor of 
redistribution in three of our four measures of redistributional attitudes.159 They also 
                                            
157  Other possible explanations are that entrepreneurs differ, for example, in personality traits 
that might be related to redistribution. 
158  Those who are not a CEO or general manager are, for example, other managers (e.g., 
“production department managers business services [incl. banker, bank manager]” (ISCO code 
1227)), “dentists” (ISCO code: 2222), “accountants” (ISCO code: 2411) or “business 
professionals [incl. publicity agent, patent agent, home economist, market researcher]” (ISCO 
code: 2419). 
159  Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests: Political orientation: 𝑧 = −3.604, 𝑝 = .0003; Income 
inequality: 𝑧 = 1.857, 𝑝 = .0633. Results of Chi-squared tests: Wealth tax: 𝜒2(1) = 4.1309, 𝑝 =
.043; Income tax: 𝜒2(1) = .0350, 𝑝 = .852. These results are qualitatively similar when we look 
at the whole sample. 
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implement a higher payment inequality between the two workers in the MERIT 
treatment. This difference is, however, not statistically significant.160 Entrepreneurs also 
desire a much higher inequality between earnings of different professions, such as a 
chairman of a company and an unskilled worker, both than heirs and employees (see 
Figure 7). In particular, when asked about how much they think (1) a chairman of a large 
company, (2) a congress member, (3) an elementary school teacher, and (4) an unskilled 
worker should earn, they, on average, desire a higher inequality (as measured in the Gini 
index of the desired earnings) than heirs (𝑡(189) = −2.1170, 𝑝 = .0356) and employees 
(𝑡(154) = −1.7891, 𝑝 = .0756).161,162 Again, heirs and employees, however, are statistically 
indistinguishable both in the share of managers among them (𝜒2(1) = 1.2391, 𝑝 = .266), 
as well as in the desired earnings inequality (𝑡(163) = −0.2343, 𝑝 = .8150).  
Overall, these results thus partly support the conjecture that experience in (upward) 
social mobility is a driver of differences in beliefs between millionaires and subjects from 
the general population (Piketty, 1995). We show that also among millionaires, those who 
have experienced social mobility believe more strongly in hard work than those who have 
not. This difference in beliefs translates, however, not necessarily into differences in 
redistributional attitudes. Further, in terms of the importance attached to luck, heirs are 
not different from other types of millionaires, suggesting that this very difference we find 
between millionaires and people from the general population might be due to an increased 
incentive of millionaires to develop a narrative in order to keep a positive self-image. 
Moreover, being confronted with merit considerations in professional life might be an 
important channel for shaping preferences for and attitudes towards redistribution. 
  
                                            
160  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: 𝑧 = −1.446, 𝑝 = .1481. In the LUCK treatment, they even implement 
lower inequality, again the difference not being statistically significant: Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney: 𝑧 = .537, 𝑝 = .5916. These results are again qualitatively similar when we look at the 
whole sample. 
161  The Gini index was calculated using the fastgini command in Stata (Sajaia, 2007). 
162  On average, entrepreneurs would desire earnings that amount to a Gini index of 0.62, heirs of 
0.55, and employees of 0.56. Note that this computed Gini index is not directly comparable to 
the actual Gini index in the Netherlands, since we only use (desired) earnings for four 
occupations assuming the latter are equally distributed in the society. 
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Figure 7: Gini index of desired earnings by source of wealth 
 
Notes: Gini index computed from what millionaires think how much 
(1) a chairman of a large company, (2) a congress member, (3) an 
elementary school teacher, and (4) an unskilled worker should earn. 
Our findings from the heterogeneity analysis regarding millionaires’ source of wealth 
further add to the experimental research on entrepreneurs. This literature reveals that 
(small scale) entrepreneurs are different in important ways. They are different in terms 
of their preference, for instance, they are less risk averse (Stewart Jr. and Roth, 2001; 
Elston et al., 2005) and are more patient (Andersen et al., 2014) than others.163 Further, 
they differ from the rest of the population in terms of their beliefs about their own chances 
of success (overconfidence) (Busenitz and Barney, 1997). Finally, and most closely related 
to our research, Lee-Ross (2015) finds that entrepreneurs are more likely to view it as less 
unfair to reward individual performance both than employees and the general 
population.164  Our findings show that also among the wealthy, there exist important 
differences in economic preferences, beliefs, and attitudes between (successful) 
entrepreneurs on the one side, and heirs and employees on the other side. 
 
5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter confirms that the wealthy have a substantially less favorable attitude 
towards redistribution than people from the general population as measured by their 
political orientation, their general attitude towards income inequality, and their attitudes 
towards raising taxes on income or wealth. Our results suggest that these differences are 
                                            
163  Andersen et al. (2014), however, find no difference in risk preferences between small business 
entrepreneurs and the general population. 
164  Lee-Ross (2015) asks participants to indicate whether they find the following fair or unfair: 
“Two secretaries doing same job but one earns more than other but is better at job”. 
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not due to differences in preferences for redistribution, but rather disparities in beliefs in 
the importance of hard work for success in life. Assessing the relation between a 
millionaire’s source of wealth and her beliefs suggests that these disparities between 
millionaires and subjects from the general population in beliefs about the role of hard work 
stem from differences in actual experienced social mobility. 
On the one hand, some studies argue that the rich are more selfish than other groups 
in society. Piff et al. (2010), for example, find that individuals from a higher social class 
give more in a dictator game and think that a lower share of people’s income should be 
spent on charitable donations as compared to lower class individuals.165,166 Alstadsæter et 
al. (2018) show that the rich are more likely to engage in tax evasion. Fisman et al. (2015) 
find that a (future) political elite in the US puts a higher weight on efficiency as opposed 
to equality and behaves less fair-mindedly in an experiment than the US general public.167 
On the other hand, Korndörfer et al. (2015) show that people from a higher social class 
give a higher percentage of their family income to a charitable cause and are more 
helpful.168 In Andreoni et al. (2017), the rich are twice as likely to return misdelivered 
envelopes as the poor. However, once the authors control for “pressures associated with 
poverty and the marginal utility of money” (p.1), there is no difference in prosocial 
behavior. Smeets et al. (2015) find that millionaires give substantially more than subjects 
usually give in a dictator game when matched to another subject with low income. In a 
recent study, Smeets et al. (2018) show that even though millionaires have approximately 
the same amount of time available for leisure as subjects from the general population, 
they spend more of this time volunteering than the latter. Evidence on the differences in 
selfishness between wealthier people and the rest of the population is thus mixed. 
Thereby, the findings clearly depend on the design of the study, for example, on the 
relative stakes involved for the different parties.169 
It could come to mind that – if the rich were more selfish than people from the general 
population, then millionaires in our sample could be more reluctant to redistribution 
because they are less willing to have their income or wealth taxed in order to finance 
redistribution. Such an argument neglects the fact that richer people have higher stakes 
in redistribution policies. In other words, the price for acting non-selfishly is higher for 
them than for people from the general population.170 For example, increasing the wealth 
                                            
165  In the former, social class was measured by subjective socioeconomic status, while in the latter 
relative social class was induced by manipulating subjects’ perceived social rank. 
166  A large scale replication study with 2.5 times the original sample size fails to replicate the 
findings (Jung et al., 2018). 
167  Subjects of the (future) political elite sample are students of Juris Doctor (J.D.) at Yale Law 
School. Results even hold when controlling for age, gender, and education level. 
168  The authors use subjects’ income, education and occupational prestige score to construct an 
objective measure of social class. Being helpful is a self-reported measure of how often subjects’ 
had engaged in everyday social deeds in the last 12 months, such as giving food or money to a 
homeless person, or offering their seat in the bus to a stranger (Korndörfer et al., 2015). 
169  Korndörfer et al. (2015) further find an influence of the measure of social class, the type of 
prosocial behavior, and the country in which the study was conducted. 
170  In line with Chapter II to IV of this thesis, we assume that people carry both self-interest 
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tax in the Netherlands from 1.2% to 2%, a person with 1 million Euros in her bank account 
would have to pay 8,000 Euros more in taxes per year, while for someone with 30,000 
Euros, it would only be 240 Euros. A person who has less than 21,000 Euros is even exempt 
from paying wealth taxes in the Netherlands. Hence, even if rich people and people from 
the general population are equally selfish, differences in stakes could cause them to be 
less in favor of redistribution in the field. Note that in the experiment, however, there are 
no monetary stakes involved for neither group, since their decision does not affect their 
own payoff. 
Nevertheless, if millionaires were indeed more self-interested than people from the 
general population, this could further augment the difference between the two groups in 
their attitudes towards redistribution in the field. We use a validated survey measure to 
assess subjects’ altruism (Falk et al., 2016). We find that in our study, the wealthy are 
even more altruistic than the general population according to this measure. Increased 
selfishness of millionaires is thus unlikely to be a driver behind the observed differences 
in attitudes towards redistribution in our study. If anything, it could have decreased this 
difference.  
                                            
and (different) social motives inside them which they trade off against each other. People can 
thus display different degrees of self-interest and other regarding behavior. 
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5.5 APPENDIX 
A Redistributional attitudes: Dutch original questions 
Table 6: Questions on redistributional attitudes in Dutch (original) 
Question  Scale 
(i) Political orientation 
In de politiek spreekt men vaak over links en rechts. 
Waar zou u uzelf omschrijven op een schaal van 0 
tot 10 waar 0 betekent links en 10 betekent rechts? 
 
0: links – 
10: rechts 
(ii) Income inequality 
Een samenleving zou er naar moeten streven om 
inkomens gelijk te maken. 
 
1: helemaal oneens – 
7: helemaal eens 
(iii) Taxes   
Wealth tax 
Momenteel betaalt iedere Nederlander 1,2% 
belasting op vermogen boven 21.000 euro. Naar uw 
mening, zouden mensen met een vermogen boven 1 
miljoen euro een lager, hetzelfde of een hoger 
percentage belasting moeten betalen? 
 
1: Een veel lager percentage belasting; 
2: Een lager percentage belasting; 
3: Hetzelfde percentage belasting; 
4: Een hoger  percentage belasting; 
5: Een veel hoger percentage belasting 
Income tax 
Het marginale belastingpercentage voor jaarlijks 
inkomen boven 57.585 euro is momenteel 52%. 
Naar uw mening, zou dit belastingpercentage voor 
mensen met een inkomen boven 57.585 euro lager 
moeten zijn, hetzelfde of hoger? 
 
1: Een veel lager percentage belasting; 
2: Een lager percentage belasting; 
3: Hetzelfde percentage belasting; 
4: Een hoger  percentage belasting; 
5: Een veel hoger percentage belasting 
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C Worker instructions 
 
Before accepting the HIT (information about the HIT on mturk) 
Title: Checking digitized entries from a list of ID numbers 
Description: This HIT consists of double checking digitized entries from a list of ID 
numbers, followed by a short questionnaire.  
Payment: $1.00 
Expected time: 10 minutes 
 
 
After accepting the HIT (Qualtrics) 
Screen 0 
Welcome! 
 
We are researchers at the University of Maastricht and are hiring workers for a simple 
work assignment. The assignment consists of double checking digitized entries from a 
list of ID numbers. The work assignment is followed by a short questionnaire. None of 
the questions will involve sensitive topics.  
 
DURATION: 
The work assignment takes exactly 5 minutes to complete, not including the time for 
reading the task instructions and completing the questionnaire. Overall, it should take 
10 minutes or less to complete the HIT. 
 
COMPENSATION: 
You will receive $ 1.00 for your participation. You have to complete the work assignment 
and questionnaire to qualify for payment. You will receive a secret key after the 
questionnaire that will allow you to complete the HIT on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: 
We will not reveal any personally identifying information about you. 
 
Please indicate, in the box below, that you have read and understand this consent form. 
 
X I have read the consent form and agree to participate in this task. 
                           
Screen 1 
Instructions: 
 
We are hiring workers to double check digitized entries from a list of ID numbers. 
 
Your task is to check as many entries as possible and to correct any mistakes you find. 
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You will have exactly 5 minutes to work on this task. 
 
On the next screens you will first see an example of how to perform the task, and then 
we will give you a short practice task to make sure you understand the assignment. The 
5-minute working period starts once you have completed the practice task. 
 
       
 
 
Screen 2 
Example: 
  
This is an example of how to perform the task. You do not have to fill in anything yet. 
 
 
On the left hand side you see a list of handwritten ID numbers that have been digitized.  
  
Your task will be to detect mistakes and to correct them. If a digitized entry is incorrect, 
fill in the correct ID number from the handwritten list in the corresponding field. If the 
entry is correct, leave the corresponding field empty. ID numbers always start with 
2 capital letters, followed by 8 numbers. 
  
In the above example, only the last ID is not digitized correctly. On the next screen you 
will see how you should fill out this table. 
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Screen 3 
Example (with solution): 
 
 
         
Screen 4 
Practice Task: 
  
This is a practice task.  
  
For each row, please check whether the digitized entry is correct. If it is incorrect, fill in 
the correct ID number from the handwritten list in the corresponding field. If the entry 
is correct, leave the corresponding field empty. Remember, ID numbers always start 
with 2 capital letters, followed by 8 numbers. 
  
 
 
 
If a worker did not complete the task correctly, the following error message is displayed: 
 
“Your answer is not correct. Please read the instructions carefully and try again.” 
 
If a worker completes the task correctly, she or he can go on to Screen 5. 
 
Screen 5 
You have successfully completed the practice task. Now you can proceed to the work 
assignment. 
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The 5-minute working period will start once you continue to the next screen. 
 
 
Screen 6 
Countdown timer starting at 5 minutes at the top of the screen. 
 
 
Work Assignment: 
 
 
 … 
 
 
Screen 7 
The 5-minute working period is over. 
 
Finally, please provide us with some basic information about yourself. 
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Q1 What is your age? 
 
Q2 What is your gender? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
Q3 What is the primary ethnicity or race you identify with? 
 Asian/Asian American (1) 
 Black/African American (2) 
 White/European American (3) 
 Hispanic/Latino (4) 
 Other (5) 
Q4 Which category best describes your highest level of education? 
 High school/GED or less (1) 
 Some college (2) 
 College degree (3) 
 Master's or professional degree (for example: JD, MD, MBA) (4) 
 Doctoral degree (5) 
Q5 What is your current employment status? 
 Full-time employee (1) 
 Part-time employee (2) 
 Self-employed or small business owner (3) 
 Unemployed and looking for work (4) 
 Student (5) 
 Not in labor force (for example: retired, or full-time parent) (6) 
Q6 What is your household income compared to the average household income in your 
country?  
 Much lower than average income1 (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 Much higher than average income7 (7) 
Q7 In general, to what extent are you politically liberal or conservative? 
 Very liberal 1 (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 160 
 Very conservative7 (7) 
 
 
Final Screen 
Thank you for completing the HIT! 
 
Your secret key is:    XX 
 
Please copy the key and paste it into AMT before you close this window. If the key you 
entered is correct, you will receive a payment of US $1.00. 
 
Treatment 1: LUCK 
Bonus Payment: 
 
You may receive a bonus payment for completing the work assignment. Whether or not 
you will receive any additional money depends on the decision made by a participant of 
an ongoing research study. 
 
You will be matched to another worker who completed the same assignment. The size of 
the bonus payment for you and the other worker is determined by chance: 
 The worker who is chosen by chance earns US $6.00 for the assignment. 
 The other worker earns nothing for the assignment. 
A third person will be informed about which worker receives the bonus payment and 
then gets the opportunity to redistribute the earnings between you and the other worker. 
This person can choose to redistribute any amount in $1.00 steps (for example 
$5.00/$1.00, $4.00/$2.00 etc.). He or she can also choose to redistribute the whole amount 
or no money at all. We will not reveal any personally identifying information about you 
to this third person. 
 
You will receive the bonus payment once all workers have completed the assignment and 
the third person has made a decision. This can take a few weeks. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
Treatment 2: MERIT 
Bonus Payment: 
 
You may receive a bonus payment for completing the work assignment. Whether or not 
you will receive any additional money depends on the decision made by a participant of 
an ongoing research study. 
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You will be matched to another worker who completed the same assignment. The size of 
the bonus payment of you and the other worker is determined by your performance on 
the task: 
 The worker who performs better on the work assignment earns US $6.00 for 
the assignment. 
 The other worker earns nothing for the assignment. 
A third person will be informed about which worker performed better and receives the 
bonus payment and then gets the opportunity to redistribute the earnings between you 
and the other worker. This person can choose to redistribute any amount in $1.00 steps 
(for example $5.00/$1.00, $4.00/$2.00 etc.). He or she can also choose to redistribute the 
whole amount or no money at all. We will not reveal any personally identifying 
information about you to this third person. 
 
You will receive the bonus payment once all workers have completed the assignment and 
the third person has made a decision. This can take a few weeks. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
D Spectator instructions 
D.1 Dutch original text 
Zo meteen start het wetenschappelijk keuze-experiment. Dit is interactief met andere 
deelnemers aan het onderzoek. Het geeft inzicht in de manier waarop u financiële en 
maatschappelijke beslissingen neemt. 
 
U kunt uw keuzes op een later tijdstip vergelijken met die van anderen, 
via www.paulsmeets.eu. 
 
Het experiment duurt ongeveer 5 minuten. 
 
Treatment 1: LUCK 
In tegenstelling tot de andere vragen in deze vragenlijst gaat u nu een keuze maken die 
een invloed heeft op de uitbetaling aan andere mensen. We vragen u daarom de 
instructies goed door te lezen. 
 
Recent hebben we via een internationaal online platform twee mensen ingehuurd om een 
taak te vervullen. Laten we hen Werker A en Werker B noemen. De taak was voor 
beiden gelijk en bestond uit het handmatig controleren van ID-nummers van 
deelnemers. Als vergoeding voor hun deelname ontvingen beide werkers $1, ongeacht 
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hun eventuele verdienste voor de taak. 
 
Nadat ze de taak hadden afgerond, hebben we de werkers verteld dat hun verdiensten 
voor de taak bepaald worden door toeval: 
- De werker die door toeval is gekozen verdient $6 voor de taak 
- De andere werker verdient niks voor de taak. 
 
Verdiensten van de werkers: 
 
Werker A is door toeval gekozen. Hij of zij verdient daarom $6 voor de taak. Werker 
B verdient daarom niks voor de taak. 
 
We hebben de werkers zelf niet geïnformeerd over wie door toeval is gekozen. We 
vertelden hun enkel dat een derde persoon op de hoogte wordt gesteld van deze 
uitkomst. Ook vertelden we de werkers dat deze persoon de gelegenheid krijgt om hun 
verdiensten te herverdelen. 
 
U bent deze derde persoon en kunt beslissen of u de verdiensten voor de taak wilt 
herverdelen tussen Werker A en Werker B. Uw beslissing is volledig anoniem. De 
werkers ontvangen na afloop van de studie de door u bepaalde betaling, maar krijgen 
verder geen informatie. 
 
Denk goed na over uw beslissing, want $6 is een aanzienlijk bedrag in deze 
arbeidsmarkt. 
 
 
Uw beslissing: 
U kunt nu de verdiensten herverdelen tussen de twee werkers. 
Werker A was de gelukkige werker die door toeval was gekozen. Werker A 
verdient daarom $6 en Werker B krijgt $0. 
 
Kies alstublieft een van de volgende opties: 
  
Ik wil de verdiensten niet herverdelen: 
 Werker A krijgt $6 en Werker B krijgt $0 betaald 
 
Ik wil de verdiensten herverdelen: 
 Werker A krijgt $5 en Werker B krijgt $1 betaald 
 Werker A krijgt $4 en Werker B krijgt $2 betaald 
 Werker A krijgt $3 en Werker B krijgt $3 betaald 
 Werker A krijgt $2 en Werker B krijgt $4 betaald 
 Werker A krijgt $1 en Werker B krijgt $5 betaald 
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 Werker A krijgt $0 en Werker B krijgt $6 betaald 
 
Treatment 2: MERIT 
 
In tegenstelling tot de andere vragen in deze vragenlijst gaat u nu een keuze maken die 
een invloed heeft op de uitbetaling aan andere mensen. We vragen u daarom de 
instructies goed door te lezen. 
Recent hebben we via een internationaal online platform twee mensen ingehuurd om een 
taak te vervullen. Laten we hen Werker A en Werker B noemen. De taak was voor 
beiden gelijk en bestond uit het handmatig controleren van ID-nummers van 
deelnemers. Als vergoeding voor hun deelname ontvingen beide werkers $1, ongeacht 
hun eventuele verdienste voor de taak. 
 
Nadat ze de taak hadden afgerond, hebben we de werkers verteld dat hun verdiensten 
voor de taak bepaald worden door hun prestatie: 
- De werker die het beste presteert verdient $6 voor de taak 
- De andere werker verdient niks voor de taak. 
 
Verdiensten van de werkers: 
 
Werker A heeft het beste gepresteerd in de taak. Hij of zij verdient daarom $6 voor 
de taak. Werker B verdient daarom niks voor de taak. 
 
We hebben de werkers zelf niet geïnformeerd over wie het beste had gepresteerd. We 
vertelden hun enkel dat een derde persoon op de hoogte wordt gesteld van deze 
uitkomst. Ook vertelden we de werkers dat deze persoon de gelegenheid krijgt om hun 
verdiensten te herverdelen. 
 
U bent deze derde persoon en kunt beslissen of u de verdiensten voor de taak wilt 
herverdelen tussen Werker A en Werker B. Uw beslissing is volledig anoniem. De 
werkers ontvangen na afloop van de studie de door u bepaalde betaling, maar krijgen 
verder geen informatie. 
 
Denk goed na over uw beslissing, want $6 is een aanzienlijk bedrag in deze 
arbeidsmarkt. 
 
 
Uw beslissing: 
U kunt nu de verdiensten herverdelen tussen de twee werkers. 
Werker A had het beste gepresteerd in de taak. Werker A verdient daarom $6 
en Werker B krijgt $0. 
 
Kies alstublieft een van de volgende opties: 
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Ik wil de verdiensten niet herverdelen: 
 Werker A krijgt $6 en Werker B krijgt $0 betaald 
 
Ik wil de verdiensten herverdelen: 
 Werker A krijgt $5 en Werker B krijgt $1 betaald 
 Werker A krijgt $4 en Werker B krijgt $2 betaald 
 Werker A krijgt $3 en Werker B krijgt $3 betaald 
 Werker A krijgt $2 en Werker B krijgt $4 betaald 
 Werker A krijgt $1 en Werker B krijgt $5 betaald 
 Werker A krijgt $0 en Werker B krijgt $6 betaald 
 
 
D.2 English translation 
Next, the scientific choice experiment will start. It is interactive with other participants 
of the study. It gives insight into the way you make financial and social decisions. 
 
You can compare your choices at a later point in time with those of the other participants, 
via www.paulsmeets.eu. 
 
The experiment takes about 5 minutes. 
 
Treatment 1: LUCK 
 
Unlike the other questions in this survey, you will now make a choice that has real 
monetary consequences for other people. We therefore ask you to pay careful attention 
to the instructions. 
 
We recently hired two individuals via an online platform to work on an assignment. Let 
us call them worker A and worker B. The assignment was the same for both workers 
and consisted of manually double checking entries from a list of participant ID 
numbers. Each worker received a flat payment of $1.00 for signing up, regardless of 
their potential earnings for the assignment. 
 
After completing the assignment, we told the workers that their earnings for the 
assignment will be determined by chance: 
● The worker who is chosen by chance earns $6.00 for the assignment. 
● The other worker earns nothing for the assignment. 
 
Earnings of the workers: 
Worker A was chosen by chance and therefore earns $6.00 for the assignment. Thus, 
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worker B earned nothing for the assignment. 
We did not inform the workers about who was chosen by chance. However, we told the 
workers that a third person will be informed about this outcome. We also told them that 
this person would get the opportunity to redistribute the earnings. 
 
You are the third person and will now choose whether to redistribute the earnings for 
the assignment between worker A and worker B. Your decision is completely anonymous. 
The workers will receive the payment that you choose once the study is complete, but they 
will not receive any further information.  
Please consider your decision carefully, as $6.00 is a considerable amount of money for 
these workers. 
 
 
Your decision 
 
You can now redistribute the earnings of the two workers.  
Worker A was chosen by chance and therefore earns $6.00 for the assignment. 
Thus, worker B earned nothing for the assignment. 
Please choose one of the following options: 
I do not want to redistribute earnings: 
 Worker A is paid $6.00 and Worker B is paid $0.00  
I want to redistribute earnings: 
 Worker A is paid $5.00 and Worker B is paid $1.00 
 Worker A is paid $4.00 and Worker B is paid $2.00 
 Worker A is paid $3.00 and Worker B is paid $3.00 
 Worker A is paid $2.00 and Worker B is paid $4.00 
 Worker A is paid $1.00 and Worker B is paid $5.00 
 Worker A is paid $0.00 and Worker B is paid $6.00 
Treatment 2: MERIT 
 
Unlike the other questions in this survey, you will now make a choice that has real 
monetary consequences for other people. We therefore ask you to pay careful attention 
to the instructions. 
 
We recently hired two individuals via an online platform to work on an assignment. Let 
us call them worker A and worker B. The assignment was the same for both workers 
and consisted of manually double checking entries from a list of participant ID 
numbers. Each worker received a flat payment of $1.00 for signing up, regardless of 
their potential earnings for the assignment. 
 
After completing the assignment, we told the workers that their earnings for the 
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assignment will be determined by their performance on the assignment: 
● The worker who performs best earns $6.00 for the assignment.  
● The other worker earns nothing for the assignment. 
 
Earnings of the workers: 
Worker A performed best and therefore earns $6.00 for the assignment. Thus, worker 
B earns nothing for the assignment. 
We did not inform the workers about who performed best. However, we told the workers 
that a third person will be informed about this outcome. We also told them that this 
person would get the opportunity to redistribute the earnings.  
 
You are the third person and will now choose whether to redistribute the earnings for 
the assignment between worker A and worker B. Your decision is completely anonymous. 
The workers will receive the payment that you choose once the study is complete, but they 
will not receive any further information.  
Please consider your decision carefully, as $6.00 is a considerable amount of money for 
these workers. 
 
 
Your decision 
 
You can now redistribute the earnings of the two workers.  
Worker A performed best and therefore earns $6.00 for the assignment. Thus, 
worker B earns nothing for the assignment. 
Please choose one of the following options: 
I do not want to redistribute earnings: 
 Worker A is paid $6.00 and Worker B is paid $0.00  
I want to redistribute earnings: 
 Worker A is paid $5.00 and Worker B is paid $1.00 
 Worker A is paid $4.00 and Worker B is paid $2.00 
 Worker A is paid $3.00 and Worker B is paid $3.00 
 Worker A is paid $2.00 and Worker B is paid $4.00 
 Worker A is paid $1.00 and Worker B is paid $5.00 
 Worker A is paid $0.00 and Worker B is paid $6.00 
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E Sample characteristics millionaires by source of wealth 
Table 7: Sample characteristics millionaires by source of wealth 
 Total Inheritance Salary Own business 
Variable 
% of  
sample 
N % of  
sample 
N % of  
sample 
N % of  
sample 
N 
Female 29.61 304 41.91 136 28.85 104 22.39 134 
Age 61.37 
(12.50)a 
304 61.68 
(12.23)a 
136 62.00 
(12.56)a 
104 59.84 
(12.02)a 
134 
University 
degree 
64.47 304 62.50 136 70.19 104 56.72 134 
Income  253  119  88  113 
low (€0–€49,999) 15.02  23.53  10.23  12.39  
middle (€50,000–
€99,999) 
33.20  40.34  26.14  35.40  
high (more than 
€100,000) 
51.78  36.13  63.64  52.21  
Wealth  251  116  86  113 
low (€0–€1 
million) 
24.30  30.17  33.72  14.16  
middle (€1 
million–€5 
million) 
61.75  62.93  56.98  64.60  
high (more than 
€5 million) 
13.94  6.90  9.30  21.24  
High subjective 
social statusb 
94.81 289 92.25 129 96.04 101 96.85 127 
High prestige 
jobc 
69.78 139 56.14 57 77.50 40 77.33 75 
Employment 
statusd 
 304  45  28  49 
Own company 38.73  15.56  10.71  69.39  
Freelance 19.01  26.67  10.71  20.41  
Employee 42.25  57.78  78.57  10.20  
Notes: a Mean (standard deviation); b Answer > 50 to the question: “In our society, there 
are groups at the top and at the bottom of the income distribution. If 1 was the bottom 
and 100 the top, where would you put yourself on this scale?” (Dutch original question: 
„In onze samenleving zijn er groepen aan de bovenkant en onderkant van de 
inkomensverdeling. Als 1 de onderkant is en 100 de top van de schaal, waar zou u 
zichzelf plaatsen op die schaal?“); c Treiman’s Standard International Occupational 
Prestige Scale (SIOPS) (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996) score > 55. d Only working 
millionaires. The remaining answer categories are retired, houseman or -wife, and other. 
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F Analysis including five subjects who choose to redistribute 
more than half 
 
Spectators from both samples implement on average a higher degree of inequality in the 
MERIT than in the LUCK treatment (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: General population: 𝑧 =
−10.148, 𝑝 < .0001; Wealthy: 𝑧 = −11.600, 𝑝 < .0001). There is no difference in inequality 
acceptance across samples neither in the LUCK (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: 𝑧 = .563, 𝑝 =
.5735) nor in the MERIT treatment (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: 𝑧 = .287, 𝑝 = .7739). 
Table 8: Differences in redistributional attitudes 
 Political 
orientation 
Income 
inequality 
Wealth tax Income tax 
Mean outcome difference     
Coefficient –.9523 1.6666 .8224 .5019 
Standard error .2055 .1496 .0673 .0690 
P-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Implemented inequality     
Coefficient –.0023 –.0049  –.0006 .0004 
Standard error .0210 .0145 .0020 .0028 
P-value .913 .733 .768 .877 
Belief luck     
Coefficient –.0108 .0376 .0040 .0027 
Standard error .0184 .0234 .0064 .0052 
P-value .557 .108 .530 .612 
Belief hard work     
Coefficient –.1360 .0680 .0154 .0242 
Standard error .0518 .0311 .0126 .0148 
P-value .009 .029 .222 .102 
Total     
Coefficient –.1490 .1006 .0189 .0264 
Standard error .0613 .0420 .0150 .0169 
P-value .015 .016 .210 .117 
     
N 486 509 506 500 
Notes: Estimates of twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition including five subjects 
who choose to redistribute more than half with the nondiscriminatory coefficient 
vector  𝛽∗ being estimated from a pooled model with a group indicator (Jann, 2008). 
Implemented inequality, belief luck, and belief hard work refers to the contributions 
of these single predictors to the mean difference in each of the measures of subjects’ 
redistributional attitudes. Total refers to the part of the difference in a 
redistributional attitude that is due to observed differences in all three predictor 
variables. The total unexplained part is the difference between the mean outcome 
difference and the total of the explained part and is not displayed here. 
G OLS regressions: Redistributional attitudes 
In order to assess the differences in redistributional attitudes between millionaires and 
the general population parametrically we run the following OLS regression model: 
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𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 , (2) 
where  𝑎𝑖𝑗  is spectator i’s attitude toward each redistribution “policy” 𝑗 ∈
{𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑥, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥}, 𝑊𝑖 is an indicator taking 
the value of 1 if a subject is wealthy (i.e., from the millionaire sample), 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of 
individual background variables (age, gender, education), and 𝜖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error 
term.  
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H OLS regressions: Beliefs about success in life 
In order to assess the differences in beliefs between millionaires and the general 
population parametrically we run the following OLS regression model: 
𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 , (3) 
where  𝑏𝑖𝑗 is spectator i’s belief about the importance of each factor 𝑗 ∈ {𝑙𝑢𝑐𝑘, ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘}, 
𝑊𝑖 is an indicator taking the value of 1 if a subject is wealthy (i.e., from the millionaire 
sample), 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of individual background variables (age, gender, education), and 𝜖𝑖 
is the idiosyncratic error term.  
Table 10: Beliefs about success in life: OLS estimates 
 Hard 
work 
Luck Hard 
work 
Luck 
Wealthy 0.393*** –0.216* 0.488*** –0.366** 
 (0.102) (0.114) (0.127) (0.142) 
     
Male   –0.098 0.087 
   (0.105) (0.125) 
     
Age   –0.002 0.004 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
     
University   –0.115 0.169 
   (0.119) (0.136) 
     
Constant 5.686*** 5.481*** 5.837*** 5.200*** 
 (0.080) (0.086) (0.197) (0.220) 
N 513 512 513 512 
R2 0.028 0.007 0.033 0.014 
Notes: OLS estimates. University is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 of a spectator has a university degree. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. * 𝑝 < .10, ** 𝑝 < .05, *** 𝑝 < .01. 
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I Distribution of implemented inequality 
Figure 9: Distributions of implemented inequality 
 
Notes: Distributions of implemented inequality by treatment and sample. 
J OLS regressions: Preferences for redistribution 
In order to assess the differences in preferences for redistribution between millionaires 
and the general population parametrically we run the following regression models using 
OLS separately for each treatment: 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, (4) 
where 𝑒𝑖 is the income inequality implemented by spectator i, 𝑊𝑖 is an indicator variable 
for whether a spectator is wealthy (i.e., from the millionaire sample), 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of 
individual background variables (age, gender, education), and 𝜖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error 
term.  
We further run the following pooled OLS regression model: 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖 + 𝜆𝑀𝑖 + 𝜂𝑊𝑖𝑀𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, (5) 
where 𝑀𝑖  is an indicator variable for whether a spectator is in the MERIT treatment. 
Consequently, 𝜂 measures the difference in the treatment effect between the wealthy and 
the general population. 
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Table 11: Inequality acceptance: OLS estimates 
 Luck Merit Luck Merit Pooled 1 Pooled 2 
Wealthy 0.020 –0.039 0.041 –0.033 0.020 0.037 
 (0.023) (0.039) (0.037) (0.048) (0.023) (0.031) 
       
Merit     0.338*** 0.337*** 
     (0.036) (0.036) 
       
Merit # Wealthy     –0.058 –0.063 
     (0.045) (0.045) 
       
Male   0.055** 0.070*  0.063*** 
   (0.022) (0.039)  (0.021) 
       
Age   –0.000 0.002  0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
University   –0.048 –0.062  –0.056** 
   (0.035) (0.040)  (0.027) 
       
Constant 0.041*** 0.379*** 0.021 0.268*** 0.041*** –0.026 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.042) (0.068) (0.015) (0.042) 
N 255 256 255 256 511 511 
R2 0.002 0.004 0.029 0.032 0.281 0.299 
Notes: OLS estimates. Dependent variable: Implemented inequality. Column 2–5: Results 
of equation (4), columns 6–7: Results of equation (5). University is a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 of a spectator has a university degree. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * 
𝑝 < .10, ** 𝑝 < .05, *** 𝑝 < .01. 
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L Beliefs about success in life by source of wealth: OLS 
estimates 
We estimate the following OLS regression model:  
𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑠𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 , (6) 
where  𝑏𝑖𝑗 is spectator i’s belief about the importance of each factor 𝑗 ∈ {𝑙𝑢𝑐𝑘, ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘}, 
𝐼𝑖  is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a millionaire got rich through an 
inheritance, 𝑆𝑖 is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a millionaire got rich from 
her salary, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of individual background variables (age, gender, education), and 
𝜖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Table 13: Beliefs about success in life of millionaires:  
OLS estimates 
 Luck Hard 
work 
Luck Hard 
work 
Inheritance –0.097 –0.372** –0.050 –0.375** 
 (0.196) (0.155) (0.206) (0.163) 
     
Salary 0.068 –0.079 0.082 –0.063 
 (0.208) (0.182) (0.211) (0.184) 
     
Male   0.272 –0.058 
   (0.200) (0.164) 
     
Age   –0.001 –0.002 
   (0.006) (0.005) 
     
University   –0.005 –0.132 
   (0.179) (0.151) 
     
Constant 5.220*** 6.231*** 5.068*** 6.448*** 
 (0.144) (0.107) (0.434) (0.364) 
N 255 256 255 256 
R2 0.003 0.023 0.011 0.027 
Notes: OLS estimates. Independent variables are the source 
of wealth of millionaires. University is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 of a spectator has a university degree. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * 𝑝 < .10, ** 𝑝 < .05, 
*** 𝑝 < .01.. A series of F-tests confirms that heirs are not 
different from employees in the importance they attach to 
luck (𝐹(1,252) = .68, 𝑝 = .4113) or to hard work (𝐹(1,253) =
2.53, 𝑝 = .1127) (test results for regressions without control 
variables). 
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M Millionaires by source of wealth and treatment 
Table 14: Number of spectators from millionaire sample 
by source of wealth 
 Treatment 
Sample Luck Merit 
Inheritance 52 48 
Salary 32 34 
Business 43 48 
 
N Redistributional attitudes: by source of wealth: OLS estimates 
We estimate the following OLS regression model: 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑠𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 , (7) 
where  𝑎𝑖𝑙  is spectator i’s attitude toward each redistribution “policy” 𝑗 ∈
{𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑥, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥}, 𝐼𝑖 is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if a millionaire got rich through an inheritance, 𝑆𝑖 is an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 if a millionaire got rich from her salary, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of 
individual background variables (age, gender, education), and 𝜖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error 
term.  
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O Preferences for redistribution by source of wealth: OLS 
estimates 
 
We run the following regression models using OLS separately for each treatment: 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑠𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, (8) 
where ei is the income inequality implemented by spectator i, 𝐼𝑖 is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if a millionaire got rich through an inheritance, 𝑆𝑖 is an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 if a millionaire got rich from her salary, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of 
individual background variables (age, gender, education), and 𝜖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error 
term.  
Table 16: Inequality acceptance of millionaires  
by source of wealth: OLS estimates 
 Luck Merit Luck Merit 
Inheritance –0.083* –0.146*** –0.076 –0.143*** 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) 
     
Salary –0.046 –0.107* –0.046 –0.108* 
 (0.059) (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) 
     
Male   0.053 0.027 
   (0.037) (0.053) 
     
Age   0.000 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.002) 
     
University   –0.049 0.009 
   (0.046) (0.049) 
     
Constant 0.109** 0.431*** 0.098 0.313*** 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.119) (0.116) 
N 127 129 127 129 
R2 0.025 0.068 0.045 0.076 
Notes: OLS estimates. Dependent variable: implemented 
inequality. University is a dummy variable taking the value 1 of 
a spectator has a university degree. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. * 𝑝 < .10, ** 𝑝 < .05, *** 𝑝 < .01. A series of F-tests 
confirms that heirs are not different from employees in the LUCK 
(𝐹(1,124) = .74, 𝑝 = .3917) or the MERIT treatment (𝐹(1,126) =
.63, 𝑝 = .4276)  (test results for regressions without control 
variables).
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CHAPTER VI 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this thesis, I have investigated motives that drive people’s willingness to (re-) distribute 
income and wealth.  
In Chapter II–IV, I explored concerns for basic needs satisfaction as a motive for the 
distribution of income. In Chapter II, I showed that a non-negligible fraction of subjects 
cares for the satisfaction of basic needs. In my experiment with subjects from a student 
sample in Cologne (Germany), the motive can explain choices that cannot be explained by 
other established motives related to caring about the incomes of relatively poorer people 
in a society; maximin and generosity. Hence, I have established concerns for basic needs 
satisfaction as an important distinct distributional motive. Further, subjects are willing 
to sacrifice some of their own income, efficiency, and utility in terms of envy in order to 
satisfy additional basic needs. In addition, I showed that in choices in which concerns for 
basic needs satisfaction and maximin predict the same allocation, this allocation is chosen 
by a large percentage of subjects. Strong basic needs types are especially likely to choose 
this option. This highlights that in such situations basic needs satisfaction is another 
important driver next to maximin. This suggests that if basic needs satisfaction was 
ignored as a motive, we would ascribe behavior driven by this motive to maximin. Hence, 
in these situations, the prevalence of maximin would be overestimated if basic needs 
satisfaction was ignored as a behavioral motive. Furthermore, if subjects have to sacrifice 
more of their own income or the income of the worst-off person in order to satisfy needs, a 
substantial fraction of subjects still chooses to fulfill those needs. Finally, questionnaire 
results support the meaningfulness of subjects’ choices in the experiment, showing that 
subjects choosing in line with basic needs satisfaction, maximin, or selfishness indeed took 
their decisions based on these concerns. 
In Chapter III, I demonstrated that concerns for basic needs satisfaction are likewise 
important in a setting in which the fulfillment of basic needs is actually at stake. In this 
experiment, subjects from the general population in Tbilisi (Georgia) are deciding about 
actual monthly incomes. In other words, the dictator and the receivers will, in the month 
of the experiment, have the income amounts depicted in an allocation chosen by the 
dictator. This entails that dictators can actually satisfy basic needs of genuine persons 
who are living with an income below the basic needs threshold in their everyday lives. 
Results from additional choices revealed that the basic needs option is not simply chosen 
because there are fewer persons below the threshold. Instead, subjects (also) care – as 
proposed in the theoretical formulation of the motive in Chapter II – for the sum of 
unfulfilled needs. Moreover, the extent to which subjects display concerns for basic needs 
satisfaction is related to helping a needy receiver in a different choice setting. Finally, a 
heterogeneity analysis revealed that females care more strongly for the fulfillment of basic 
needs, while there is no relation of the motive to age or income. 
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In Chapter IV, I observed that if there is a minimal strategic incentive to satisfy needs 
in order to ensure the survival of the receiver in the game, the prevalence of behavior in 
line with concerns for basic needs satisfaction increases substantially. Even subjects 
displaying a considerable amount of self-interest in the choice experiment, choose to 
satisfy the receiver’s need – and by this give up half of the amount that they can distribute 
– in the need game. Given that these results cannot be explained by risk aversion or beliefs 
about other dictators’ giving behavior, I concluded that the salience of group survival 
might have triggered dictators’ desire to fulfill receivers’ needs. I further remarked that 
this is consistent with the notion that human beings are predisposed to act in accordance 
with the motive in situations in which it is evolutionarily important. 
Altogether, these findings suggest that the motive of basic needs satisfaction is an 
important consideration in the distribution of incomes. I have shown that the motive is a 
behavioral driving force in distributional decisions across different incentive structures 
and subject pools. These experiments constitute, to the best of my knowledge, the first 
attempt to provide clean evidence on the existence of concerns for basic needs satisfaction, 
by disentangling the motive from other important distributional concerns related to caring 
for poorer persons, such as maximin, in an incentive compatible way.  
The knowledge about people’s distributional motives can be informative for the design 
and acceptance of social security systems. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) note that 
fairness considerations can influence, for example, the perceived fairness of tax systems 
as mechanisms for implementing redistributive policies. This, in turn, can have severe 
impacts on the acceptance of these systems and, thereby, ultimately of the political regime. 
Barth et al. (2013), for example, show that people’s fairness concerns are related to the 
probability of justifying and actually engaging in tax evasion. The fact that the fulfillment 
of basic needs matters alongside other motives has relevant implications for policy. In 
discussions about the optimal design of redistributive policies, people with different 
motives for redistribution are likely not only to hold different positions, but also to discuss 
about different things. When arguing about redistribution, advocates of maximin will be 
concerned with how, for example, incomes, wealth, and education possibilities can be 
equalized in a society. For this purpose, they might also consider raising taxes from the 
very rich, but not from those with incomes below the mean, in order to further equalize 
incomes. On the contrary, proponents of basic needs fulfillment will discuss about securing 
means of subsistence for the needy and would raise taxes from all those with incomes 
above the basic needs threshold. They might regard an adequate amount of social security 
benefits and a more extensive public funding of, for example, education and basic health 
care and infrastructure as valuable policy instruments for redistribution, but might at the 
same time object to redistribution of income beyond the basic needs threshold. 
Understanding people’s distributional motivations can therefore have important 
implications for the design, extent, and acceptance of different kinds of redistributive 
policies and for structuring the political debate. My findings are a first step towards 
understanding the importance of basic needs satisfaction as an individual concern for the 
distribution of incomes in a society. 
As already addressed in Chapter II (Section 2.4.1), the estimated prevalence of 
concerns for basic needs satisfaction in the choice experiment is likely to be a rather 
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conservative estimate.171 First, if maximin is taken seriously, it would call for income 
transfers until income equality is achieved. It is questionable whether subjects choosing 
(repeatedly) in line with maximin in my experiment would go as far as to promote total 
equality or at least a large amount of unconditional redistribution. It is more likely that 
at least some choices in line with maximin are potentially driven by a desire to fulfill the 
needs of the poorest person. A subject choosing the maximin option simply gives priority 
to the “needier” person at the expense of the sum of unfulfilled basic needs. Hence, it might 
be that a part of subjects choosing in line with maximin in the experiment are motivated 
by ensuring basic needs fulfillment, but with a different utility term for the latter (Weiss 
et al., 2017). Second, when decisions affect the ‘survival’ of a fellow subject – and 
ultimately also of the group – then BNS becomes a lot stronger. Of the same subjects of 
whom, on average, 17 percent choose the basic needs option in the choice experiment of 
Chapter II, almost 50 percent of dictators give up half of their endowment if this ensures 
the receiver’s survival to the next round in the need game of Chapter IV.172 Even subjects 
choosing selfishly before, now decide to help a needy person, which is consistent with the 
notion that people are motivated by different concerns and that behavior in line with these 
concerns is context dependent (Konow, 2001). Third, in the student sample in Tbilisi, in 
which participants knew the group of potential receivers, we saw that concerns for basic 
needs satisfaction are extremely strong (see Chapter II, Section 2.4.2). Given its 
implications for social policy, its potential crucial significance as a behavioral driver and 
the relatively modest attention it has received in the economics literature so far, it is thus 
important to further investigate the motive.  
In Section 4.4 of Chapter IV, I made a proposition for a one-shot need game that can 
serve as a workhorse experiment for future research on the motive. In the following, I 
provide an outlook of how the game can be used for this purpose, exploring the propositions 
put forward at the end of Chapter IV. This research can help to further assess the 
significance of the motive, its impact on economic outcomes such as efficiency, and how its 
application relates to important factors such as a person’s responsibility for being in need.   
With respect to a person’s responsibility for being in need, I will focus on two main 
cases. A person can be responsible for being in need because she made a risky choice or 
because she exerted too little effort to avoid her dire situation. The first case can be 
modeled in the need game by introducing a lottery choice to determine the endowment of 
the receiver. In particular, the receiver is presented with a choice between a safe amount 
that guarantees need fulfillment and a lottery with an amount lower than the threshold 
as the unlucky outcome, and an amount a lot higher than the threshold and the safe 
amount as the lucky outcome. If the receiver chooses the risky choice and is unlucky, she 
can thus be held responsible for the fact of being in need (see Cappelen et al., 2013a). The 
second case gets at the trade-off between equity or merit and need and can be incorporated 
into the need game by varying the source of the endowment in the style of Frohlich et al. 
(2004). In one treatment, the endowment is provided by the experimenter as manna from 
                                            
171  The estimated prevalence additionally relies on the theoretical formulation of the motive (see 
Chapter II, Section 2.2 and 2.4.1). 
172  I consider subjects assigned the role of the dictator in the need game. 
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heaven. In a second treatment, the endowment is allocated to subjects based on 
performance in a real effort task. In this treatment, it is thus again a receiver’s 
responsibility if her initial endowment is lower than the threshold. 
It is important to investigate the influence of these two types of responsibilities for 
being in need on an individual’s willingness to fulfill these needs, since they relate to 
redistribution policies in the field. In a society with high needs-based redistribution, 
people’s willingness to incur the costs for this redistribution is crucial for social cohesion. 
This willingness is, in turn, likely to depend on their propensity to take into account 
individual responsibility for being in need. A person’s willingness to incur costs to fulfill 
basic needs might be reduced when the person in need is responsible for her dire situation. 
Firstly, being in need due to a risky decision can be related to situations in which people 
suffer from health problems that are a direct consequence from hazardous behavior, like 
heavy drinking, or pursuing extreme sports. The societal costs of alcoholism alone are 
estimated to sum up to 27 billion Euros per year (Hinz, 2010). People’s willingness to incur 
these costs in cases in which the affected individuals are (at least partly) responsible for 
the emergence of these costs, therefore, deserves empirical attention. Secondly, the 
relative importance of merit and need claims is relevant for assessing people’s support for 
the redistribution of incomes in the field. In a market economy, a person’s pre-tax work 
income is typically based on her productive contribution, i.e., on meritocratic grounds. It 
is a stable finding in the experimental economics literature that people generally like to 
give people the fruits of their productivity (e.g., Frohlich et al., 2004; Cappelen et al., 2007; 
Almås et al., 2017). Depending on the size of the (welfare) state, these incomes are taxed 
and a part of these taxes are spent on redistributive purposes. Redistribution, in turn, is 
based to a large extent on ensuring people’s basic necessities (see Section 2.1 in Chapter 
II). In other words, in these types of welfare states, people are currently paying to cover 
the basic necessities for those, whose income is not high enough to do this by themselves. 
It is therefore an important question, how people trade off the fulfillment of needs against 
meritocratic claims.173 
With respect to the relation between needs fulfillment and efficiency, an important 
question is whether an institutionalized guarantee of basic needs fulfillment entails 
efficiency losses. Okun (1975) postulated that there is a trade-off between redistribution 
and efficiency, since the former undermines individuals’ motivation to exert effort.174 This 
is especially the case if the rule on which redistribution is based, is perceived as unjust. It 
is an interesting question whether the relation between redistribution and efficiency 
depends on the rule upon which the latter rests, i.e., whether the relationship is different 
                                            
173  Cappelen et al. (2013b) show that when subjects have to trade off entitlements against need 
considerations, both motives are important. In their design, however, the possibility of need 
considerations is introduced by letting subjects of rich countries play with participants from 
poor countries. This relies on the assumption that subjects from the poor countries are indeed 
viewed as needy. This is not unproblematic, since subjects are all students, i.e., individuals 
who are typically not deprived of their basic needs even in poor countries. 
174  See, for example Andersen and Maibom (2016), for a recent analysis of this trade-off using data 
on 34 OECD countries. 
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if the primary goal of redistribution is the satisfaction of basic needs as opposed to 
reducing general inequality. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) implement an experiment 
in which a tax system redistributes participants’ earnings above a certain floor level to 
those who did not manage to reach this minimum.175 They find that subjects’ overall 
productivity even increases when experiencing redistribution through such a tax 
system.176 The remarkable finding is that this is the case for beneficiaries, as well as net 
tax payers. In the light of the present thesis, it is important to investigate whether these 
results extend to the experimental setup of the need game in which falling short of the 
threshold has real consequences for subjects. I further propose to explore whether the 
positive effect of redistribution also holds under an alternative rule for redistributing the 
earnings, for example, achieving a certain degree of income equality. For this purpose, the 
need game with a production phase could be augmented by an additional redistribution 
phase in which earnings are redistributed according to the respective rule. This research 
could be a brick for designing optimal redistribution policies while at the same time 
minimizing adverse incentive effects. 
Finally, the need game can be used to dig deeper into how exactly individuals take into 
account needs fulfillment in distributional decisions in order to inform theoretical 
formulation of the motive (see Chapter II, Section 2.2; Siebel, 2017; Traub et al., 2017). An 
important issue is whether and to what extent individuals are concerned with the overall 
amount of unfulfilled basic needs, and/or the number of persons falling below the 
threshold. In a first attempt in this direction, I showed in Chapter IV that people do not 
only care for the number of persons lifted above the threshold, but also for the overall 
amount of unfulfilled needs. As a next step, I propose to systematically vary the number 
of persons in need and the amount of unfulfilled needs in order to explore the relative 
importance of these two factors. Another related question is whether individuals care more 
generally for the distribution of unfulfilled needs, which is especially relevant in situations 
of resource scarcity. Do they have a preference for equal relative needs fulfillment as 
suggested by Siebel (2017), or do they give priority to a needy person who lacks fewer 
resources in order to reach the threshold over another needy person who lacks more 
resources, as could be derived from Weiss et al. (2017)? Or do they, alternatively, give 
                                            
175  In the experiment, subjects get paid according to their performance in a real effort task. 
Subjects who earn more than a certain floor level get taxed. This money is assigned to subjects 
who earned less than this minimum. Thus, the height of the tax depends on the task 
performance of the least productive members of the group. The experiment is played for three 
rounds. Before this stage of the experiment, they let subjects rank four principles of 
distributive justice after briefly introducing those principles. This ranking does not have any 
consequences for their payoffs. The principles are maximizing either the floor or the average 
income, the average with a floor, or the average with a range constraint. The floor is defined 
as income of the least well-off individual. The principle of maximizing the average with a floor 
constraint “ensure(s) that individuals ‘at the bottom’ receive a specific minimum” (Frohlich 
and Oppenheimer, 1992, p. 36). They find that roughly 57 percent of the subjects ranked this 
principle as first. 
176  Note that they find this effect only in treatments in which the principle was adopted in a 
democratic process. 
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priority to a poorer needy person? This issue also relates to the above mentioned possibility 
that part of behavior in line with maximin in the choice experiments of Chapter II and III 
might actually be motivated by a desire to help the person with the highest needs. 
In Chapter V, I showed that in terms of preferences to level income differences that 
stem from luck, or individual effort, the wealthy are not different from people from the 
general population in my study. They do, however, have different beliefs about the 
importance of hard work for success in life. I showed that this difference in beliefs partly 
explains differences in attitudes towards redistribution. Millionaires believe that hard 
work is crucial for determining earnings in the field and are therefore less willing to 
redistribute those earnings. People from the general population, however, attach less 
importance to hard work in determining these earnings and are therefore less reluctant 
to redistributing part of these very earnings. I have thus identified one explaining factor 
for the differences in support for redistribution in the field between those with potentially 
high political power and the average citizen. 
This chapter shows that while it is important to investigate (re-)distributional concerns 
of the general population, it is also crucial to look at the preferences of those groups in 
society with a disproportionate policy impact (Fisman et al., 2015). Even though this might 
not be desirable in a democracy, one cannot neglect the fact that the very wealthy have 
disproportionate power to enforce their political ideas. The global trend towards even 
higher inequality of wealth and income is seen as a threat to social order (Alvaredo et al., 
2017b). In order to fight this trend by any political means, knowledge about what drives 
support for redistribution of the wealthy is therefore indispensable. 
One interpretation of my findings is that the rich are actually less in favor of 
redistribution because they believe more strongly in the importance of individual effort for 
determining the very earnings that are to be redistributed. In other words, they might 
believe that other members of the society have a lower income because they are lazy. This 
means that – provided that the rich assign too much responsibility to individual effort – 
one way of increasing their willingness to redistribute is to raise awareness that 
differences in earnings are to a large part also determined by luck. One possibility could 
be, for example, to provide them with information about actual social mobility or equality 
of opportunities in their society. This could increase, for example, tax honesty, which is 
found to be particularly low among the rich (Alstadsæter et al., 2017). If the low 
importance attached to luck is – as suggested by my results – driven by a desire to develop 
a narrative in order to maintain a positive self-image, millionaires might, however, be 
reluctant to give up this belief. 
Relating the two main parts of this thesis, Chapter V revealed that beliefs about 
determinants for success in life can mediate how preferences for redistribution translate 
into support for redistribution in the field. These beliefs might also influence support for 
redistributive policies aimed at securing basic needs fulfillment. A person who strongly 
believes that hard work is important for success in life is also likely to believe that someone 
who is unsuccessful did not work hard; in other words, that someone who is poor is 
responsible for her dire situation. As a consequence, an individual who, as in the example 
of Chapter V (Section 5.1), is not willing to redistribute income that was generated through 
individual effort, might take into account a person’s responsibility for being in need. She 
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might thus be reluctant to satisfy needs of a person who could have provided for herself if 
she had exerted more effort. This view corresponds to German social security legislation 
in SGB XII that permits benefit cuts if a beneficiary does not comply with her duties to 
take up work (§39a SGB XII). In contrast, the idea of an unconditional basic income does 
not tie this income to any individual responsibility of providing individual effort in order 
to earn this income. Instead, the satisfaction of basic needs is viewed as a basic human 
right (Werner, 2018). This also reflects the idea behind the formulation of the principle in 
Chapter II (Section 2.2) of this thesis that everybody has an equal right to satisfy her basic 
human needs (Shue, 1996) and of basic needs fulfillment as having priority even in cases 
in which a person has full responsibility over her misfortune (Fleurbaey, 1995). 
Drawing on Chapter II to IV and possible extensions described in the present chapter, 
an important question is thus whether the relevance of individual responsibility also 
extends to the satisfaction of basic needs. If a person is reluctant to redistribute income 
that was generated by individual effort from a richer to a poorer person – even if the latter 
would be, without redistribution, be deprived of her basic needs – then her beliefs about 
individual responsibility can potentially play a role. This can help to structure policy 
discussions about the introduction of a universal basic income to replace current transfer 
systems. The former is ultimately an expression of society’s acknowledgement of basic 
needs fulfillment as a basic right that arises merely from being a member of this society 
and is thus independent from any individual merit. 
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Valorization addendum 
In Chapter II–IV, I showed that concerns for basic needs satisfaction are an 
important consideration in the distribution of incomes across different incentive 
structures and subject pools. By disentangling the motive from other established motives 
related to caring about the incomes of relatively poorer people in a society – maximin and 
generosity – I have established concerns for basic needs satisfaction as a distinct 
distributional motive. I further showed that subjects are willing to sacrifice some of their 
own income, efficiency, and utility in terms of envy in order to satisfy additional basic 
needs. 
In Chapter II, I showed that in choices in which concerns for basic needs 
satisfaction and maximin predict the same allocation, basic needs satisfaction is another 
important driver next to maximin. This suggests that the prevalence of maximin would be 
overestimated if basic needs satisfaction was ignored as a behavioral motive. Results of 
Chapter III revealed that subjects (also) care – as proposed in the theoretical formulation 
of the motive in Chapter II – for the sum of unfulfilled needs. Finally, a heterogeneity 
analysis revealed that women care more strongly for the fulfillment of basic needs, while 
there is no relation of the motive to age or income. Chapter IV indicated that under a 
minimal strategic incentive to ensure the survival of the receiver in the game, the 
prevalence of behavior in line with concerns for basic needs satisfaction increases 
substantially and even otherwise selfish subjects satisfy the receiver’s needs. Additional 
analyses suggest that the salience of group survival might have triggered dictators’ desire 
to fulfill receivers’ needs which is consistent with the notion that human beings are 
predisposed to act in accordance with the motive in situations in which it is evolutionarily 
important. 
My findings of Chapter II to IV of this thesis can be useful both for academic 
purposes as well as for public policy. With respect to academia, my results can inform a 
normative theory of needs-based justice. The formulation of such a theory that is informed 
by research on individual distributional motives is, for example, aspired by the DFG 
research group “FOR2104: Needs-based justice and distributional procedures”. 177  For 
public policy, the knowledge about people’s concerns for the fulfillment of basic needs as 
opposed to other distributional motives related to caring about poorer persons in society 
can be informative for the design and acceptance of social security systems. As elaborated 
on in Chapter VI, in discussions about the optimal design of redistributive policies, people 
with different motives for redistribution are likely not only to hold different positions, but 
also to discuss about different things. Understanding people’s distributional motivations 
can thus help to structure the political debate and inform policy makers about the optimal 
design of redistributive policies, especially those targeted at the poorest members of 
society, and by this help create acceptance of these policies.  
It should, however, be kept in mind that it is not advisable to directly apply my 
findings to public policy. Before this can be done, much more research on the motive of 
                                            
177  Original title in German „Bedarfsgerechtigkeit und Verteilungsprozeduren“. 
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basic needs satisfaction is necessary. This includes, for example, the question whether the 
application of the motive is unconditional or depends on the recipients characteristics such 
as individual responsibility, or on characteristics of the preference holder such as her 
gender, age, and income (as examined in Chapter III), or her cultural background, the 
(subjective) probability of becoming a recipient herself, and the features of the social 
security system in the country she lives in. As becomes clear, the findings of this thesis 
are just a first step towards understanding the importance of basic needs satisfaction as 
an individual concern for the distribution of incomes in a society. 
In Chapter V, I showed that differences in the importance of hard work for success 
in life between the wealthy and people from the general population partly explains 
differences in attitudes towards redistribution. Millionaires believe that hard work is 
crucial for determining earnings and are therefore less willing to redistribute those 
earnings. These findings are important for academia, since they show that it is crucial to 
investigate (re-)distributional attitudes, preferences, and beliefs of those groups in society 
with a disproportionate policy impact, as they might differ from those of the general 
population. Scholars should thus consider these groups regularly as subjects for their 
empirical research. With respect to the relevance for public policy, especially for state 
redistribution, knowledge about what drives support for redistribution of the wealthy is 
indispensable. If policy makers want to fight rising inequality by increasing state 
redistribution from the rich to the poor, they can tackle the beliefs of the wealthy about 
what drives inequalities in society. Provided that the rich assign too much responsibility 
to individual effort, one way of increasing their willingness to redistribute is to raise 
awareness that differences in earnings are to a large part determined by luck. One 
possibility could be, for example, to provide them with information about actual social 
mobility or equality of opportunities in their society. This could increment their support 
for redistribution as expressed, for example, in increased tax honesty. If the low 
importance attached to luck is – as suggested by my results – driven by a desire to develop 
a narrative in order to maintain a positive self-image, millionaires might, however, be 
reluctant to give up this belief. Correcting possibly false beliefs that lead to certain 
revealed preferences is further ethically less problematic than directly intervening in 
people’s preferences and trying to manipulate their likes and dislikes. 
In the current times of digitalization and automatization, wealth is created by a 
decreasing number of people, as an increasing number of jobs and operations can be 
carried out by machines. In light of this, mechanisms to redistribute this wealth – 
especially in order to ensure basic necessities – become more important. As a result, 
knowledge on people’s (re-)distributive fairness concerns gains increasing significance in 
order to design redistributive policies that are viewed as fair and thereby promote social 
cohesion. 
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